<? :£ 




LEE'S INVASION 
OF NORTHWEST VIRGINIA 



LEE'S INVASION 

OF NORTHWEST VIRGINIA 

IN 1861 



BY 

GRANVILLE DAVISSON HALL 



Falstaff — I will not lend thee a penny. 
Pistol— Why, then the world's mine oyster 
which I with sword will open. 

MERRY WIVES OF WINDSOR. 



Sir Andrew — Plague on't! an' I thought he 
had been valiant and so cunning in fence, 
I'd have seen him damned ere I'd have 
challenged him. 

TWELFTH NIGHT. 



19 11 






Copyright, 1911 

^ by 
Granville Davisson Hall 






§ 



Press of 

The Mayer & Miller Company 

525 S. Dearborn Street 

Chicago 



©CI.A297096 



CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

Reconnoissant 9 

Virginia in Revolt a Hundred Years Ago. ... 17 

Civil Preliminaries in 1861 26 

The Military Initiative 31 

Organizing Rebellion in the Northwest 32 

Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Bridges Burned. . 43 

Porterfield 's Retreat to Philippi 48 

Surprise and Capture of Philippi 52 

Lee Sends Garnett to Meet the Union Ad- 
vance 63 

McClellan's Advance on Rich Mountain. ... 70 
Battle of Rich Mountain — Official Reports 77 
Rosecrans' Statement Before Committee of 

Congress 90 

Retreat and Death of Gen. Garnett 101 

Pegram's Retreat and Surrender 110 

Resume 122 

Lee's Final Failure to Get Through the 

Mountains 129 

McClellan's Abandonment of the Kanawha 

Valley 141 

The Campaign Reviewed by Col. Porterfield. . 151 
The Story of a West Virginia Scout 157 



RECONNOISSANT. 

Fifty years after the event, there are signs of a re- 
nascent literature dealing with the southern rebellion, 
which apologists for that attempt at national homicide 
prefer to describe as the "War between the States." 
In this semi-centennial year, the American citizen may 
well suspend his mad pursuit after the almighty dol- 
lar and take a few minutes off to recall the events 
and portents which a half century ago darkened the 
western hemisphere. This slender volume is a modest 
attempt to trace the salient features of a single epi- 
sode in the great tragic story; the opening chapter 
in a volume whose "finis" no man could then fore- 
cast. 

The sole attempt to justify the rebellion in its 
initial stage was the protest against "coercion." This 
was simply a demand by the conspirators, who had 
seized the machinery of all the Southern state gov- 
ernments, that the lawful authority of the nation 
should not interfere with their plans or pleasure in 
the trifling matter of upsetting the United States 
government. Yet when the next stage had been 
reached, coercion was the first weapon drawn in Vir- 
ginia against every citizen who resisted the usurpa- 
tion which had seized the Commonwealth. It was 
first employed in the State capital to compel a sover- 
eign convention to pass an ordinance of secession 
against the expressed will of two-thirds of the voters 
of Virginia. 

Lee's invasion of Northwest Virginia was an at- 
tempt to apply the same argument to the loyal people 

9 



]0 Lee's Invasion op Northwest Virginia 

west of the Allegheny mountains, whose representa- 
tives had been "coerced" in the Convention; to sil- 
ence them by military terrorism, as their fellow-loy- 
alists had been silenced in the East. It was the first 
blow in a war forced between neighbors and brethren 
who had no quarrel of their own. 

The men used for this purpose were drawn chiefly 
from the Shenandoah Valley ; and there is nothing in 
evidence to show that they had much heart in the 
work. In the earlier Virginia, The Valley had stood 
shoulder to shoulder with the West in a fight against 
the discrimination and injustice of the Tidewater, 
demanding larger citizenship and equal taxation. 
For these they had unitedly fought a battle which 
went back to the beginning of the century; had com- 
bined in popular conventions at Winchester and 
Staunton, the last of which, held in 1825, had sat as 
a deliberative body and formulated demands so force- 
ful that they led to the assembling of the State Con- 
vention of 1829-30; and this proving barren of re- 
sults, had renewed the struggle later in the Conven- 
tion of 1850-51. In the crisis of 1861, the men of 
the Valley were little behind their western brothers 
in devotion to the Union; but under pressure of a 
deep-laid and adroit conspiracy and later military 
terrorism, they were forced, "like dumb-driven cat- 
tle," into a rebellion which the great majority of 
them abhorred. 

Virginia was not the only one of the seceding States 
in which a majority of the people were friendly to 
the government. If there could have been throughout 
the South in the autumn of 1860 a plebiscite on the 
issue of secession even as free as the vote in Virginia 



Reconnoissant 1 1 

in February, 1861, on that issue in the guise of 
"Reference," it would have shown a very large ele- 
ment in those States who did not want secession. But 
in the States farther south, even more than in Vir- 
ginia, public opinion was controlled by a violent min- 
ority, and the timid well-intentioned citizens shrank 
from an avowal of opinion or sentiment sure to sub- 
ject them to denunciation. So that an unconstrained 
vote in the Coast States expressive of the real senti- 
ments of the people there was then — and had been 
for many years — impossible. 

It was part of the original Confederate plan to 
overrun and hold all Virginia to the Ohio river. The 
execution of this was entrusted to Gen. Lee. The 
failure of the scheme was signal. The struggle lasted 
only a few months, but it was sufficient. For while, 
after this first campaign, there were raids to obtain 
supplies and guerrilla warfare in some counties, there 
was never serious danger of the subjugation of West- 
ern Virginia by the Confederacy. 

Gen. Lee did not win any laurels in the Northwest. 
The forces he threw across the mountains were driven 
back. When, after the defeat and death of Gen. 
Garnett, he took personal command and made an at- 
tack on Reynolds at Cheat Mountain, he failed ; failed 
again at Elkwater ; failed the third time when he tried 
to launch Floyd through the mountain passes of the 
Gauley and upper Kanawha. Lee's renown was won 
in defensive war, fighting on the inner and shorter 
lines, on familiar ground. His genius was Fabian, 
not Napoleonic. He gained no fame in purely ag- 
gressive war. To his complete failure in Western 
Virginia was added his discomfiture when, after two 



12 Lee's Invasion op Northwest Virginia 

years experience, he undertook to carry the war into 
Pennsylvania. 

Following the failure of the Rebellion, the South 
needed a hero. Jefferson Davis did not quite fill the 
bill. In Virginia, at least, Gen. Lee has taken the 
place, though it must be added that Stonewall Jack- 
son is a strong claimant in the popular mind. 

The real ground for the exalted esteem in which 
Lee is held in Virginia is probably not so much his 
military achievements as his lovable personality and 
the modest demeanor which colored his later life. 
He was a man not only of fine social culture but of 
brains and scholarship. When, as an army officer, 
after careful deliberation, he deserted his standard 
and put himself in the front of the organized war 
for its overthrow, he clearly understood what he was 
risking. He was putting to the touch not only life 
and fortune, but his future place in world history. 
If he should win, he would be an illustrious patriot. 
If he failed, he knew he would be entitled to the 
reward all history accords to traitors. He had Bene- 
dict Arnold before him as an example. When the 
end came, Lee had the sagacity to understand that 
under the unprecedented magnanimity of the govern- 
ment, there was nothing for him but silence, submis- 
sion and a humility becoming one who had been the 
instrument of irremediable injury to the people he 
loved. 

To men who attempt great crimes and fail, the world 
is more charitable than they deserve. We may all, 
however, do justice to the personal virtues of Gen- 
eral Lee without condoning the irreparable wrong 
done by him in turning his sword against the govern- 



Reconnoissant 13 

raent which had bred and fed and trusted him ; which 
had never, in the weight of a feather, wronged him 
or his people ; which, indeed, had been their faith- 
ful and obedient servant from its foundation down 
to the hour when they assailed it. 

"0, Liberty," quoth Madam Roland, standing at 
the foot of the guillotine, ' ' what crimes are committed 
in thy name ! ' ' So, in the name of patriotism men 
have lent themselves to great wrongs. But in time 
the inexorable truth vindicates itself, and the real 
crimes of history are pilloried in the impartial ver- 
dicts of mankind. The American Rebellion, judged 
by the motives which inspired it and by the lack of 
justifying reasons, will take its place in the catalogue 
of indefensible crimes. Even out of these, it does ap- 
pear, good is educed, and 

"Ever the right comes uppermost, 
And ever is justice done." 

The invasion of Northwest Virginia was a mistake 
— a part of that tremendous mistake which began with 
the firing on Sumter. In moral relations, there are 
many proofs of error; in military dialectics, there 
needs be only one — failure. No less able an adviser 
than George W. Summers warned the Richmond 
junta against it. Governor Letcher lent himself to it, 
yet had his doubts. Colonel Porterfield, in a letter 
printed between these covers, admits the error. It 
is not unlikely some of the eminent Western Virginia 
statesmen then exiled in Richmond exercised an un- 
due influence in pressing the enterprise, more for 
personal than for military reasons. 



14: Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 

The facts recited in this narration are derived 
chiefly from the official publication known as the 
' ' Rebellion Record. ' ' The endeavor has been to bring 
them into chronological and related order, so as to 
make a consecutive story. From this remark is ex- 
cluded (of course) General Rosecrans' statements 
before the joint committee of Congress on the Con- 
duct of the War, the "Story of a Scout," also the 
preliminary chapter on the mutinous conditions in 
Virginia at the close of the Eighteenth Century, when 
Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr were organizing 
for the overthrow of the Federal Party — or of the 
Federal Government. This is an incident in Virginia 
annals little known to the present generation. The 
reader may find it an interesting parallel to the 
preparations in Virginia, with similar purpose, in 
1860 and 1861. 

No connected story of this campaign has ever be- 
fore been printed. The present essay does not claim 
to be exhaustive of even the brief time and limited 
territory covered by it. A compilation of this kind 
of necessity omits much which lends interest to his- 
torical narration. This lack is in some measure 
compensated by the authenticity of what is given, 
comprising the controlling events which enter into the 
historical movement. 

An acceptable addition to the official record is 
some pertinent comment on the campaign and its 
crowning event — the battle of Rich Mountain — 
written by Col. George A. Porterfield, of Charles 
Town, West Virginia. This appears in his letters ap- 
pended to the narrative. These shed the light of ap- 
posite criticism just where it seems to be due. 



Reconnoissant 15 

The military operations in Northwest Virginia 
quickly following the investment of Gen. Lee with 
command, developed the first serious collision between 
Northern and Southern armies in the field. Com- 
pared with later movements, this campaign is a minor 
event. Yet it was not without consequences, imme- 
diate and remote. It gave the first shock to the the- 
ory then prevalent in the South that Northern men 
would not stand up on the martial field before the 
superior gentlemen of that section. It proved that 
courage, endurance and military skill were not the ex- 
clusive possession of those bred upon a servile soil. 
It furnished a commander for the army upon whom 
depended the defense of the national capital. Out of 
this grew weighty consequences, military and political. 
It resulted also in the exemption of Northwest Vir- 
ginia from further military attack and the security 
throughout the war of Ohio, eastern Kentucky and 
western Pennsylvania. Not least important, it made 
easy the restoration of civil government in Virginia, 
followed by the creation of a separate State west of 
the Alleghenies — an event far-reaching and momen- 
tous in the sequel — which, in the words of Abraham 
Lincoln, "turned that much slave soil into free and 
consummated an irrevocable encroachment upon the 
cause of the Rebellion." 

Olencoe, Illinois, March, 1911. 



VIRGINIA IN REVOLT MORE THAN A HUN- 
DRED YEARS AGO. 

More than sixty years prior to the Rebellion in 
1861, Virginia was on the verge of open revolt against 
the United States. She had ratified the constitution; 
but there had been a dissentient element — consider- 
able and influential — which, under the stimulation of 
Mr. Jefferson's scarcely disguised hostility to the 
Federal leaders, had steadily through the years waxed 
in bitterness. 

This country has long been accustomed to regard 
South Carolina as the most disaffected of the States; 
yet inexorable facts entitle Virginia to dispute this 
unenviable eminence. Her action in sending a statue 
of Gen. Lee to the National Hall of Fame does her no 
credit. That hall is supposed to be the valhalla where 
the fame of the great and good citizens of the Republic 
is to ripen through the ages and furnish inspiring ex- 
amples to the youth of rising generations. For Vir- 
ginia to place there the figure of one whose sole claim 
to distinction is that he betrayed the government 
which had educated and cherished him, and tried to 
tear down the fabric of civil liberty Virginia's own 
illustrious citizens had builded in an earlier age — 
men whose names and work are revered all over the 
civilized world — is an offense against the patriotism 
of the country and a slur upon such names as AVash- 
ington, Madison, George Mason and John Marshall. 
It indicates that Virginia has learned little from her 
costly and bloody experience. 

17 



18 Lee's Invasion op Northwest Virginia 

When President Washington neared the close of 
his second term, he acquainted Mr. Jefferson with his 
determination not to be a candidate for a third. 
Mr. Jefferson, believing this opened the presidential 
field to him, became still more industrious than he 
had been in sowing the seed of dissension; more 
censorious and demonstrative in his hostility towards 
the Federal leaders; to whom he imputed a design to 
subvert the republic and establish a monarchy. Despite 
this covert but widely spread detraction, it failed to 
give him the coveted place when Washington's suc- 
cessor was chosen in 1796. John Adams was elected 
President, and the Virginia statesman had to be con- 
tent with second place. For a time, there was an ap- 
parent truce. It was only apparent. A still-hunt 
went on ; and the opposition party, calling itself ' ' Re- 
publican, " waxed in strength and in rancor under 
the special culture of Mr. Jefferson in Virginia and 
Aaron Burr in New York. 

The attitude of the French Revolutionary govern- 
ment greatly embarrassed Mr. Adams ' administration, 
as it had embarrassed that of Washington. French 
emissaries in the United States commited lawless acts 
which threatened international complications. Their 
conduct became so insolent and offensive as to force 
the enactment of what were called the alien and sedi- 
tion laws. This legislation was used by the anti-ad- 
ministration party to add fuel to the "Republican" 
flame. On the authority of the secret despatches of 
the French minister, Fauchet, it is stated that the 
French government had information upon which it 
imputed to the Jeffersonian party the design of caus- 
ing a general explosion of revolt to subvert the 
United States government. 



Virginia in Revolt 19 

Mr. Jefferson had been sent to France as pleni- 
potentiary at a time when the French revolution was 
in embryo. He witnessed the assembling of the States- 
General. He was consulted, on the one hand, by the 
ministers of Louis XVI and, on the other, by popular 
leaders like Bailey and Mirabeau. He came home 
in 1789 to take the post of Secretary of State in 
Washington's cabinet, deeply imbued with the ideas 
of the revolutionary leaders; and this sympathy per- 
vaded and colored his political conduct thencefor- 
ward. 

For more than a hundred years the country has 
accepted Jefferson as the "father" of the party which 
came into power in 1800 as "Republican," and which 
afterwards, calling itself "Democratic," held con- 
trol of the government, with scarcely a break, down to 
1861. But John Minor Botts, of Virginia — who was 
no mean figure in Southern politics prior to the Re- 
bellion — held that this paternal relation belonged to 
Aaron Burr.* It is in evidence that in 1800 the Repub- 
lican party was very evenly divided touching this claim 
of paternity. In the election for president that year, 
Burr and Jefferson each received the same number of 
electoral votes. It was only through the magnanimity 
of Hamilton that Jefferson won the prize — under cir- 
cumstances which will be mentioned later. In that 
contest, the Republican party — and the Democratic 
ever after — were dominated by the fundamental idea 
of diluting the powers of the central government and, 
at its expense, strengthening the sovereignty and 
importance of the individual states. This theory of 



♦It is a curious fact that Botts' father was one of the 
counsel who defended Burr when on trial for treason. 



20 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 

government is generally credited to Jefferson. It was, 
in fact, the theory of the group of politicians with 
whom he co-operated — mostly in the South — and be- 
longed rather to that era in our national history than 
to any one leader. 

Mr. Jefferson was sent to France in the spring 
of 1785, as successor to Dr. Franklin, and was absent 
from the country through the entire formative period 
out of which emerged the new form of a national 
government. He did not yield a cordial support to 
the Constitution framed in his absence. It created 
a federal nation, and that was not what he wanted. 
He was willing to have a nation for protection against 
foreign aggression, but not for domestic government. 
A mere league of states for home purposes was his 
ideal — as if it were possible to have this and pre- 
sent the front of a nation to the rest of the world. 

Under the skillful and tireless misconstruction of 
Mr. Jefferson and his accomplished coadjutor, Mr. 
Burr, the energetic measures of Mr. Adams' ad- 
ministration were colored and construed to such pur- 
pose that as early as 1798 Virginia had become a hot- 
bed of "Republican" reaction. Even Mr. Madison, 
who had been one of the most pronounced — as he 
was one of the ablest — of the nationalists in the con- 
vention which framed the Constitution, yielded to the 
reactionary furor and wrote the "Resolutions of '98," 
passed by the Virginia Assembly December 21st of 
that year, while Mr. Jefferson wrote the cognate 
declarations put forth next year by the legislature of 
Kentucky. It was in these Kentucky resolutions the 
remedy of "nullification" was first suggested. This 
was brought forward thirty odd years later by Cal- 



Virginia in Revolt 21 

houn and put down with a strong hand by President 
Jackson. Both the Virginia and Kentucky declara- 
tions embodied the creed of a government without the 
backbone of national authority; with the individual 
states sovereign and independent of obligation to each 
other — a theory tried out in the prior Confederation 
and found a calamitous failure. In the U. S. House 
of Representatives, a member denounced the alien and 
sedition acts, declaring the people ought to resist 
their execution, and he "hoped in God they would." 

In Virginia the fury of revolt appears to have 
completely dominated the Assembly. In December, 
1796, they passed an act "authorizing the executive 
to procure arms for the defense of the Common- 
wealth." This is just what Letcher did prior to the 
spring of 1861. By resolution passed in November, 
1796, the executive was directed to proceed to execute 
this act. In January, 1798, the Assembly passed an 
act to establish arsenals in the counties of Prince Ed- 
ward and Orange or Culpepper, and to have "build- 
ings erected for the preservation of arms and fortifi- 
cations thrown up for the defense of the arsenals." 
Each arsenal was to be capable of holding ten thou- 
sand complete stand of arms ; and to insure a supply of 
arms, the executive was empowered to establish a 
manufactory in the vicinity of Richmond and required 
to procure six hundred pistols, holsters, swords, scab- 
bards and belts for the equipment of cavalry. The 
executive was also authorized to issue arms and am- 
munition to the regiments within the limits for which 
the arsenals were erected. 

By acts of Assembly passed in 1796, 1798 and in 
January, 1799, taxes were imposed on all classes of 



22 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 

taxable property, including slaves over twelve years 
of age, for the purposes contemplated by the warlike 
legislation described. When we reflect how, through 
the whole history of Virginia, the ancient regime re- 
sisted taxation of this sacred form of property, we 
may realize the intensity of the war fever which would 
warrant the legislature in a measure of this kind ! 

In January, 1800 — the presidential year — an act 
was passed directing the executive "to distribute 
without delay among the several regiments of militia, 
according to their strength, two-thirds of all the 
arms and accoutrements belonging to the State or 
which might be procured under appropriations 
made." 

Thus, at the opening of the year in which the 
election for President was to be held, the Common- 
wealth was equipped for war! For what? Against 
whom? 



Relating to the dangerous conditions shown by the 
foregoing details, Gen. W. R. Davie, of North Caro- 
lina, in June, 1799, wrote Justice Iredell (one of the 
judges of the United States Supreme Court, appointed 
by Washington), and commenting on the exasperated 
party feeling in the country, remarked that Virginia 
was the only State of which he despaired. He said 
he had conversed with some gentlemen who had been 
traveling in other states and had recently been at the 
Petersburg (Virginia) races, who had "returned with 
the firm conviction that the leaders in Virginia were 
determined to overthrow the General Government; 
that if no other measure would effect this, they would 
risk it upon the chance of war. ' ' He added : " I under- 



Virginia in Revolt 23 

stand that some of them talk of 'seceding from the 
Union,' while others boldly assert the policy and 
practicability of severing the Union, alleging that 
Pennsylvania would join them; that Maryland would 
be compelled to change her politics with her situation ; 
that the submission and assistance of North Carolina 
was counted on as a matter of course, and that the two 
southern states (South Carolina and Georgia) would 
follow." 

Judge Iredell, in a letter to his wife, January 24 ; 
1799, said : 

"The General Assembly of Virginia are pursuing steps which 
directly lead to civil war ; but there is a respectable minority 
struggling in defense of the Government, and the Government 
itself is fully prepared for anything they can do and resolved, 
if necessary, to oppose force with force." 



In the election of 1800, the Republican party, under 
the lead of Jefferson and Burr, won the presidency. 
Had the result been adverse to them — had Mr. Adams 
and the Federal party triumphed — who is prepared to 
affirm that Virginia would not then have headed a 
revolt against the continuance of that party in control 
of the Government, as she did sixty-one years later 
against the change of control arising from the election 
of Lincoln? 

The Constitution provided that the candidate re- 
ceiving the highest electoral vote should be President. 
Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Burr each received the same 
number of votes — seventy-three. There being no 
choice, the election was thrown into the House of 
Representatives. It depended on Federal votes which 
of these men should be President. A choice was not 



24 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 

reached without difficulty. Mr. Jefferson was sounded 
to know what assurances he was willing to give touch- 
ing certain vital issues. He declined to give any 
pledges. He was elected by Federal votes, on an ap- 
peal made by Hamilton in a spirit of patriotism and 
personal magnanimity which elicited high praise from 
John Randolph, who succeeded Jefferson as Washing- 
ton's secretary of state. Mr. Randolph in after life 
often declared that Jefferson owed his election to 
Hamilton, and that to Mr. Hamilton's action in this 
crisis the country owed the safety of the republic. Mr. 
Randolph knew thoroughly the inside of Jeffersonian 
and Virginia politics at that time; and such a state- 
ment from him has a deep significance. 

In explanation of his course, Mr. Hamilton de- 
clared if there was a man in the world he "ought to 
hate, ' ' it was Jefferson. To those who know with what 
rancorous misrepresentations Jefferson pursued Ham- 
ilton for years, even when associated with him in 
Washington's cabinet, this declaration will seem fully 
justified. Mr. Hamilton said that, on the other hand, 
he had never had any personal complaint to make 
against Burr. But he regarded Burr as a bold, dar- 
ing man of unprincipled ambition, who had no aim 
but his own aggrandisement and who was restrained 
by no moral scruples. It was vain to hope he could 
be won over to Federalist views. He would combine 
the rogues of all parties and overrule the good men 
of all parties. On the other hand, Jefferson had pre- 
tensions to character. He was fanatic in his democ- 
racy and at the same time crafty, persevering and in- 
sincere, but a far less dangerous man than Burr. 
If Jefferson were elected, the whole responsibility 



Virginia in Revolt 25 

would rest upon the Republican party; if Burr, the 
responsibility would be upon the Federalists, for the 
people had intended to vote for him for Vice-Presi- 
dent only, in which place he would be harmless. 

Hamilton's course in giving the presidency to Jef- 
ferson, for such reasons as stated by him, easily con- 
nects with his later death by the hand of Burr on the 
heights of Weehawken. 



The political revolution thus outlined, accomplished 
one hundred and ten years ago under threat of re- 
bel] ion and the overthrow of the Government, was 
fundamental and far-reaching. It set the example 
which, being followed, gave to the world the American 
Civil war of 1861-65. The party which thus came 
into power in 1801 held the control thus gained 
through a practically unbroken succession for sixty 
years. At last the time and the conditions came for 
another change of control. The party which had held 
the reins so long made war rather than surrender 
them in obedience to the verdict of the people ren- 
dered in strict conformity to the Constitution and laws. 
Had John Adams been chosen President in 1800, 
there is reason to believe Virginia would have ten- 
dered then the issue of secession, or some other form 
of disruption, with the dread alternative of civil 
war. 



THE CIVIL PRELIMINARIES IN 1861. 

The rebellious conspiracy in Virginia was so ripe 
for co-operation with the Cotton States by the open- 
ing of the year 1861, and so entirely in control of 
the executive and legislative State machinery, that 
the General Assembly was called by Gov. Letcher to 
meet in extraordinary session January 7th. Despite 
the false pretenses put forward in his message 
as reasons for this astonishing proceeding, the sole 
object was to commit Virginia to the Southern revolu- 
tion, already in full tide and only waiting for Vir- 
ginia to embark; and from the day the legislature 
met, events moved toward that end with a swiftness 
and precision which showed how completely the pro- 
gramme for Virginia had been prepared. 

Disregarding precedents requiring consent of the 
voters before a convention could be called, the As- 
sembly on the 14th of January ordered an election for 
delegates to a convention to meet February 13th. The 
second day after the Legislature met, they voted a 
declaration that they were "unalterably opposed" to 
any attempt by the Government to "coerce into re- 
union or submission" any State attempting to with- 
draw from the Union. A week later they adopted 
another declaration that if the differences between 
the North and the South failed of adjustment, "then, 
in the opinion of the General Assembly, every consid- 
eration of honor and interest" demanded Virginia 
should ally herself with the "slaveholding States of 
the South." 

26 



The Civil Preliminaries 27 

Thus did the legislative body undertake to stake 
out for the sovereign body about to be assembled a 
road which led straight to Mongomery. The Legis- 
lature of Virginia had no constitutional authority to 
call a convention, nor to deal itself with national ques- 
tions. This rested only in the voters of the State. 
The most the Assembly had the right to do was to 
submit to the voters whether they would authorize 
a convention. The vote on "reference" shows that 
if the question of calling a convention had been sub- 
mitted, none would have been called. The legislature 
did submit to the people when electing delegates the 
question whether their action should go back to them 
for approval ; and the answer to that question was, by 
a vote of two to one, that no action affecting the State's 
relations to the Federal Government should have any 
effect until approved by subsequent vote of the people 
of Virginia. 

The vote on "reference" was, in the whole State, 
except eight small and remote counties, 100,356 for 
reference to 45,161 against. This shows that less than 
one-third of the voters of Virginia wanted secession. 
Yet in sixty days these proportions were reversed ! 

As the next logical step in the programme, the 
Convention was organized and controlled by the seces- 
sion minority. John Janney, of Loudoun, who called 
himself a "Union man," was made President. In his 
address — blowing hot and cold — he apostrophised the 
American flag floating over the old capitol in which 
the Convention sat, and prayed it might "remain 
forever:" "provided," thus and so. "Provided al- 
ways" Virginia had equal rights with other States 



28 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 

like New York, Ohio and Pennsylvania — as if she had 
not always had these, and more! 

One of the things John Janney did to keep the 
flag flying over the Virginia capitol was, to appoint 
a committee on Federal relations, twenty-one in num- 
ber, of whom only two proved faithful to the Union 
— and one of these not without reproach. 

Another: When the Convention had appointed as 
commander-in-chief of the Virginia forces, Robert E. 
Lee — who within a month had received as a special 
mark of confidence at the hands of President Lincoln, 
a commission as a colonel of cavalry in the U. S. 
Army — President Janney had Lee brought into the 
Convention hall and, with spectacular ceremonial and 
effusive feeling, congratulated him on his traitorous 
desertion of the American flag, which he had taken an 
oath to defend, to accept command of the Virginia 
(Confederate) armies raised and to be raised in rebel- 
lion against it. 

The history of this Convention need not be further 
recited here. Step by step, with military trim and 
energy, they marched straight to an ordinance of se- 
cession, which was passed in secret session, in terrorem, 
with injunction of secrecy till leave should be given to 
disclose. The secret league, eight days later reduced 
the once proud Commonwealth to the condition of 
vassalage under the Cotton-State Insurrection, with 
Jefferson Davis as absolute dictator and his minions 
riding rough-shod over her people. 

Other measures taken by the Convention in be- 
trayal of the people of Virginia, long before the date 
when those people had the right to decide by their 
votes whether there should be any secession or league 



The Civil Preliminaries 29 

with the Southern Confederacy, are summarized by 
historian Virgil A. Lewis, in his volume, "How West 
Virginia Was Made," as follows: 

Election of members of the Congress of the United States 
forbidden. 

Alliance, offensive and defensive, made with the so-called 
Confederate States. 

Constitution of the Confederate States adopted. Members 
elected to the Confederate Congress. 

Officers who had sworn to support the Constitution of the 
United States released from their oaths. 

All the people of Virginia absolved from their allegiance 
to the United States. 

Capture of Harper's Ferry I*. S. Arsenal, etc., Navy Yard 
and other U. S. property at Gosport; seizure of custom houses 
at Norfolk and Richmond. 

Virginia formally admitted as a member of the Confeder- 
ate States. 

Even before the consummation of the secret league 
with Stephens, Virginia, east of the mountains and 
in many counties west of them, was under a despotism. 
When the farce of voting (May 23rd) whether they 
would ratify or reject the secession ordinance was 
staged, the people of Virginia were already muzzled 
and manacled. In Richmond, where John Minor 
Botts had received 1,800 votes as a candidate for the 
Convention against Randolph, only two votes were 
cast against the ordinance. So everywhere else with- 
in the Confederate lines. Only in a limited number of 
free counties in Northwest Virginia, did men dare 
exercise their electoral rights as citizens. The pun- 
ishment of these recalcitrants, was the work under- 
taken by General Lee. 



30 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 

There is philosophic truth behind the old Greek 
axiom, that "Whom the gods would destroy they first 
make mad." Men filled with a blind fury cannot 
realize how close behind them marches retribution. 
Of a crisis in the French ^Revolution, Carlyle re- 
marks : 

"This, then, is the abomination of desolation; come sud- 
denly, though long foreshadowed as inevitable. For to the 
blind all things are sudden." 

AVhen imbecile Louis XVI summoned the States- 
General as the last expedient to save the Bourbon 
regime, which for hundreds of years had ridden 
France like "an old man of the sea," how was he to 
foreknow that he was but opening the door to a lion 
which was waiting to devour him and his line? Driven 
by the imperious demands of the hour, he walked 
blindly into the jaws of the Revolution. 

No more could the conspirators at the Virginia 
capital foresee that the Convention, summoned at 
their behest, without authority, as part of their plan 
to destroy what they could no longer control and to 
draw a line of perpetual warfare across this continent, 
was to be the "beginning of the end" of the mediaeval 
oligarchy who had for more than two hundred years 
imposed a system of caste and savagery upon this 
country and ruled its political counsels for their 
own evil ends. 



THE MILITARY INITIATIVE. 

LEE IN THE SADDLE. 

April 19th, the rank of Major-General of the mili- 
tary and naval forces of Virginia was created, and 
three days later Robert E. Lee, a colonel of cavalry 
in the United States Army, was nominated to the 
rank and confirmed by the Convention, with special 
honors and congratulations at the hands of Presi- 
dent Janney. 

Two days before, A. G. Richardson, Adjutant-Gen- 
eral of Virginia, sent orders to Brig.-Gen. James 
H. Carson, Sixteenth Brigade, Winchester, direct- 
ing him to issue "instant orders" to the brigade 
to be in readiness for service at a moment's warning 
to support a movement of State troops against the 
United States Arsenal at Harper's Ferry. Next day, 
similar orders were sent to Gen. Thomas Hay- 
mond, Fairmont, to give orders to the Third Division 
to be ready for service at a moment's notice, and 
that he "take measures effectually to prevent the 
passage of Federal or any other troops from the 
West eastward on the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad." 
The brigadiers in Raymond's division were: Burton 
Fairfax, Preston county; J. H. Carson, Frederick 
county; James Boggs, Pendleton county; C. B. Con- 
rad, Gilmer county; Bushrod W. Price, Marshall 
county ; and John J. Jackson, Wood county. 

The day the Secession ordinance was passed, the 
Convention appropriated $100,000, with instructions 
to Letcher "to repel invasion." 

31 



ORGANIZING REBELLION IN THE 
NORTHWEST. 

CONCENTRATIONS WEST OF THE MOUNTAINS. 

The day following the consummation of the secret 
league of usurpation between the Convention and 
Alexander H. Stephens, the Confederate Secretary 
of War at Montgomery wired John Letcher, rebel 
Governor, to know at what points and in what num- 
bers the military forces of Virginia were to be ren- 
dezvoused, adding: "For action here, an early answer 
is expected." May 1st, Letcher wired Secretary Wal- 
ker in reply : 

"Arrangements have been made to call out, if necessary, 
50,000 volunteers from Virginia, to be rendezvoused at Nor- 
folk, Richmond, Fredericksburg, Alexandria, Harper's Ferry, 
Grafton, Kanawha, Parkersburg and Moundsville." 

In this reply is clearly disclosed the expectation 
that the Confederacy would take speedy possession 
of all Western Virginia to the Ohio river. 

May 3rd, Governor Letcher issued a proclamation, 
calling on the State volunteer companies, where there 
were any, or when organized, to rendezvous "for the 
service of Virginia." Anticipating this proclama- 
tion, General Lee had already issued orders to carry 
out its objects. These orders did not obtain general 
publicity in Northwestern Virginia. They were cir- 
culated through secret channels among those only 
who were known to be in co-operation or sympathy 
with the Kebellion. So dominant was the Union sen- 
timent, that the only open rendezvous established in 

32 



Organizing Rebellion in the Northwest 33 

the Northwest at that time was at Fetterman, on the 
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, two miles north of Graf- 
ton. Here Capt. William P. Thompson (son of 
Circuit Judge George W. Thompson, of Wheeling) 
put his Marion guards into camp. The Postmaster at 
Fetterman, it was said, was friendly to the cause and 
the Confederate correspondence during the occupa- 
tion at Grafton was carried on through the Fetter- 
man office, the Grafton office not being deemed trust- 
worthy. Two or three days before the advance of 
the Union forces under Kelley and Morris, this ren- 
dezvous was moved up to Grafton, the arrival of 
about a thousand troops from the south sufficing to 
keep the Union people of Grafton quiet. 

APPOINTMENT OF RECRUITING OFFICERS. 

April 29th, Maj. Alonzo Loring, of Wheeling, was 
directed by Gen. Lee to "Muster into the service 
of the State such volunteer companies as offer them- 
selves in compliance with the call of the Governor, 
take command of them and direct the military opera- 
tions for the protection of the terminus of the Balti- 
more & Ohio Railroad and also of the road." Maj. 
Loring was further instructed to put himself in com- 
munication with Maj. Francis M. Boykin, Jr., who 
had been directed to give protection to the railroad in 
the vicinity of Grafton "with a view to co-operate, if 
necessary," and to report the number of companies 
he might muster into the service, the condition of 
their arms, equipments, etc. 

April 30th, Gen. Lee directed Maj. Francis M. 
Boykin, Jr., "commanding Virginia volunteers, Wes- 
ton, Virginia, ' ' to muster into the service of the State 



34 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 

such companies as might offer their services "for the 
protection of the northwestern portion of the State." 

He was instructed to assume the command, to take 
post at or near Grafton (unless some other point 
should offer greater facilities for the command of 
the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad and the Parkersburg 
Branch) ; to "endeavor to obtain the co-operation of 
the officers of the road" and afford them every assist- 
ance in his power; also to endeavor to give quiet and 
security to the inhabitants of the country; to place 
himself in communication with Maj. Loring at Wheel- 
ing and co-operate with him if necessary; to report 
the number of companies he might muster, with sug- 
gestions as to the best means for the accomplishment 
of the object in view. He was advised that 200 "old 
flint-lock" muskets would be forwarded to him by 
Gen. T. J. Jackson, then in command at Harper's 
Ferry. 

May 3rd, Gov. Letcher issued a proclamation au- 
thorizing the commanding general of the military 
forces of Virginia to cause to be mustered into the 
service of the State from time to time, as the public 
exigencies might require, such additional number of 
volunteers as he might deem necessary. 

May 4th, Maj. Loring was notified by Gen. Lee 
that his authority to call out volunteers was limited 
to Tyler, Wetzel, Marshall, Ohio, Brooke and Han- 
cock counties. 

GEN. LEE'S AVANT COUREUR. 

May 4th, Gen. Lee directed Col. George A. Porter- 
field of Jefferson county, to repair to Grafton and se- 
lect a position for troops to be called into the serv- 



Organizing Rebellion in the Northwest 35 

ice, with a view to hold both branches of the Balti- 
more & Ohio Railroad to the Ohio river. He was di- 
rected to co-operate with Maj. Loring of "Wheeling, 
and to place a force on the Parkersburg branch, and 
was advised that Maj. Boykin would act under his 
orders. 

Col. Porterfield was authorized to extend the call 
for volunteers to Wood, Wirt, Roane, Calhoun, Gil- 
mer, Ritchie, Pleasants and Doddridge counties — to 
rendezvous at Parkersburg; to Lewis, Harrison, 
Monongalia, Taylor, Barbour, Upshur, Tucker, 
Marion, Randolph and Preston counties — to rendez- 
vous at Grafton. 

The muskets to be sent by Jackson from Harper's 
Ferry were to be distributed under Porterfield 's 
orders. He was instructed that it was not intended 
to interfere with the peaceful use of the railroad, and 
he was to co-operate with its officers and agents and 
"aid them in the management of the road" as much 
as possible. 

In a dispatch from Gen. Jackson to Gen. Lee, 
dated Harper's Ferry, May 7th, Jackson said: "An 
unarmed company in Harrison county has offered its 
services and I design arming it at Grafton." This, 
it is presumed, is the company which marched into 
Clarksburg from Romine's, May 20th, under com- 
mand of Uriel M. Turner. 

THE ENEMY'S COUNTRY. 

May 10th, Maj. Boykin reported from Grafton to 
Gen. Lee: 

"The feeling in nearly all our counties is very bitter, and 
nothing is left undone by the adherents of the old Union to 



36 Lees Invasion of Northwest Virginia 

discourage those who are disposed to enlist in the service of 
the State. I find that organizations exist in most of the 
counties pledged to support what they term 'the Union.' " 

Maj. Boy kin deemed it impracticable to hold Graf- 
ton with the very small force which could be gotten 
together soon, and saw "no alternative but to send 
troops from the east for the present. This section'' 
he said "is verging on a state of actual revolution, 
and many men who were true and loyal to the State, 
are afraid to leave their families among men who 
recognize as a leader John S. Carlile, who openly 
proclaims that the laws of the State should not be 
recognized." 

Maj. Boykin thought they should have at least one 
battery and that 500 men would be sufficient to quell 
any disturbance which might arise "if a smaller force 
were sent." 

He thought troops should be assembled at Par- 
kersburg immediately and recommended that Judge 
William L. Jackson, formerly second auditor and 
afterwards lieutenant-governor of Virginia, be put 
in command at that place.* 

In reply to this, Gen. Lee wrote Maj. Boykin, May 
11th, that he must "persevere and call out companies 
from well-affected counties and march them to Graf- 
ton." He advised that 400 rifles and some ainmuni- 



*Francis H. Peirpoint, in a speech from the balcony of 
the McClure Hotel, Wheeling, May 11, 1861, said: "An officer 
had come to Grafton to make a rendezvous for Letcher's 
troops 'if it was not offensive to the people.' But the 
b'hoys live at Grafton — 100 of them, as good as ever trod 
the soil. They told this officer: 'Now, my friend, we are a 
hospitable people and we will be generous with you. We 
will give you until the next train starts to leave. But as 
sure as there is a God in heaven, if you come back this 
way, you will not get through.' He left by the first train." 

The writer learns from good authority this reference 
was to Maj. Boykin. 



Organizing Rebellion in the Northwest 37 

tion had been ordered from Staunton to Maj. Goff, 
Virginia volunteers, Beverly,* who had been directed 
to communicate with Porterfield and take his direc- 
tions as to the disposition of the arms and ammuni- 
tion. Gen. Lee did not "think it prudent to order 
companies from other parts of the State to Grafton, 
as it might irritate instead of conciliating the popu- 
lation in that region." 

May 13th, Gen. Lee wrote Maj. Boykin again, to 
inform him that 600 additional rifles had been sent 
to Maj. Goff, at Beverly, to be subject to Col. Porter- 
field's orders. He stated that Maj. Goff had been 
ordered to muster troops in Randolph and adjacent 
counties, and it was hoped to obtain there a sufficient 
number for the needs of Grafton, as he deemed it 
"inadvisable to send troops from the East for the 
present." 

COL. PORTERFIELD AT GRAFTON. 

Col. Porterfield arrived at Grafton May 14th, and 
immediately reported to Gen. Robert S. Garnett, 
Adjutant General, Richmond, that the officers who 
had been directed to report to him were not present, 
nor was there any volunteer or other force there. 
He would proceed at once to ascertain the where- 
abouts of Maj. Goff's command. On account of the 
sparseness of the population, it would be difficult to 
get the various companies to act in concert. "After 
my return," he said, "I would desire as soon as pos- 
sible to be reinforced by a detachment of not less than 
250 men and a few pieces of artillery, if they can be 
spared from the command at Harper's Ferry." 

♦David Goff, brother of Nathan and Waldo P. Goff, of 
Clarksburg. 



38 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 

May 16th, Col. Porterfield wrote again to Adjt. 
Gen. Garnett : 

PORTERFIELD TO GARNETT. 

"In my last report I stated that I would first get pos- 
session of the arms sent to Maj. Goff, and then try to collect 
a force to occupy this place. I accordingly sent a messenger 
to Maj. Goff, at Beverly, about 50 miles distant, and proceeded 
to ascertain what force I could get, its condition and the senti- 
ment of the people of the counties of Taylor, Barbour and 
Harrison. I also sent orders to the captains of companies, 
supposed to be armed, in the neighboring counties to bring 
their companies immediately to a designated point and there 
await my orders. 

''The messenger returned from Beverly with the reply that 
nothing had been heard of the rifles, nor had Maj. Goff been 
informed that they were to be sent to him. This is a serious 
disappointment. Several companies in this vicinity are or- 
ganizing and expecting to be furnished at once with arms and 
ammunition. I found a company organized at Pruntytown 
which will be ready to receive arms in a day or two. There 
is another at Philippi awaiting arms, and another in Clarks- 
burg which will soon be ready. I have seen the officers of 
these companies. There are other companies forming in the 
surrounding counties, but all without arms and un-uniformed. 
This force when received will not for some months be more 
effective than undisciplined militia. There are but two com- 
panies in this vicinity known to be armed. One of these — 
Capt. Boggess', at Weston — has old flint-lock muskets, in bad 
order, and no ammunition. The other — Capt. Thompson, at 
Fairmont — has a better gun and some ammunition. These 
companies are now marching towards this point: are ordered 
to do so, at least. This is the only force on which I have 
to depend; and it is very weak compared with the strength 
of those in this section who, I am assured, are ready to op- 
pose me. 

"I have found great diversity of opinion and much bitter- 
ness of feeling among the people of this region. They are 
apparently upon the verge of civil war. A few bad men have 
done much mischief by stirring up rebellion among the people 



Organizing Rebellion in the Northwest 39 

and representing to them the weakness of the State and its 
inability or indisposition to protect them, the power of the 
government at Washington and their willingness to give any 
required aid to resist the State authorities. I am too credibly 
informed to entertain any doubt that they have been and will 
be supplied with the means of resistance. They and their 
accomplices have also threatened the property and persons of 
law-abiding citizens with fire and sword. Their efforts to 
intimidate have had their effect both to dishearten the one and 
encourage the other. Many good citizens have been dispirited, 
while the traitors have seized guns and ammunition of the 
State to be used against its authority. Arms in the hands 
of disbanded volunteer companies have been retained for the 
same avowed purpose. 

"The force in this section will need the best rifles. Those 
at Harper's Ferry which were injured by the fire, if fitted up, 
will do very well, as there will not be the same use for the 
bayonet in these hills as elsewhere; and the movements should 
be light infantry and rifle; although the bayonet, of course, 
would be desirable." 

May 19th, Gen. Lee wrote Col. Porterfield that 1,000 
muskets and rifles for use of the troops under his com- 
mand had been sent to Maj. Goff and Lieut. Cheno- 
weth, of Beverly ; that several hundred arms had also 
been sent, for the use of Porterfield 's command, to 
Gen. Jackson, at Harper's Ferry; and that several 
companies had been directed to go with arms from 
Staunton to Beverly, "to gather strength as they pass 
along." 

SENATOR MASON ON INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS. 

Ex-Senator James M. Mason, who had been di- 
rected to go to Maryland on a secret mission, wrote 
Gen. Lee from Winchester May 15th regarding the 
occupancy of Maryland Heights by Gen. Jackson; 
about which it appears Gov. Letcher had some scruples 



40 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 

as being an invasion of the sovereign State of 
Maryland. Mr. Mason said the occupancy of Mary- 
land Heights was necessary to the command of the 
town of Harper's Ferry, and that a small body en- 
trenched there could hold the position against a su- 
perior force. In reference to the right of Virginia to 
occupy the Heights, he said : 

"I want to speak only of our right to fortify and hold those 
Heights, whether Maryland protest or no, putting aside the 
law of necessity and its sanctions. If Maryland were suo jure 
and a friendly contiguous power, the occupation of her terri- 
tory, hostile and menacing to Virginia, gives the clear right 
in public law to Virginia to occupy her territory too, so far 
as necessary for self-protection; a right not to be questioned 
under existing circumstances by Maryland or any other power. 

"But Maryland is not suo jure; she comprises one of the 
United States, a power now foreign to Virginia and in open 
hostility to us. Occupying her territory, therefore, is only 
occupying the territory of the enemy ; nor is it invasion in the 
proper sense of that term, because the occupation is defensive 
and precautionary only, and not for aggression, and will cease 
as soon as the enemy withdraw from Maryland." 

MAKES A MILITARY SUGGESTION. 

Regarding the position of the Baltimore & Ohio 
Railroad, Mr. Mason said it was "important that a 
sufficient military force of our State should be ex- 
hibited and retained along that road at important 
points west of Harper's Ferry, at least as far as the 
western slope of the Allegheny mountains; and, as 
two such points," he said, "I would indicate Pied- 
mont and Grafton. The numerous tunnels through 
the mountains, the numerous bridges across rivers and 
streams, and especially the expensive and complicated 
viaduct along Cheat river, in the Allegheny raoun- 



Organizing Rebellion in the Northwest 41 

tains, furnish abundant places for such irremediable 
damage, provided we are in advance of the invad- 
ers. ' ' 

LEE admits his first failure. 

May 21st, Gen. Lee wrote Mr. Mason: 

"Measures have been taken more than three weeks ago for 
securing control of both branches of the Baltimore & Ohio 
Railroad and for throwing a force into the disaffected region 
of the State; to carry out which Maj. Loring has been sent to 
Wheeling to protect the terminus of the main road and Col. 
Porter field to Grafton with instructions to concentrate there 
three regiments, at Parkersburg one regiment, at Moundsville 
one regiment. These measures having in part failed, several 
companies have been sent from Staunton to Beverly, with in- 
structions to gather strength as they pass through the country, 
for Col. Porterfield's command. By this means it is hoped 
that a considerable force has been concentrated at Grafton by 
this time and loyalty in some degree engendered in the dis- 
affected region of which you speak." 

MILITARY CENSORSHIP BY A WHEELING EDITOR. 

In a letter written by Capt. Daniel Shriver of the 
(Wheeling) Shriver Grays, dated Harper's Ferry 
May 19th, addressed to Gen. T. J. Jackson, in com- 
mand there, Shriver says there were at that date be- 
tween 300 and 400 Federal troops stationed on Wheel- 
ing Island, who had been regularly sworn into the 
United States service by Major Oakes and furnished 
with arms at request of citizens of Hancock, Brooke, 
Ohio and Marshall counties, "for the express purpose 
of resisting the authority of the State of Virginia. 
At this time," says Captain Shriver, "A. W. Camp- 
bell, of the city of Wheeling, by published authority 
from Gov. Dennison, of Ohio, will not permit citi- 



42 Lee's Invasion op Northwest Virginia 

zens of Wheeling to ship provisions in any quantity 
over the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad." 

RECRUITING AT FETTERMAN. 

In report made by Col. J. M. Heck, of the 25th 
Virginia (Confederate) regiment, sometime after the 
battle of Rich Mountain, he states that May 24th he 
reported for duty to Col. Porterfield, who, he says, 
then held Fetterman with about 100 men. He adds 
that on the 25th of May Porterfield received six or 
seven recruits under Col. Turk ; that May 26th Porter- 
field, with this small force, took possession of Grafton ; 
and at midnight of the 26th Heck says he departed 
for Richmond, under instructions from Porterfield, 
to report the condition of the command at Grafton 
and the need of reinforcement. 

HOW LEE WOULD DEAL WITH " TRAITORS. ' ' 

Gen. Lee wrote Col. Porterfield May 24th acknowl- 
edging his letter of the 18th and expressing regret 
that he had "not been successful in organizing the 
companies of volunteers that you (he) expected. In 
answer to your inquiry as to the treatment of 
traitors," pursues the General, "I cannot believe 
that any citizen of the State will betray its interests, 
and hope all will unite in supporting the policy she 
may adopt." 

MORE MUSKETS AND AMMUNITION. 

May 27th Gen. Lee advises Col. Porterfield that he 
had ordered 1,000 muskets, with sufficient supply of 
powder and lead, to Beverly, escorted by Col. Heck 
and Maj. Cowen; and that Col. Heck had been in- 
structed to call out all the volunteers he could along 
the route. 



B. & 0. RAILROAD BRIDGES BURNED. 

GEN. SCOTT CAUTIONS MCCLELLAN. 

May 21, 1861, Gen. Scott communicated (by letter) 
with Gen. McClellan, at Cincinnati, in command of 
the Department of the Ohio, evidently regarding the 
threatening aspect of matters in Northwest Virginia, 
though the paper does not appear among the official 
records, and May 24th he wired McClellan as follows : 

"We have certain intelligence that at least two companies 
of Virginia troops have reached Grafton, evidently with the 
purpose of overaweing the friends of the Union in Western 
Virginia. Can you counteract the influence of that detach- 
ment? Act promptly, and Alaj. Oakes, at Wheeling, may give 
you valuable assistance." 

Answering this, McClellan wired Adjt. Gen. Town- 
send, May 26th: 

"My time has been so much occupied I have been unable 
to reply to the General's letter. 

"I was engaged in maturing plans to carry out the Gen- 
eral's telegraph instructions when I learned by telegram that 
two bridges on the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad near Farming- 
ton station had been burned Saturday night. I received this 
information late yesterday afternoon at Camp Dennison. Col. 
Kelley, of the First Virginia Volunteers, with his own regi- 
ment and four companies of the Second, are ordered by tele- 
graph to move without delay from Wheeling towards Fair- 
mont, guarding the bridges as they proceed. Col. Irvine, of 
the Sixteenth Ohio, was ordered to support the movement. Col. 
Steedman, of the Fourteenth Ohio, supported by the Eighteenth 
and two light guns, was ordered to occupy Parkersburg and 
the lines of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad towards Grafton. 

"Col. Kelley left Wheeling about 7 a. m. today. Col. Irvine 
crossed at Benwood about 10 o'clock. Col. Steedman moved 
to Parkersburg about 10 o'clock. 

43 



44 Lee's Invasion op Northwest Virginia 

"By telegraph this morning I directed the necessary sup- 
plies to re-establish telegraph communication and to repair 
bridges, etc., to be forwarded at once from Wheeling. 

"Gen. Morris holds himself ready to move from Indianapolis 
on receipt of telegraphic orders, with from two to five regi- 
ments, should it become necessary. The regiments at Camp 
Dennison are in the midst of the process of reorganization for 
three-year service. By tomorrow one fine regiment will be 
ready to move and others will soon be prepared. I hope, how- 
ever, that the forces already out toward Grafton will suffice 
for the end in view. 

"I telegraphed Maj. Oakes, making him acting aide-de- 
camp temporarily, that he might be able to interfere authori- 
tatively should it prove necessary. 

"P. S. — Nothing is yet known by the public of this move- 
ment. I have thus far succeeded in keeping it secret and 
hope to do so until Grafton is occupied or the troops have 
considerably advanced. Have this instant heard from Col. 
Kelley at Mannington, Va., as follows: 

" 'Agreeably to your orders, I left my camp this morning 
at 5 o'clock with my regiment and Capt. Hayes' company of 
the Second regiment. Just arrived here without accident or 
casualty. Found the road in good order. Bridges all safe 
and guarded by the railroad company and loyal citizens. Will 
move forward to the burned bridges. This town will be occu- 
pied by Col. Irvine, who follows. We will repair bridges as 
soon as possible. I hear that Parkersburg is occupied.' " 

May 26th, Gen. McClellan wired Col. B. F. Kelley, 
First Regiment Virginia Volunteers, Wheeling: 

"If you have reliable information that bridges of the Balti- 
more & Ohio Railroad have been burned you will at once pro- 
cure transportation on that railroad and move your whole 
command, including the separate companies of Virginia volun- 
teers not attached to your regiment, as near to Fairmont as 
can be done without endangering the safety of your command. 
Leave a sufficient guard to protect the bridges and other struc- 
tures most liable to destruction. Col. Irvine, of the Sixteenth 



B. & 0. Railroad Bridges Burned 45 

Ohio, is ordered to cross the river and support you. Telegraph 
me constantly as to the state of affairs and how much support 
you need. Conduct the preliminaries of your movement with 
as much secrecy as possible and see that the telegraph con- 
veys no intimation of it in any direction. Consult Maj. 
Oakes freely. The move must be made with the greatest 
promptness to secure the bridges. Take at least one week's 
rations. Accoutrements will follow you tomorrow. I count 
on your prudence and courage. Preserve the strictest disci- 
pline. See that the rights and property of the people are 
respected, and repress all attempts at negro insurrection." 

Under same date, Gen. McClellan wrote Col. Kel- 
ley: 

"I have telegraphed you this evening, instructing you to 
make a forward movement on Fairmont. The principal reason 
for this order was the burning of the bridges, which caused 
me to anticipate by some two or three days the more carefully 
prepared measures I had contemplated with the intention of not 
only securing the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad but also of driving 
all the armed Secessionists out of Western Virginia. 

"In your present movement you will be careful to run no 
unnecessary risk; for it is absolutely necessary that we should 
not meet with even a partial check at the outset. The chief 
object of your advance is to prevent any further destruction 
of the railroad. You will not move on Grafton without re- 
storing the bridges in your rear, unless you receive positive 
information that Col. Steedman's command has actually 
reached Grafton or a neighboring point where you can without 
doubt unite with him. Col. Steedman occupies Parkersburg 
tomorrow morning with two regiments and will then proceed 
to take possession of the line of the B. & 0. R. R. as far 
towards Grafton as he can with safety. Col. Irvine will be 
under your orders." 

Under same date, Gen. McClellan instructed Col. 
Irvine to cross the river at Benwood and support Col. 
Kellev's movement: 



46 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 

"Leave a detachment to guard the bridge over the Ohio 
and secure Wheeling. Advance the rest of your command at 
least as far as Fish creek ( ? ) . Render all assistance in pre- 
serving the bridges. I do not expect you to be driven back. 
Support will soon reach you if necessary. Preserve the strict- 
est discipline. Take one week's rations. See that the rights 
and property of the people are respected, and repress all at- 
tempts at negro insurrection." 

Under same date, Gen. McClellan instructed Col. 
J. B. Steedman, commanding Fourteenth Regiment, 
Marietta, Ohio, to cross the river and occupy Parkers- 
burg, and that the Eighteenth Ohio at Athens would 
support him. He was ordered to move by rail towards 
Grafton as far as prudent, leaving sufficient guards 
at Parkersburg and the bridges as he advanced. He 
gave the same instructions to protect rights of per- 
son and property, concluding with the instruction to 
"repress all attempts at negro insurrection." 

Under same date, Gen. McClellan wired Brig. Gen. 
Thomas A. Morris, Indianapolis: 

"You will probably be ordered tomorrow to move with, say, 
two regiments to Wheeling or Parkersburg. Circumstances 
may change this, but be ready. Keep this secret; and when 
you do move give out Pittsburg or some other point as your 
destination." 

Under same date, Gen. McClellan issued a proclama- 
tion to the people of Western Virginia, wherein he 
assured them, among other things, that he would 
"with an iron hand, crush any attempt at insurrec- 
tion on the part of the slaves." 

Under same date, he issued an address to his troops, 
ordering them to "cross the frontier and enter upon 
the soil of Virginia." It would seem from the reitera- 



B. & 0. Railroad Bridges Burned 47 

tion of this injunction about negro insurrection that 
the General was laboring under some grave misappre- 
hension as to the state of facts in the territory he 
was invading. There was not an acre of the earth's 
surface anywhere at that date in less danger of servile 
insurrection than Western Virginia. The insurrec- 
tion of white people was the only one that need have 
cost Gen. McClellan a moment's anxiety. 

May 30th, Gen. McClellan reported to Adjt. Gen. 
Townsend that Col. Kelley had occupied Grafton at 
2:30 P. M. that day, "without the loss of a single 
life, ' ' the Secessionists having abandoned the place be- 
fore his arrival. "The Colonel," he said, "will pursue 
them on the Beverly road and endeavor to capture at 
least some of the arms that they sent away before 
they retreated." Col. Kelley 's movement had been re- 
tarded by the necessity of rebuilding the burned 
bridges. On arriving at the place where the bridges 
had been burned, he had at once sent an advance 
guard to secure the important bridge across the Mon- 
ongahela one mile east of Fairmont. He commended 
Col. Kelley highly and suggested he be made a brig- 
adier of volunteers. 

The General added to this report : 

"I am now organizing a movement on the valley of the 
Great Kanawha; will go there in person and endeavor to cap- 
ture the occupants of the Secession camp at Buffalo, and then 
occupy the Gauley bridge." 



PORTERFIELD'S RETREAT TO PHILIPPI. 

HIS OWN REPORT OF HIS REASONS. 

May 29th, from Philippi, Col. Porterfield reported 
to Adjt. Gen. Garnett that on the 27th, at Grafton, 
he had received reliable information of a contemplated 
movement from the West by which a large body of 
men were to be precipitated upon him in a few hours ' 
time. "I was assured," he said, "that about 1,500 
Federal troops had collected at Marietta, some at 
Bellaire, 1,000 to 1,500 on the island opposite Wheel- 
ing ; ' ' and, in this state of things, he adds : 

"I ordered some of the bridges of the Baltimore & Ohio 
Railroad northwest of Fairmont to be destroyed; which order 
was carried into effect by the destruction of two between 
Farmington and Mannington, about 35 miles northwest of 
Grafton. 

"I also sent out an expedition to destroy a bridge of the 
Northwestern Virginia Railroad 50 or . 60 miles west from 
Grafton. The object of this expedition has, I am informed, 
been accomplished, although my party has not returned. I 
caused a small bridge on the same road about 15 miles west 
of Grafton to be destroyed, but I learn it has been repaired by 
the company so trains can pass over it. 

"On the evening of the 27th I received information of the 
arrival by the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad of a body of troops 
variously estimated at from 1,000 to 3,000 at the burned 
bridges near Mannington. It was supposed these men would 
be followed by others as soon as the house-cars which con- 
tained them could be returned to the Ohio river. In this 
state of things I inquired of Gen. Johnson by telegraph (the 
Grafton end of which only was under the control of our 
friends, so far as I know) if he could reinforce me. For reply, 

48 



PORTERFIELD 's KETREAT TO PHILIPPI 49 

I was informed that no men could be sent from his command 
at Harper's Ferry. 

"On the 28th, learning from most reliable persons that the 
invading force had reached Fairmont, 20 miles northwest of 
Grafton, and thinking that the latter point, from its topography 
and the character of its population (a good part of which 
would have united with our enemies upon their appearance), 
was not an eligible one for us, and considering our very inade- 
quate supply of provisions and ammunition — particularly caps 
— and that our number of infantry was small (not more than 
550) and the want of any sort of training or military discipline 
among our men; and being informed that other bodies of men 
besides those first spoken of had passed the burned bridges by 
means of temporary repairs of them and approached Fair- 
mont, I concluded to remove the State arms and stores to 
Philippi, about 15 miles in our rear; there establish a depot 
in a friendly country; to concentrate such volunteers as were 
on the way or could be easily and speedily attracted to that 
point, and there to organize and strengthen my command. I 
met on the way an unarmed company of volunteers from 
Upshur ; and at Philippi I was joined by a well-armed com- 
pany of horse from Rockbridge. I have been compelled to 
send home, for want of arms to supply them with, a company 
of horse from Pocahontas, and to dismiss to their homes for a 
short time a like company raised in Barbour. 

"As soon as I can organize my command, which I hope to 
do soon, I will return to some more eligible point in the 
neighborhood of Grafton which will enable me to command 
both railroads; and in the meantime I hope to be able more 
effectually to cut off the railroad communications east and 
west of that place." 

In the foregoing, Col. Porterfield speaks of the 
force with which he retired to Philippi as not more 
than 550 infantry. It was authentically reported in 
the "Wheeling papers at the time that on the 23rd of 
May about 1,000 horse and infantry from the South 
arrived at Webster on their way to Grafton. From 



50 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 

Staunton, May 5, 1861, Harman wrote Gov. Letcher 
that by direction of Gen. Lee he would that day start 
arms, etc., intended for the Northwest, under escort 
of Capt. F. F. Sterret's company of cavalry; that he 
had also ordered Capt. Felix H. Hull, then at Staun- 
ton, to proceed at once to Highland to gather 200 men, 
including his company, to accompany Capt. Ster- 
rett 's command ; that Capt. Moorman, of Pendleton, 
was also to join with 200 men; that Capts. Stover 
and McNeil, of Pocahontas, each with 150 men, if pos- 
sible, were to repair to Huttonsville — all to unite their 
commands under Capt. Sterrett and proceed to Bev- 
erly. "My aim," said Harman, "is that the expedi- 
tion shall reach its destination (Grafton, if thought 
proper) at least by the day of election:" which was 
May 23rd, the day these troops arrived at Webster. 
A letter from Gen. Lee to Col. Porterfield, dated May 
24th, reads : " By this time the companies from Staun- 
ton must have reached you, and also one from Harper's 
Ferry; and I hope the true men of your region have 
been encouraged to go into the service of the State." 
Gen. Johnson, commanding at Harper's Ferry, sent 
to the Adjutant General at Richmond July 1st an 
anonymous letter written from Martinsburg, stating 
that, according to the best information to be obtained 
there, Col. Porterfield left Grafton the previous Mon- 
day "with his command of about 1,500 men, and went 
to Philippi, where he probably awaited reinforce- 
ments from the Valley." The writer reported the 
arrival of United States troops at Mannington, said 
nothing definite was known about the troops ad- 
vancing from Parkersburg, but that some of the rail- 
road bridges on that line also it was believed had been 



PORTERFIELD 's RETREAT TO PHILIPPI 51 

destroyed. There had been no military force of 
either side at Grafton the previous Wednesday at 4 :00 
p. ni., but some of the Union men of the neighborhood 
were gathering together with such arms as they could 
get at home. The writer added that the bridges be- 
tween Martinsburg and Cumberland should be burned 
(especially the bridge over the Potomac proper). 
"Small bridges," he said, "are but a small hindrance 
in point of time to an army; and recollect, the rail- 
road is to be the means of precipitating the immense 
body of men from Ohio and west of Ohio who are to 
occupy our Virginia. Only important bridges will 
present obstacles, as to time, of any material value. 
West of Martinsburg there are important bridges, but 
I fear they are in the hands of Union men and a lit- 
tle force would be required." 

Whatever Col. Porterfield 's force may have been, 
it would seem the "true men" of that locality, in- 
voked by Gen. Lee, did not contribute much to it. 
The only report of any accessions from such sources 
relates to the "six or seven raw recruits" which 
Col. Heck reported as joining Col. Turk at Fetter- 
man. 



THE SURPRISE AND CAPTURE OF PHILIPPI. 

The Junction of Kelley and Morris at Grafton — The 
Strategic Advance and Rout. 

mcclellan's REPORT TO GEN. SCOTT. 

Gen. McClellan, from Cincinnati, June 1st, wired 
Adjt. Gen. Townsend: 

"Learning that the rebels who abandoned Grafton were 
this morning at Philippi, I have ordered an advance on that 
point in two columns from Grafton and Clarksburg, with in- 
structions to drive them beyond Beverly and hold the latter 
place. 

"I propose also to advance on Elizabeth and Weston in 
order to encourage the Union sentiment and to induce the 
Kanawha people to take a more decided course. I think they 
are not yet fully up to the mark and need careful nursing. 

"By driving the rebels beyond Beverly, I think we shall free 
almost the whole of Western Virginia from their influence. 

"I have already informed you that I have placed the opera- 
tions in Western Virginia under Brig. Gen. Thomas A. Morris, 
of the Indiana volunteers, a graduate of West Point, and a 
cool, deliberate man." 

Same date, McClellan to Townsend: 

"Road from Parkersburg to Grafton open. Move on Phil- 
ippi and Beverly tonight to drive the rebels entirely over 
the mountains. 

"Kanawha movement suspended for the present in conse- 
quence of conference with Union men. I explain by mail." 

GEN. MORRIS' REPORT TO MCCLELLAN. 

Col. Kelley 's command, arriving at Grafton May 
30th, was joined in the evening of June 1st by the 
forces under Gen. Morris via Parkersburg Branch, 

52 



The Surprise and Capture of Philippi 53 

being six companies of his own regiment and 
nine of the Ninth Indiana. Under the latter date, 
Gen. McClellan had wired Adjt, Gen. Townsend that 
an advance on Philippi would be made that night; 
but upon conference between Morris and Kelley, it 
was agreed to defer it until the following night. The 
story of the advance, the surprise of Porterfield 's 
camp, the rout of his forces and the wounding of 
Col. Kelley are told in Gen. Morris' report, supple- 
mented by a letter written recently by Capt. Thomas 
H; Norton, of Wheeling (since dead). 

To mislead the numerous spies, Gen. Morris gave 
an order to Col. Kelley, June 2nd, to take six com- 
panies of his own regiment, nine of Milroy's and six 
of Irvine's Sixteenth Ohio and proceed on the Balti- 
more & Ohio Railroad to a point about six miles east 
from Grafton, and thence march by the shortest and 
most practicable route to Philippi, regulating march 
and bivouac so as to be sure of coming before Phil- 
ippi as near four o'clock in the morning as possible. 
"But should you this evening" (the order read) "re- 
ceive certain information that the Rebels have re- 
treated eastward from Philippi, you will follow them 
with all the speed the strength of your troops will 
allow. In such case, as early as possible, inform Col. 
Dumont, on the other bank of the river, and direct 
his co-operation in the pursuit, to continue, in your 
discretion, till they are beyond Beverly." 

This column moved eastward by railroad train on 
the 2nd at 9 :00 a. m., and was generally understood 
to be an advance on Harper's Ferry. After leaving 
the cars as directed, the distance to Philippi was 
about twenty-five miles on a road but little traveled. 



54 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 

The instructions required a rapid march during the 
day and early part of the night, to a point from 
which, after a sufficient rest, Philippi could be cer- 
tainly reached by four o'clock next morning. 

Capt. Thomas H. Norton, of Wheeling, a lieuten- 
ant in Col. Kelley's command, narrates in the Wheel- 
ing Intelligencer of August 10, 1906, following inci- 
dents in this connection : 

"About midnight a terrific rainstorm interrupted the march 
and the command was halted for a few hours, and I remember 
seeking shelter under a wagon from the downpour until I was 
called upon to take charge of a prisoner in the person of a 
backwoods farmer who lived in the vicinity, and to whom 
Capt. Fordyce represented that we were a detachment of Con- 
federate troops sent from Harper's Ferry to reinforce Porter- 
field. Acting under this supposition the man consented to 
guide our column to the point it was desired to reach, but we 
soon undeceived him as to the identity of our troops, and 
under a threat of instant death compelled him to accompany 
us and show us the way. Either from accident or design, the 
command was guided in a direction that brought us a mile or 
more on the flank of Porterfield's encampment at Philippi, 
and when the head of the column reached the apex of the hill 
that gave us a view of the town and the camp of the enemy, 
we were startled by an artillery fire from the heights on the 
opposite side of the river, which we first supposed was a Con- 
federate battery opening fire on us ; but a few moments dis- 
closed it to be attached to the brigade of Ohio and Indiana 
troops that were co-operating in the movement from the direc- 
tion of Webster. This fact cheered our men and the companies 
though wearied with the long march double quicked down 
the road, and were the first to enter the main street of the 
town, along which the enemy were retreating in hot haste. 



"I remember that I had the pleasure of assisting to eat the 
very excellent breakfast prepared for Col. Porterfield, which 



The Surprise and Capture of Philippi 55 

we found steaming hot in his quarters at Philippi after the 
so-called battle was over, and in rummaging about the adju- 
tant's office in the same building we captured a lot of official 
documents. Among them was a letter from Governor Letcher, 
of Virginia, recommending the Colonel to run down to Wheel- 
ing some day, and capture the arms recently sent there by the 
Secretary of War, and if attacked by Ohio or Pennsylvania 
troops to retreat along the line of the B. & 0. R. R., burning 
the bridges to prevent pursuit. I sent the original or a copy 
of this letter to the Intelligencer and it w r as published to- 
gether w T ith a description of the affair at Philippi." 

Col. Dumont, commanding the Seventh Indiana 
regiment, was directed to proceed at 8 :30 p. m. on the 
2nd, to Webster, three miles west of Grafton, where 
he was joined by Col. Steedman, with five companies 
and two fieldpieces; also by Col. Crittenden, with six 
companies of his regiment. From Webster this column 
was to march on Philippi, distant about seventeen 
miles, arriving there at four o'clock precisely next 
morning. This column was to divert the attention of 
the enemy until the attack was made by Col. Kelley. 
When joined by Kelley, the whole force was to be 
under his command. This force leaving Grafton after 
dark, had reasonable assurance of reaching the enemy 
in advance of any information from their friends, as 
the event proved. Gen. Morris' report states that: 

"The march through the storm and darkness was very 
severe. The last five miles made by Dumont's column was 
covered in seventy-five minutes. Many of the men fainted 
and were left on the road. Others threw away their haversacks 
and provisions to keep up." 

The arrival of the two columns was but fifteen min- 
utes apart. A reconnaissance in advance of Dumont's 
column was made by Col. F. W. Lander, who had the 



56 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 

immediate direction of the artillery. After the bridge 
over the Tygart's Valley was taken, "he pressed for- 
ward and joined Col. Kelley, rode into the enemy's 
ranks and captured the person reported to have shot 
Col. Kelley. He had great difficulty in restraining 
the Virginia volunteers from summarily despatching 
the man, who is a noted secessionist and a quarter- 
master of the Rebel forces. ' ' * 

Gen. Morris' report says there was much difficulty 
in getting an accurate statement of the Rebel loss; 



*In answer to an inquiry by the writer touching the 
identity of this person, Col. Porterfield wrote under date of 
March 6, 1905: "Capt. Jordan was the quartermaster. I 
had heard the report that he had shot Col. Kelley, but never 
put confidence in it. I thought he had said so for notoriety. 
I do not think any one knew who wounded Col. Kelley." 

Capt. Norton, in the letter already quoted from, makes 
the following statement regarding the shooting of Col. 
Kelley: 

"Col. Kelley was undoubtedly shot — and at the time was 
supposed mortally wounded — by a Confederate quartermaster 
named Simms. We had not proceeded half way through the 
village before my attention was called by some of the 
men to the fact that Col. Kelley had been shot and fallen 
from his horse. Turning about I saw a number of soldiers 
surrounding a burly man on the side of the road who held 
in his hand an old-fashioned horse-pistol. They were say- 
ing, 'This is the man who shot our Colonel!' and were 
about to put him to death with their bayonets; but just at 
that moment a mounted officer rushed into the crowd of ex- 
cited soldiers and rescued the imperiled Confederate. Our 
men cried out: 'Who are you?' and he replied: 'Col. Lander, 
your commander. This man is a prisoner of war, and to 
kill him is murder. Go after the enemy.' 

"Our men then seemed pacified, but took charge of the 
prisoner. Some of the men then assisted Col. Kelley into a 
house opposite to where he was shot, and he was laid on a 
mattress on the floor; where, after the fray was over, it was 
ascertained that his wound was not necessarily mortal, and 
in a few days, Dr. Frissell, of Wheeling — who was then 
regarded as the most accomplished surgeon in our State — 
was sent for, and he soon pronounced the Colonel out of 
danger. In a few weeks Col. Kelley was well enough to 
be removed to Wheeling, and I was detailed with a platoon 
of soldiers to escort him to the city, and finally carried him 
in a carriage to the home of his father-in-law, Mr. William 
S. Goshorn, who lived out the Pike in Pleasant Valley, where 
in a month or two he fully recovered. 

"Simms was removed to Grafton and held there as a 
prisoner for some time in a room at the hotel; and several 
times, when off duty, I engaged him in conversation, but 
never could induce him to admit that he fired the shot that 
wounded Col. Kelley." 



The Surprise and Capture of Philippi 57 

that their killed were estimated at from fifteen to 
forty, and were supposed to have been carried off by 
friends during the confusion incident to the pursuit. 



June 3rd, Gen. McClellan wired Townsend, trans- 
mitting following telegram from Gen. Morris, in com- 
mand at Grafton: 

"We surprised the rebels, about 2,000 strong, at Philippi 
this morning. Captured a large amount of arms, horses, 
ammunition, provisions and camp equipage. The attack was 
made after a march during the entire night in a drenching 
rain. The surprise was complete. Fifteen rebels killed. The 
gallant Col. Kelley, of the First Virginia volunteers, is, I fear, 
mortally wounded. No other important casualties on our 
side." 

Gen. McClellan reported to Townsend June 10th, 
regarding the rout of the enemy at Philippi, that 
he had learned they had received very considerable 
accessions to their numbers. "To prevent further 
outrages upon the railroads," he said, "I directed an 
immediate movement to dislodge and disperse them. 
This was executed under the orders of Gen. Morris, 
Col. Kelley of the First Virginia volunteers having 
the immediate command of the attacking columns." 

Gen. McClellan compliments Col. Kelley highly and 
recommends his appointment as a brigadier. He also 
commends Col. Dumont and Col. Lander of the In- 
diana troops. 

confederate accounts. 

Maj. M. G. Harman, Col. J. M. Heck and Maj. 
R. E. Cowen despatched from Staunton to Richmond, 
June 6th: 



58 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 

"Messrs. Spalding and Cook have just reached here, leaving 
Philippi Monday morning. The Federal troops surprised Col. 
Porterfield's command, opening fire upon the town with artil- 
lery, and drove us out, with a reported loss of about six 
killed and a considerable quantity of arms, baggage and 
provisions. Much heavier loss to the enemy in men. Mc- 
Clellan led the Federal forces. Our forces retreated to Beverly. 

"An expedition under Col. Heck leaves here Friday for 
the Northwest. We urge you will send by express train 
2,000 men with arms and ammunition, to drive the vandals 
out, or else give up our border. These gentlemen were in the 
engagement; say Col. Porterfield had but little ammunition of 
any kind. Send an officer of experience to command our 
forces, with a battery and 5,000 arms if possible." 

Same date Maj. Harman wrote Gen. Lee, as fol- 
lows, enclosing a letter he had written to Col. Porter- 
field at Beverly: 

"From all the information I have received, I am pained to 
have to express my conviction that Col. Porterfield is entirely 
unequal to the position which he occupies. The affair at 
Philippi was a disgraceful surprise, occurring about day- 
light, there being no picket guard, or guard of any kind, on 
duty. The only wonder is that our men were not cut to pieces. 
They were all asleep, and were only aroused by the firing of 
the enemy." 

In Harman 's letter to Porterfield, referred to in 
the foregoing, he states that he had received a tele- 
gram from Gen. Lee, saying: "Send a messenger to 
Col. Porterfield to be valiant and maintain his 
ground until relief reaches him." 

Col. Porterfield, from Huttonsville, June 9th, wrote 
Adjt. Gen. Garnett, regarding the state of his com- 
mand: 

"I have not been able to get even proper returns made out 
to send to your headquarters, and my own reputation has 



The Surprise and Capture of Philippi 59 

been injured by the character of my command. In fact, if it 
had been intended to sacrifice me I could not have expected less 
support than I have had." 

He adds: 

''I have been reliably informed that two companies of ne- 
groes, armed and uniformed, have been seen at Fairmont. The 
country to the northwest is in a state of revolution, all law- 
abiding citizens being driven off by the traitors, assisted by 
northern troops. The private property of Secessionists, but 
otherwise inoffensive citizens, and their cattle, young, unbroken 
colts, and the clothing of women and children, have been 
seized and taken off from citizens of Philippi." 

In a letter to Adjt. Gen. Garnett, June 11th, Col. 
Porterfield says Col. William L. Jackson had reported 
to him for duty. 

"He has been very active and will become a most useful 
officer. Col. Willey, who has also been very zealous and use- 
ful, was left sick in Philippi. I have assurance that he shall 
be well treated." 

Col. Willey 's usefulness consisted in his services in 
burning the bridges between Mannington and Farm- 
ington. 

PHILIPPI COURT OF INQUIRY. 

A court of inquiry into the responsibility for the 
disaster at Philippi was constituted at request of 
Col. Porterfield. Their report was submitted July 
4th. The summary of the testimony shows condi- 
tions existing prior to the attack of Kelley and Du- 
mont, June 3rd: 

"The Court reported that the force at Philippi had con- 
sisted of 600 effective infantry and 175 cavalry, Virginia 
troops, sufficiently well armed but badly and insufficiently sup- 



60 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 

plied with accoutrements and ammunition. They were taken 
by surprise between daybreak and sunrise on the morning of 
June 3rd, no alarm or intimation of their approach having 
been given by the pickets until the enemy was within four or 
five hundred yards and had opened artillery fire. 

"The investigations of the commission had developed that 
a main and picket guard as strong as was consistent with 
the effective infantry force present, was regularly detailed 
and posted at distances sufficiently far out to accomplish the 
object in view, provided they knew and did their duty, which 
latter is strongly to be suspected from the fact that although 
in advance they failed to give any intimation of the enemy's 
approach, a conclusion which is strengthened by the official 
report of the mounted officers out with the scouting parties 
on the night of June 2nd that they had neither seen an infan- 
try picket nor been challenged by its sentinels going from or 
returning to the town that night. 

"It appears that immediately upon the arrival of the com- 
mand at Philippi, the officer in command, Col. Porterfield, 
took measures to place his force, which was raw and new in 
service, under a course of instruction, and to select those, in 
his opinion, best fitted to instruct the sentinels and guards in 
their duties. The testimony shows that while there was a 
certain degree of confusion in some quarters, a portion of the 
command moved from the town in good order, and that the 
whole force, nearly, after passing some distance from the town, 
was reformed and proceeded in order. 

"It is shown in the evidence that an expectation of attack 
or movement upon Philippi shortly to be made was enter- 
tained generally among the officers and others of the command 
and that intelligence (how well founded is not known) was 
brought from time to time of the strength and supposed intent 
of the enemy; that this had so far produced its effect as to 
induce the officer in command to call a meeting of his officers; 
that the result of their consultations and deliberations was an 
almost if not unanimous decision in favor of immediate re- 
treat; that when Col. Porterfield returned to the room (from 
which he had been absent a short time) their opinion was 
conveyed to him, to which he seemed loth to accede, yet de- 



The Surprise and Capture of Philippi 61 

termined to make a further examination of the munitions on 
hand and to prepare the baggage and train for removal at a 
moment's notice. No orders to march at any particular time 
were given, so far as can be gathered from the testimony, 
although it appears that an understanding or impression was 
had or entertained by some that the movement would not 
take place until morning, while some believed it contingent on 
the weather. 

"The record will disclose the fact of a difference of con- 
struction (as to the hour of the return) of the orders given 
to the officer in command of the cavalry company from which 
the scouting party or parties was taken for duty on the night 
of the 2nd June. 

"The testimony of several witnesses bears evidence of the 
cool, deliberate and self-possessed conduct of Col. Porterfield 
on the morning of June 3rd." 

In reviewing the proceedings of the court, Gen. Lee 
remarks that : 

"The position at Philippi was seriously threatened by a 
superior force of the enemy, distant only four hours' march; 
that Col. Porterfield was aware of the danger of his position 
and prudently prepared to vacate it. His desire to prevent 
the occupation of the town by the enemy was worthy of all 
praise, and had he promptly sent back his baggage and inef- 
fective men and arranged his plan of defense and taken proper 
measures to secure information of the advance of the enemy, 
he might safely have retained his position and either given 
battle or retired, as circumstances might dictate. It does not 
appear from the record of the court that any plan of defense 
was formed; but it does appear that the troops retired with- 
out his orders, and that the instructions to the advance guard 
were either misconceived or not executed. To these circum- 
stances must be attributed the disaster that followed, and 
they call for heavy censure of all concerned. 

"The commanding General remarks with pleasure upon the 
coolness, self-possession, courage and energy displayed by Col. 
Porterfield at the moment of attack: but he cannot exonerate 



62 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 

him from blame in not taking proper precautionary measures 
beforehand. Yet, in consideration of all the circumstances, 
he does not think it necessary to do more than express the 
opinion of the court in the hope that the sad effect produced 
by the want of forethought and vigilance as exhibited in this 
case will be a lesson to be remembered by the army through- 
out the war." 



LEE SENDS GARNETT TO MEET THE 
UNION ADVANCE. 

DISPOSITIONS AND PLANS OF THE NEW COMMANDER. 

June 13th, Gen. Lee advised Col. Porterfield that 
Gen. Robert S. Garnett, Adjt. Gen. of the P. A. N. 
Va., had been sent to take command in the North- 
west. June 16th, Gen. Garnett reported to his suc- 
cessor, Adjt. Gen. Cooper, that his command had oc- 
cupied the mountain pass at Laurel Hill, twelve miles 
north of Beverly, and the pass in the Rich Mountain 
on the turnpike leading from Beverly to Buckhannon, 
at a point about seven miles west of Beverly. 

June 18th, Gen. Garnett wrote to Cooper, complain- 
ing of the condition of his command and insufficiency 
of supplies. 

He wrote on the 20th that the enemy was reported 
6,000 strong at Philippi and 4,000 in Grafton, with 
six pieces of artillery at Philippi. His own opinion 
was there were not more than 7,000 men at both 
places. 

He explained his reasons for seizing the two passes 
named. He had heard the enemy were moving from 
Philippi to Buckhannon and made a forced march 
by night to take possession of these passes before 
they could be occupied by the enemy, both being 
necessary to check an advance on Beverly from either 
direction. He presumed it was the object of the 
enemy to seize the two passes and thus shut his forces 
in the valley of Beverly, Huttonsville, etc. But he 
now doubted if anything could be done with the 
Laurel Hill pass. It was not so formidable as he 

63 



64 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 

had been led to suppose, and would present no diffi- 
culty to good light infantry. 

From Laurel Hill, June 25th, Gen. Garnett re- 
ported to Adjt. Gen. Cooper, more in detail, the con- 
dition and surroundings of his command and the 
strategic advantages and disadvantages of his situ- 
ation. He said that he had reached Huttonsville on 
the 14th and found twenty-three companies of 
infantry, mostly mustered in, but "in miserable 
condition as to arms, clothing, equipments, instruc- 
tion and discipline." Twenty of these were organ- 
ized into two regiments, one under Lieut. Col. W. L. 
Jackson, and the other under Lieut. Col. J. M. Heck. 
These two regiments were at once marched to Rich 
Mountain pass and to Laurel Hill. Though the force 
was "wholly incapable" of rendering anything like 
efficient service, he deemed it so important to possess 
the two turnpike passes over Rich Mountain and 
Laurel Hill before they should be seized by the enemy, 
that he left Huttonsville on the evening of the 
15th with the two regiments he had organized there 
and Capt. Rice's battery, and by marching them 
the greater part of the night, reached the two passes 
early in the afternoon of the following day. "I re- 
gard these two passes," says Gen. Garnett, "as the 
gates to the Northwestern country, and had they been 
occupied by the enemy, my command would have been 
effectually paralyzed or shut in the Cheat River val- 
ley. It was a great mistake on the part of the enemy 
not to have remained here after driving Col. Porter- 
field's command over it." 

Gen. Garnett said he had blocked all the country 
roads leading from the northwestern country which 



Lee Sends Garnett 65 

"cross this range of mountains between the foot of 
Cheat Mountain and St. George;" he was now en- 
deavoring to collect grain and cattle from the direc- 
tion of Philippi and Buckhannon, and expected to 
make a depot at the foot of Cheat Mountain six miles 
south of Huttonsville. He regarded his force suffi- 
cient to hold these passes, but not sufficient to hold 
the railroad. He remarks that the road from St. 
George to Cheat River bridge, near Rowlesburg, by 
which he could approach the railroad, is blocked. He 
thinks his best chance of getting to the railroad would 
be by the Morgantown road from Evansville. From 
that point, he could equally menace Grafton, twelve 
miles distant, and Cheat bridge, fourteen miles dis- 
tant; at each of which points the Union army had a 
force. They would be obliged to keep their forces at 
these points, which would enable him to get at the 
road at Independence, five miles from Evansville, de- 
stroy it there and then fall upon the force at Cheat 
River bridge (by marching along the railroad), be- 
fore it could be reinforced from Grafton. The objec- 
tion to this plan was that the enemy at Philippi 
could throw himself on Garnett 's rear. If he had 
sufficient force to hold Laurel Hill securely, his re- 
maining force could regain it from Cheat bridge via 
St. George, with a little work on that road, the 
roads from Philippi (four in number) being blocked 
by Garnett. His "moving force" — say 3,000 — would 
not be sufficient, he feared, for this operation. 

Two companies of infantry were being organized 
at Beverly under Col. Porterfield, who had been as- 
signed temporarily to the command of that place. 



66 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 

"The mass of the country people," said Gen. 
Garnett, ' ' is against us. ' ' 



Gen. Lee, in his acknowledgment of this report, 
says: 

"The rupture of the railroad at Cheat River would be worth 
to us an army." 



July 1st, Gen. Garnett wrote again, asking for ad- 
ditional force: 

"With the railroad running across my entire front, I have 
become satisfied I cannot operate my present position with 
any reasonable expectation of substantial success with the 
present force under my command. My hopes for increase of 
my force in this region have been sadly disappointed. Only 
eight men have joined me here and fifteen at Col. Heck's 
camp. These people are thoroughly imbued with an ignorant 
and bigoted Union sentiment. 

"Unless I am misinformed as to the state of feeling among 
the people and the condition of things in the Kanawha valley, 
it is my opinion that Gen. Wise's command could be of more 
service to the cause by operating in the direction of Parkers- 
burg and the Northwestern Railroad. It would produce a 
very effective diversion in favor of the operations from this 
point." 

In a letter dated July 6th, Gen. Garnett refers to 
this again : 

"Some subsequent information has confirmed me in my 
convictions as to the propriety of such a movement. I learned 
a day or two since from sources in my front that 2,800 men 
who had been put upon light-draft steamers in Pittsburg to 
operate in the Kanawha valley were diverted from that pur- 
pose and landed at Parkersburg; from which place they 
came to Clarksburg, and thence to Buckhannon; where, with 



Lee Sends Garnett 67 

others from Philippi to the number of 3,000 to 4,000, they 
have taken up their position with supporting - forces at Weston 
and Clarksburg, numbers unknown." 

Gen. Garnett did not favor a direct move on Par- 
kersburg, because that, instead of taking the troops 
away from his front, would simply bring in more 
troops from beyond the Ohio ; but if "Wise were to 
retrace his steps from Charleston to Summersville in 
Nicholas county, and go thence to Bulltown in_ Brax- 
ton county — "both of which counties are loyal to our 
cause — he would be within a day's march of Wes- 
ton and threaten both it and Buckhannon; and the 
enemy would have to draw from his force in my front 
to meet him. The valley of the Kanawha is com- 
paratively loyal to our cause, and the force under 
Floyd would be abundant to meet any force which 
it is probable the enemy will send into that region 
for the present." 

Garnett suggested that the enemy could at all 
times maintain superiority of numbers in his vicini- 
ty, and it was a question for the government to de- 
cide "whether the mere paralyzation of a superior 
force of the enemy, with the hope of seizing the rail- 
road if an opportunity should offer, is a sufficient 
object to warrant the maintenance of our forces in 
this region. I have," he adds, "by no means relin- 
quished or abated my hope of being able on some 
favorable occasion to get at the road. But this is a 
contingency. ' ' 

DIVERSION BY WISE. 

To Gen. Garnett 's suggestion of a diversion which 
might be made by Gen. Wise, Gen. Lee replied July 



68 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 

11th, and same date wrote to Wise in regard to it. 
To the latter, he said: 

"Gen. Garnett thinks one of the most effective means of 
keeping the Kanawha valley free is to give Gen. McClellan full 
occupation where he now is. He thinks if your column should 
move from Charleston direct upon Parkersburg it would merely 
have the effect of bringing further reinforcements from Ohio; 
but if it were to march from Sunimersville, in Nicholas county, 
to Bulltown, in Braxton, both of which are loyal to our cause, 
it would be within a few days' march of Weston and would 
threaten both it and Buckhannon, and that the enemy would 
thus be divided and might be struck at in detail. Communica- 
tion with Gen. Garnett can be had by way of Huttonsville. He 
estimates the enemy's force at 6,000 men; at Grafton a few 
hundred; at Clarksburg about 3,000; at Weston 2,000, and at 
Cheat River bridge from 2,000 to 3,000— making a total of 
about 17,000 men." 

In reply to this suggestion, Gen. Wise wrote Gen. 
Lee from Charleston, July 17th : 

"Gen. Garnett was mistaken in his anticipations about the 
enemy not invading the Kanawha valley and in his apprehen- 
sion of my moving from Charleston direct upon Parkersburg. 
We are now on both sides of the Kanawha as high as the 
mouth of Coal River, front to front to the foe. * * * At Coal, 
I have posted 900 efficient men ; at Two-Mile and Elk, say, 800 
efficient, and at Gauley Bridge, Summersville and the Old Mill, 
on the Birch river, in all 1,000, with instructions to scout 
towards Suttonville, where the enemy are already in posses- 
sion. I have anticipated Gen. Garnett, you see, in this move- 
ment. I cannot reinforce him, but he may me, by the road 
leading from Huttonsville up Tygart's valley road to Rack- 
stone, up that fork to where it crosses the range of Rich 
Mountain; thence between Grassy Creek and Back Fork of Elk 
to where it crosses Elk; thence southwest to the head of 
Laurel creek; thence to the head of Big Birch river and down 
the same to the Old Mill near there at the gorge of Birch 
mountain, in my outpost from Summersville. If Gen. Floyd 



Lee Sends Garnett 69 

can reinforce Coal river and Gen. Garnett can, in considerable 
number, reinforce Birch and Elk, T will make a diversion that 
shall distract and defeat the enemy." 

CHEAT RIVER VIADUCT. 

June 22nd, Jefferson Davis wrote to Gen. John- 
son, commanding at Harper's Ferry, suggesting that 
"if the bridge at Cheat River and the Grand (King- 
wood) tunnel could be destroyed so as to prevent 
the use of the railroad for the duration of the war, 
the effect upon public opinion in West Virginia would 
doubtless be of immediate and great advantage to 
our cause." 

From Grafton, June 23rd, Gen. McClellan reported 
to Adjt. Gen. Townsend that he had information 
which made it probable there were from 1,500 to 3,000 
Rebels at Romney, entrenched with a few guns. He 
thought their object was to cover the approach to 
Winchester, and to serve as a base for guerrilla par- 
ties operating towards Piedmont. 



THE UNION ADVANCE ON RICH MOUNTAIN. 

GEN. MCCLELLAN'S PLANS. 

From Parkersburg, June 22nd, Gen. McClellan 
wired Adjt. Gen. Townsend that he was on the point 
of moving forward to Clarksburg, to advance thence 
"either on the rear of the enemy at Beverly or to go 
on to Piedmont." 

From Grafton, June 23rd, McClellan wired Town- 
send: 

"I did not find my orders intelligently carried out for the 
advance on Cheat River, and will go there myself tomorrow 
to see it properly attended to. It is very important to secure 
that line. 

"There is certainly a strong force of some kind near Hut- 
tonsville, with a strong advanced party entrenched near Laurel 
Mountain, between Philippi and Beverly." 

As soon as he could get his command well in hand, 
the General proposed moving with his available force 
from Clarksburg to Buckhannon, "then on Beverly, 
to turn entirely the detachment at Laurel Moun- 
tain," the troops at Philippi to be advanced in time 
to follow up the retreat of the Rebels in their front. 
"After occupying Beverly," he said, "I shall move 
on Huttonsville and endeavor to drive them into the 
mountains, whither I do not propose to follow them 
unless under such circumstances as to make success 
certain. 

"As soon as practicable, I intend to clear out the Valley of 
the Kanawha." 

70 



The Union Advance on Rich Mountain 71 

mcclellan proclaims. 

June 23rd, a proclamation was issued by Gen. 
McClellan from Grafton, "To the Inhabitants of 
Western Virginia," warning them against engaging 
in guerrilla warfare; and another, "To the Soldiers 
of the Army of the West," concluding with these 
words: "Soldiers, I have heard that there was dan- 
ger here. I have come to place myself at your head 
and share it with you. I fear now but one thing — 
that you will not find foemen worthy of your steel." 

REBUKES GEN. MORRIS. 

Somewhat in line with this vainglorious pronounce- 
ment was a rebuke given by McClellan to Gen. Mor- 
ris in a letter to him a fortnight later. While at 
Buckhannon, Gen. McClellan received a letter by 
messenger from Gen. Morris, then in command at 
Philippi with a force of three to four thousand con- 
fronting Garnett at Laurel Hill, written to acquaint 
his superior with the situation there. Gen. Morris' 
letter does not appear with Gen. McClellan 's reply, 
but the reply, dated July 3rd, indicates that Morris 
had expressed apprehension of attack by Gen. Gar- 
nett and fear that the defense of Philippi was not 
sufficiently assured with the force at his command. 
Gen. McClellan 's reply expresses surprise that Mor- 
ris should feel any apprehension and rebukes him 
rather harshly for timidity, adding, however, that he 
had ordered the Sixth Ohio, Col. Latham's company, 
and such of Keys' cavalry as were fit for service, to 
reinforce him. 

"Do not ask for any further reinforcements," said 
McClellan. "If you do, I shall take it as a request 



72 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 

to be relieved from your command and return to In- 
diana. I have spoken plainly. I speak officially. 
* * * I must have generals under me who are will- 
ing to take as much risk as I am. I propose taking 
the really difficult and dangerous part of this work on 
my own hands. ' ' We shall see how McClellan did this 
at Rich Mountain. 

July 6th, from Buckhannon, A. A. Gen. Williams 
sent a letter to Gen. Morris, directing him to move 
next morning to a position within two miles of Gar- 
nett's army, which is particularly described as being 
"near Eliot's farm, in preference on the south side 
of Barker's Mill Run, on the heights in the rear of 
William Yeager's house." He said it was "prefer- 
able to avoid the defile north of the Eliot house by 
crossing the river somewhere near the nineteenth 
milepost from Beverly and recrossing at the ford 
where the Middle Fork road crosses, just at the posi- 
tion to be occupied." Morris was directed to occupy 
Belington by a strong advanced guard, also to cover 
the paths leading from the rebel camp to his left. 
It was added that he was to do all in his power to 
hold Garnett in check in the present position and to 
induce the enemy to believe Morris was to make the 
main attack, "the object being to cut them off at 
Beverly. ' ' 

The reference in this letter to ' ' the nineteenth mile- 
post from Beverly," just at the position Morris was 
directed to take, "within "two miles of the enemy," 
indicates that the distance from Beverly to Garnett 's 
position was seventeen miles, contrary to the opinion 
expressed in Col. Porterfield's letter that it did not 
exceed twelve. 



The Union Advance on Rich Mountain 73 
mcclellan's resources and plans. 

July 5th, Gen. McClellan wrote Adjt. Gen. Town- 
send from Bnckhannon : 

"You will observe that this is the most strategical position 
in this region. From it I can cover our base of operations and 
supplies and move readily by good roads in any desired direc- 
tion. 

"Have directed the positions on Cheat River, Grafton, Web- 
ster, Clarksburg and Parkersburg to be entrenched. The 
bridges and tunnels of the two branches of the road are now 
well guarded. The Cheat River, covering the left of our base, 
is guarded by eleven companies; Grafton, by a regiment; 
Clarksburg, by some eight companies, besides Virginia re- 
cruits; Parkersburg six companies, two regiments of Indiana 
troops to arrive there today and to be disposable as a reserve 

when needed. companies occupy Wirt C. H. Four 

companies at Ravenswood repulsed 0. J. Wise night before 
last. 

"In consequence of the threatening aspect of affairs in the 
Great Kanawha valley, I have ordered four regiments there. 

"Our troops composing the active army are at Philippi, 
amusing the enemy, who is strongly entrenched with artillery 
on Laurel Mountain, between that place and Beverly. I have 
with me here six entire regiments of infantry, six detached 
companies, two batteries, two companies of cavalry. Two 
more regiments and some five or six detached companies of 
infantry will reach here by tomorrow night. 

"The Seventh Ohio occupied Weston three days since, and 
four companies of the Seventeenth reached Glenville from 
Parkersburg yesterday. I ordered strong detachments of these 
companies to move last night on Bulltown, to break up a large 
force of armed rebels congregating there. 

"I expect to find the enemy in strong position on Rich 
Mountain just this side of Beverly. I shall, if possible, turn 
the position to the south and then occupy the Beverly road 
in his rear. * * * From all I learn the enemy is still un- 
certain where the main attack is to be made, and is committing 



74 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 

the error of dividing his army in the face of superior forces. 
If he abandons the position of Laurel Mountain, the troops at 
Philippi will press him closely. I shall know tonight with 
certainty what he has in the pass at Huttonsville." 

Next day McClellan despatched Townsend: 

"By the 8th or 9th, at latest, I expect to occupy Beverly, 
fighting a battle in the meanwhile. I propose to drive the 
enemy over the mountains towards Staunton, and expect your 
further orders by telegraph whether to move on Staunton or 
towards Wytheville." 

Same date McClellan to Townsend: 

"I expect to attack the enemy on the 8th or 9th. He is 
entrenched on Rich Mountain. Have ordered Morris to move 
in the morning his command (sixty-two companies and one 
battery) to within one and a half miles of Laurel Mountain, 
where the enemy is strongly entrenched." 

To the first telegram, Townsend replied: 

"When you speak of extending your operations to Staun- 
ton, and even to Wytheville, the General fears your line will 
be too long without intermediate supports. He wishes you to 
weigh well these points before deciding." 

July 10th, from Middle Fork bridge, McClellan 
wired Townsend: 

"In sight of the enemy, who is strongly entrenched. I 
think I can turn his position. My other column from Phil- 
ippi is within a mile of the entrenchments on Laurel Hill ; 
advanced guards within two hundred yards of the enemy on 
each line. Shall make no further extended movement with- 
out laying the whole case before the General and obtaining 
his orders in advance." 



THE ACTION AT RICH MOUNTAIN. 

FEDERAL REPORTS. 

When the last foregoing despatch was written, Gen. 
McClellan, with the main body of his army, was at 
Roaring creek, a tributary of the Middle Fork river, 
where he confronted the force under Col. Pegram, 
entrenched near the west base of Rich Mountain, on 
the Beverly and Buckhannon turnpike. 

What followed is related in several reports, as 
follows : 

The official reports of Gen. McClellan to the War Depart- 
ment at Washington; 

•Report of Gen. Rosecrans, second in command, to Gen. 
McClellan ; 

Testimony of Gen. Rosecrans before the Committee on the 
Conduct of the War, at Washington, in 1865. 

MCCLELLAN 'S REPORTS OF PROGRESS. 

Following wires were sent by Gen. McClellan to 
Townsend, prior to writing his official report: 

From the top of Rich Mountain, 9 :00 a. m., July 
12th : 

"We are in possession of all the enemy's works up to a 
point in sight of Beverly. * * * Rosecrans' column left 
camp yesterday morning and marched some eight miles through 
the mountains, reaching the turnpike some two or three miles 
in the rear of the enemy, driving out a defensive force and 
taking a couple of guns. I had position ready for twelve 
guns near main camp, and as guns were moving up ascertained 
that the enemy had retreated. Am now pushing on to Beverly 
and part of Rosecrans' troops are within three miles of it." 

75 



76 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virgini, 

From Beverly, July 12th, 8 :00 p. m. : 

"I turned the enemy's very strong entrenchments on Rich 
Mountain yesterday with Gen. Rosecrans' brigade and one 
company of cavalry. Had a spirited action with a large party 
of the enemy, who had two guns on the summit of the moun- 
tain. Captured both guns and killed a large number of the 
enemy. This morning as we were in the act of moving twelve 
guns into position to command the enemy's entrenchments by 
a road cut last evening, it was ascertained that he had left 
in the utmost confusion. I advanced on Beverly and occupied 
it with the least possible delay, thus cutting off Garnett's re- 
treat on Huttonsville and forcing him to take the Leadsville 
and Saint George road. Captured official papers show Gar- 
nett's forces to have been ten thousand men. Have ordered 
Gen. Morris to press him closely, and have given instructions 
by telegraph which will throw 5,000 to 6,000 men and four 
guns in his front, so that there is good reason to hope we may 
yet capture him. 

"I shall move on Huttonsville tomorrow morning and en- 
deavor to seize Cheat Mountain pass before the enemy can 
occupy it in strength. With that pass seized, the position 
on Cheat River strongly occupied, and Gauley Bridge held, 
as it is probably by this time by Gen. Cox, I think we shall 
have placed the occupation of Western Virginia on a safe 
basis." 

From Beverly, July 13th : 

"Garnett abandoned his camp early this morning. He 
came within a few miles of Beverly, but our rapid march 
turned him back in great confusion and he is now retreating 
on the road to Saint George. I have ordered Gen. Morris to 
follow him closely and have telegraphed for two Pennsylvania 
regiments at Cumberland to join Gen. Hill at Rowlesburg. 
The General is concentrating all his troops at Rowlesburg to 
cut off Garnett's retreat near West Union, or, if possible, 
Saint George." 



RICH MOUNTAIN. 

mcclellan's report to GEN. SCOTT. 

Headquarters Army of Occupation, Western Virginia, 

Gamp near Euttonsville, July 14, 1861. 

Colonel: I have the honor to submit, for the informa- 
tion of the commanding general, the following report of the 
operations of the forces under my command from the time 
of my leaving Grafton : 

Previous to my departure from Grafton I became satis- 
fied that a large body of the rebel army (supposed to consist 
of six or seven thousand men, under Brigadier General Rob- 
ert S. Garnett, formerly of the United States army) occupied 
an intrenched position at Laurel Hill, about thirteen miles 
south of Philippi, on the turnpike leading to Beverly, with 
the apparent intention of making a determined stand at that 
point. Whereupon I at once resolved to push on with all 
the available force at my disposal, and endeavor, by making 
a rapid detour through Buckhannon, to reach Beverly and 
strike their rear, cutting off their supply communication 
from Staunton. 

As soon as I had concentrated my forces at Buckhannon, 
I moved forward, and at the same time ordered General 
Morris to advance from Philippi and take a commanding 
position about a mile and a half distant, and directly op- 
posite the enemy's works, thereby enabling him to divert 
their attention from me, also to watch their movements and 
be in position to act promptly after I had reached their rear 
at Beverly. 

General Morris promptly responded to my order and se- 
cured the proper position with but slight resistance, and I 
pushed forward with my column as rapidly as my means of 
transportation would permit. 

On the evening of the 9th instant I arrived at Roaring 
creek, near the base of Rich Mountain, where I found the 

77 



78 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 

enemy, in considerable force, had destroyed a bridge, and 
were strongly intrenched at a point where the road enters a 
defile leading up the mountain, about tAvo miles distant from 
my camp. On the morning of the 10th I ordered a recon- 
naissance in force, consisting of the 9th and 4th Ohio volun- 
teers and Loomis's battery, under the supervision of Lieu- 
tenant Poe, topographical engineers. This was pushed within 
two hundred yards of the enemy's guns, and resulted in the 
loss of one man killed and one wounded, but the dense thickets 
with which their works were surrounded prevented the attain- 
ment of much positive or satisfactory information. It served, 
however, to confirm my previous supposition that the in- 
trenchments were held by a large force, with several guns in 
position to command the first approaches, and that a direct 
assault would result in a heavy and unnecessary loss of life. 
These considerations at once determined me to make an effort 
to turn their flank and commence the attack from the rear. 
Accordingly, I ordered General Rosecrans to move at 4 o'clock 
in the morning with the 19th Ohio, the 8th, 10th, and 13th 
Indiana regiments, and Burdsall's dragoons, to cut his way 
through the almost impenetrable thickets of brush to the lofty 
summit of Rich Mountain, at Hart's farm, about five miles 
distant, and to move thence at once down the turnpike road 
and attack the intrenchments in rear, and, during the progress 
of his march, to communicate with me every hour. The re- 
mainder of the force under my command to be held in readi-' 
iic^s to assault in front as soon as Rosecrans' musketry 
should indicate that he was immediately in their rear. The 
order to General Rosecrans to attack the rear of the enemy's 
lower intrenchments was not carried out, but his brigade re- 
mained at Hart's farm during the remainder of the day and 
night, and I received no communication from him after about 
11 o'clock a. m., when he was still distant about a mile and 
a half from Hart's farm. 

About the time I expected the general to reach the rear 
of their intrenchments I moved up all my available force 
to the front and remained, in person, just in rear of the ad- 
vance pickets, ready to assault when the indicated moment 
should arrive. In the meantime I sent Lieutenant Poe to 



Rich Mountain 79 

find such a position for our artillery as -would enable us to 
command the works. Late in the afternoon I received his 
report that he had found such a place. I immediately detailed 
a party to cut a road to it for our guns, but it was too late 
to get them into position before dark, and, as I had received 
no intelligence whatever of General Rosecrans' movements, 
I finally determined to return to camp, leaving merely suf- 
ficient force to cover the working party. Orders were then 
given to move up ten guns with the entire available infantry 
at daybreak the following morning. As the troops were much 
fatigued, some delay occurred in moving from camp, and 
just as the guns were starting intelligence was received that 
the enemy had evacuated their works and fled over the moun- 
tains, leaving all their guns, means of transportation, am- 
munition, tents, and baggage behind. Then, for the first time 
since 11 o'clock the previous day, I received a communication 
from General Rosecrans giving me the first intimation that 
he had taken the enemy's position at Hart's farm, from which 
it appeared that he, with great difficulty, and almost super- 
human efforts on the part of his men, had forced his way up 
the precipitous side of the mountain, and at about 1 p. m. 
reached the summit, where he encountered a portion of the 
enemy's forces, with two guns in position behind earth and 
log works, affording protection to their men. 

The attack was commenced by the enemy with heroic 
spirit and determination. They opened upon the advance of 
our column with volleys of musketry and rapid discharges of 
canister, killing several of our men and at first throwing 
them into some confusion. They, however, soon rallied and 
returned a brisk and accurate fire, which told with terrible 
effect in the enemy's ranks, killing and wounding nearly 
every man at their guns. The troops then advanced, continu- 
ing their well-directed fire until they drove the enemy from 
their position and caused them to take flight down the turn- 
pike towards their intrenchments at the base of the moun- 
tain. 

The troops then encamped on the battle-field at about 2 
o'clock p. m., and remained there until the following morn- 
ing, when I made a rapid march and occupied Beverly. I 



80 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 

here learned that General Garnett, as soon as he discovered 
we were approaching his rear and had cut off his retreat in 
this direction, abandoned his intrenchnients at Laurel Hill, 
leaving his tents and other property, and had made a hasty 
retreat in the night over a rough country road leading towards 
St. George. General Morris had been repeatedly instructed by 
me to keep a close watch upon Garnett's movements, and to 
be ready the moment he retreated to follow him up vigor- 
ously with all his available force and crush him if possible; 
but, much to my surprise, when he discovered that Garnett 
had escaped, he only sent a portion of his force about eight 
miles, and then halted it for several hours to communicate 
with me and bring up re-enforcements. 

This detention gave Garnett the opportunity to get far 
in advance, and had it not been for the rapid and well- 
directed march of the advance conducted by Captain Benham, 
it is believed that the rebel general would have escaped un- 
harmed. Captain Benham is entitled to great praise for his 
prompt and energetic movement upon Garnett's rear, the re- 
sult of which will be seen from his report enclosed. This 
shows that General Garnett and about twenty others of the 
enemy were killed, and fifty prisoners, two stands of colors, 
and one rifled cannon taken, besides the baggage train and 
a large amount of other property I take very great pleas- 
ure in recommending Captain Benham to the special notice 
of the general-in-chief. 

Immediately after learning that Garnett had retreated, I 
ordered Brigadier General Hill (commanding at Grafton) to 
assemble all his disposable force and endeavor, by a rapid 
march upon Saint George or West Union, to cut off the re- 
treat of the rebels ; but I have not yet heard the result of 
his movement. My last advices this evening report General 
Hill's advance within four miles of the retreating rebels. 

I have not time now to notice individual acts of merit and 
bravery displayed in the recent conflicts, but shall take an 
early opportunity of presenting them to you in detail. I 
cannot, however, let the present occasion pass without making 
mention of the services of Brigadier General Rosecrans in 
conducting his command up the very precipitous sides of the 



Rich Mountain 81 

mountains and overcoming the formidable obstacles which 
impeded his progress; also, for the very handsome manner 
in which he planned and directed his attack upon the rebels 
at Hart's farm, carrying them after a stout and determined 
resistance. I also consider it due to my volunteer aide-de- 
camp, Colonel F. W. Lander, to speak of his services in 
this connection. He (by the request of General Rosecrans) 
accompanied his column, and by his experience assisted ma- 
terially in conducting the troops over a most difficult coun- 
try, and displayed extraordinary activity and courage in the 
battle. He escaped unhurt, having the horse under him dis- 
abled by a canister shot. 

I pursued the retreating rebels yesterday as far as Cheat 
River, and became satisfied that they would not stop short of 
Staunton. I therefore returned to this camp, which commands 
the communication between eastern and western Virginia over 
the Staunton and Parkersburg turnpike. 

General Garnett's command, when last heard from, were 
retreating in great confusion near the north branch of the 
Potomac on the road leading from West Union to Williams- 
port. 

I trust I will not be regarded as merely conforming to a 
formula when I express the great obligations due to my per- 
sonal and general staff, who by their good judgment, un- 
tiring energy and cool conduct, have enabled me to overcome 
the inevitable difficulties of an imperfect and hasty organiza- 
tion, and to accomplish whatever good results have been 
achieved. As far as I have myself observed and learned from 
their officers, the conduct of the volunteers who participated 
in the actions at Rich Mountain and at Carrick's Ford was 
unexceptionable. They invariably displayed an ardent desire 
to meet the enemy, and great gallantry in action, and, in my 
judgment, all they require to make good and reliable soldiers 
is a little more drill and discipline. 

The results of the action at Rich Mountain, as nearly as 
can be ascertained, were as follows: Our loss in killed, 12; 
wounded, 59 ; no prisoners. The loss of the enemy in killed, 
135; wounded and prisoners (not yet reported,) as near as 
can be determined, between 800 and 900. Two brass 6-pounder 



82 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 

cannon, a large number of muskets, two stands of colors, and 
other property, were taken. Two 6-pounder brass cannon 
were captured at the lower intrenchments, with a large 
wagon train, with horses and a large number of tents. But 
the really important results of these operations are the com- 
plete rout and annihilation of the rebel forces, the capture of 
one and the death of the other of their leaders, that this por- 
tion of Western Virginia is entirely freed from their presence 
and that there is now not one single organized band of the 
rebels on this side of the mountain north of the Kanawha 
valley. 

After my arrival at Beverly I received a note from Colonel 
Pegram, containing a proposition to surrender his command 
as prisoners of war. This note, with my reply, are enclosed. 
His command, consisting of 33 commissioned officers and 560 
men, are now prisoners. 

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, Major General U. S. Army. 

Colonel E. D. Townsend, A. A. G., 



ROSECRANS' REPORT TO McCLELLAN. 

Headquarters of the Army, Washington, D. C. 
Headquarters 1st Brigade U. S. Volunteer Militia. 
Beverly, Virginia, July 19, 1861. 

Major: In obedience to the order of the major general 
commanding, I have the honor to submit the following report 
of the operations of the 1st brigade, consisting of the 8th and 
10th Indiana volunteer militia, the 13th Indiana U. S. vol- 
unteer infantry, and 19th Ohio U. S. volunteer militia, which 
resulted in dislodging the rebel forces from their intrenched 
position at camp Garnett on Rich Mountain. 

After the armed reconnaissance was over, by direction of 
the major general I ordered the 8th Indiana to bivouac in 
advance of the camp at Roaring creek, and the 10th and 13th 
into camp. 

About 10 p. m. I came to the headquarters with a plan 
for turning the enemy's position. The general, having con- 
sidered it and heard the information on which it was based, 
was pleased to direct me to carry it out, and for that pur- 
pose ordered Colonel Sullivan, of the 13th Indiana, and 
BurdsalPs cavalry, temporarily attached to the brigade, and 
that the movement should begin at daylight on the next morn- 
ing. 

The troops were ordered to parade in silence under arms, 
without knapsacks, with one day's rations in their haversacks 
and their canteens filled with water. By inadvertence the as- 
sembly was sounded in the 19th Ohio regiment and lights put 
in several tents, when I discovered it ; but they were promptly 
extinguished. 

The pickets relieved, the regimental camps and guards with 
the sick, and a few men of each eompany remaining, orders 
were given that the reveille should be beaten at the usual hour, 
and the column formed and moved forward in the following 
order and strength: 

83 



84 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 

First. 8th Indiana, under Benton 242 strong 

Second. 10th Indiana, under Manson 425 " 

Third. 13th Indiana, under Sullivan.. 650 

Fourth. 19th Ohio, under Beatty 525 

Total infantry 1,842 

Fifth. Burdsall's cavalry 75 

Aggregate 1,917 

Colonel Lander, accompanied by the guide, led the way 
through a pathless forest over rocks and ravines, keeping far 
down on the southeastern declivities of the mountain spurs 
and using no axe, to avoid discovery by the enemy, who 
we supposed would be on the alert by reason of the appear- 
ance of unusual stir in our camp and the lateness of the 
hour. A rain set in about 6 a. m. and lasted until about 
11 o'clock a. m., with intermissions, during which the col- 
umn pushed cautiously and steadily forward, and arrived at 
last and halted in rear of the crest on the top of Rich Moun- 
tain, hungry and weary with an eight-hours' march over a 
most unkindly road. They lay down to rest, while Colonel 
Lander and the general examined the country. It was found 
that the guide was too much scared to be with us longer, 
and we had another valley to cross, another hill to climb, 
another descent beyond that to make, before we could reach 
the Beverly road at the top of the mountain. On this road 
we started at 2 o'clock and reached the top of the mountain 
after the loss of an hour's time, by mistake in the direction 
of the head of the column, in rectifying which the 10th In- 
diana took the advance. 

Shortly after passing over the crest of the hill, the head 
of the column, ordered to be covered by a company deployed 
as skirmishers, was fired on by the enemy's pickets, killing 
Sergt. James A. Taggart and dangerously wounding Capt. 
Christopher Miller, of the 10th. The column then advanced 
through dense brushwood, emerging into rather more open 
brushwood and trees, when the rebels opened a fire of both 
musketry and 6-pounders, firing some case shot and a few 
shells. 



Rosecrans' Report to McClellan 85 

The 10th advanced and took position at A, Plan No. 1, 
with one company deployed as skirmishers covering its front. 
The 8th advanced and halted in column of fours at B. The 
13th advanced to C, in an old road, where it was ordered to 
occupy the heights, with three companies at d d d, and skir- 
mish down the hill, keeping strong reserves on the top; three 
companies were ordered back to E, to cover the debouch up 
the valley on the left; the companies of the remainder were 
to fill the space in the line marked | | | , the remain- 
ing two companies standing in column at . The 19th Ohio 
came down the road and halted in column at H.* 

Owing to misunderstanding orders, Colonel Sullivan oc- 
cupied the hill with his whole regiment, and it took forty 
minutes to correct the error and get in the proper position as 
indicated. The command forward was then given, and an- 
other company from the right of the 10th deployed as skir- 
mishers, leaving an interval through which the 8th could pass 
in column and charge the rebel battery on the left of their 
position at Z as soon as our fire had told properly. At the 
same time Colonel Sullivan was to take his four companies 
and charge around the road on the left. After an advance 
of fifty yards and some heavy firing from our line, the en- 
emy showed signs of yielding, and 1 gave orders to the 8th 
and sent them to the colonel of the 13th, to charge in column. 
The 8th made a mistake and got into line at B, where, in 
consideration of their abundant supplies of ammunition, I 
left them. 

The 13th went into column at D, Plan 2. Seven companies 
of the 19th Ohio deployed into line at H and delivered two 
splendid volleys, when the enemy broke. Meanwhile I rode 
round to the 13th and drove them in to charge up across the 
road, as shown at L. The 10th charged by fours at J. The 
8th came down and charged upon the rebel front at K. 

The battle was over, the enemy dispersed, one piece of can- 
non taken at A, another at B, and their dead and wounded 
scattered over the hill-side. 



*Gen. Rosecrans' battle plans were not found by the compilers 
with his report. 



86 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 

Learning from a captive that the 44th Virginia and some 
Georgia troops and cavalry were below, and finding it too 
late to continue the operations against the rebels' position 
that evening with troops as much exhausted as were ours, 
and threatened, too, by succors, the troops were bivouacked in 
the position shown on Plan No. 2 — Lieutenant Colonel Hol- 
lingsworth going down on the ridge with six companies to 
the position mentioned, within half a mile of the rebel pickets. 

The two brass 6-pounders captured were put in order, and, 
under command of Captain Conckle, 19th Ohio, placed — one 
looking down the Beverly road at C, the other at d, looking 
towards camp Garnett. 

During that rainy night our men bivouacked cheerfully, 
and turned out with great promptitude whenever the rebels 
by their movements alarmed our pickets. About 3 o'clock in 
the morning of the 12th our pickets brought in a prisoner from 
the rebel camp, from whom I learned their forces were dis- 
organized and probably dispersing. This determined the disposi- 
tions for the attack on the camp. I ordered Colonel Beatty, 
with all the 19th, to proceed along the ridge and take their 
position on the south side of the road, and directed BurdsalPs 
cavalry, accompanied by one company of the 10th Indiana, 
to reconnoitre down the road. Colonel Sullivan, with the 
13th, was to follow the movement promptly, and by his skir- 
mishers to clean the hill-side north of the road. 

These orders were obeyed, and, finding the position aban- 
doned, Burdsall's cavalry and company C, 10th Indiana regi- 
ment, entered the camp about 6 o'clock a. m., where they 
found and took prisoners ten (10) officers, five (5) non-com- 
missioned officers, fifty-four (54) privates, the descriptive list 
of which is hereto attached, and marked A. Colonel Beatty 
entered the upper camp about the same time and occupied it, 
taking charge of the property, among which were two brass 
6-pounders, and some eighty tents, four caissons, and one 
hundred (100) rounds of ammunition. Colonel Sullivan, of 
the 13th Indiana, came in and occupied the camp on the north 
side of the road, and took charge of the horses, wagons, tents, 
tools, and implements of the rebels there. 



Rosecrans' Report to McClellan 87 

The 8th and 10th Indiana were left in possession on the 
battle-field, and were charged with the duty of burying the 
dead. They remained until next morning, the 13th, when the 
whole force moved forward to their present encampment at 
Beverly. 

Having given the details, I close my report by the follow- 
ing 

SUMMARY OF THE MOVEMENT. 

With strong detachments from the 19th Ohio, the 8th, 10th 
and 13th Indiana, and BurdsalPs cavalry, amounting to 1,912 
rank and file, I set out at 5 a. m. of the 11th, and by a cir- 
cuitous route through a trackless mountain forest reached 
the Beverly road at the top of Rich Mountain, where I found 
the enemy advised of my approach, and in force with two 
6-pounders, field-pieces, and infantry, from various circum- 
stances judged to have been from 800 to 1,200 strong, though 
probably not all of them in action. We formed at about 3 
o'clock, under cover of our skirmishers, guarding well against 
a flank attack from the direction of the rebels' position, and 
after a brisk fire, which threw the rebels into confusion, car- 
ried their position by a charge, driving them from behind 
some log breastworks, and pursued them into the thickets on 
the mountain. We captured twenty-one (21) prisoners, two 
brass 6-pounders, fifty stand of arms, and some corn and 
provisions. Our loss was twelve (12) killed, and forty-nine 
( 49 ) wounded. 

The rebels had some twenty (20) wounded on the field. 
The number of the killed we could not ascertain, but sub- 
sequently the number of burials reported to this date is one 
hundred and thirty-five (135), many found scattered over the 
mountain. Our troops were informed that there were one or 
two regiments of rebels towards Beverly, and finding the hour 
late, bivouacked on their arms, amid a cold, drenching rain, 
to await daylight, when they moved forward on the enemy's 
intrenched position, which was found abandoned by all ex- 
cept sixty-three (63) men, who were taken prisoners. 

We took possession of two brass 6-pounders, four caissons, 
and one hundred rounds of ammunition, two kegs and one 



88 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 

barrel of powder, 19,000 buck and ball cartridges, two stands 
of colors, and a large lot of equipments and clothing, consist- 
ing of 204 tents, 427 pairs pants, 124 axes, 9S picks, 134 
spades and shovels; all their train, consisting of 29 wagons, 
75 horses, 4 mules, and 60 pairs harness. 

The enemy finding their position turned, abandoned in- 
trenchments which taken by the front would have cost us a 
thousand lives, and dispersed through the mountains, some 
attempting to escape by the way of Laurel Hill, and others 
aiming for Huttonsville. Among the former were the com- 
mand of Colonel Pegram, which, unable to join the rebels at 
Laurel Hill, surrendered to the major general on the 13th. 
Our loss in the engagement, killed and wounded, is shown in 
the statement hereto appended, marked B. The list of prison- 
ers taken is shown in the paper hereto appended, marked D. 
The invoice of property captured and turned over to the post 
quartermaster is hereto annexed, marked E. 

In closing this report, I deem it proper to observe that, 
considering the inexperience of both officers and men, the 
fact that one-fourth were on picket guard the previous evening, 
and had a most fatiguing march through the rain, and with 
only inadequate supplies of food, their conduct was admirable. 

Among those w T ho are entitled to special mention are Colo- 
nel Lander, who, with the guide, led the way into the very 
midst of the action; Colonel Manson, of the 10th Indiana, 
who was everywhere along his line, inspiring the men by his 
voice and presence, and w T ho bravely led the charge of his 
regiment. 

Colonel Benton was ready to obey orders, and moved among 
his men with alacrity. 

Colonel Sullivan charged with his command as the rebels 
were dispersing, and captured several of the prisoners. Major 
Wilson, of the 8th, was conspicuous for coolness and prompt- 
itude of action. Lieutenant Colonel Colgrove, of the 8th, 
deserves especial mention for his coolness while forming his 
lines of the regiment under fire. Major Foster, of the 13th, 
showed coolness and self-possession in forming a portion of his 
men under the fire of the cannon. 



Rosecrans' Report to McClellan 89 

My thanks are due to Captain Kingsbury, my assistant adju- 
tant general, and to Captain A. Irwin Harrison, for their 
valuable and efficient aid in carrying orders under fire. 

The 10th Indiana was under fire for an hour and a half. 

The 19th Ohio distinguished itself for the cool and hand- 
some manner in which they held their post against a flank 
attack, and for the manner in which they came into line and 
delivered their fire near the close of the action. 

I consider Colonel Beatty to have managed his men well, 
and to have been ably seconded by Colonel Hollingsworth and 
Major Buckley. 

For the individuals who distinguished themselves under the 
eyes of their regimental commanders, I respectfully refer to 
the report of the colonels of regiments herewith submitted. 

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

W. S. ROSECRANS, 
Brigadier General United States Army. 

Major S. Williams, A. A. G., 

United States Army, Headquarters Army of West Virginia. 



GEN. ROSECRANS' ACCOUNT OF THE BAT- 
TLE GIVEN BEFORE A COMMIT- 
TEE OF CONGRESS. 

Gen. Rosecrans' official report to Gen. McClellan 
was written in Beverly a week after the battle. He 
was called before the Committee of Congress on the 
Conduct of the War, to whom he made a sworn de- 
tailed statement of his campaigns, April 22, 1865. 
In that statement is embraced the substance of his 
official report to Gen. McClellan, and some additional 
facts and explanations elicited by the inquiries of the 
Committee. The discerning reader by scanning Gen. 
McClellan 's report and this statement of Gen. Rose- 
crans will be able to judge whether the commanding 
officer was fair to his subordinate and whether he 
himself acted the part of a brave soldier in that en- 
gagement. 

Answering questions of the Chairman, Gen. Rose- 
crans, after detailing the circumstances of his in- 
duction into the service, said: 

Of the campaign in Western Virginia in 1861, I have to 
state that as soon as Garnett entered West Virginia he moved, 
with his main column, to Lanrel Hill, on the Beverly and 
Wehster road, seventeen miles north of Beverly;* while Gen. 
Pegram, with a considerable column — seizing the pass over 
Rich Mountain, on the Beverly and Ripley turnpike — covered 
Garnett's communications with his base at Staunton. 

General McClellan, having ordered Gen. Morris with all 
his available force to confront Garnett, moved from Camp 



*Col. Porterfleld thinks this distance does not exceed 
twelve miles. 

90 



Gen. Rosecrans' Account of the Battle 91 

Dennison to Parkersburg the 22d of June. 1861 , where he 
assembled three small brigades and two batteries. I was 
ordered to accompany him, and at Parkersburg placed in com- 
mand of a provisional brigade, consisting of the 8th and 10th 
Indiana, and the 17th and 19th Ohio volunteer infantry, three 
months' service. Moving McCook's and Schleick's brigades to 
Grafton, he left me in command at Parkersburg, whence, un- 
der his orders, I moved to Clarksburg on the 28th, and im- 
mediately advanced to Duncan's farm, 15 miles distant on the 
road to Buckhannon, where I encamped and reported for 
orders. 

General McClellan having determined that General Morris 
should watch the motions of Garnett, while he, with the re- 
mainder of his available force, should move by the way of 
Buckhannon and Rich Mountain to Beverly, permitted me to 
occupy Buckhannon, which I did by a night march; and on 
my arrival found, contrary to our information and belief, 
that the citizens were mainly loyal, and that the place had 
never been in the hands of the enemy for more than a few 
hours. 

As soon as General McClellan's troops had concentrated at 
this point and his supplies came up, he moved, reaching Roar- 
ing creek, at the foot of the western slope of Rich Mountain, 
about 3 o'clock p. m. of the second day, where the command 
went into camp in a drenching rain. Reconnoitring the enemy, 
he was found posted in a strong natural position on the turn- 
pike near the foot of the mountain — his right covered by an 
almost impenetrable laurel thicket — his left resting high up 
on the spur of the mountains, and his front defended by a 
log breast-work, in front of which was an abatis of fallen 
timber. As the second in rank, the command of the camp de- 
volved on me, and my first duty was to know the locality. 
I soon learned that a young man named Hart, whose father 
kept a tavern in the gap at the top of Rich Mountain, was 
loyal, and had been seen in our camp; and that, having 
herded cattle, he knew the mountains thoroughly, which fact 
I reported to Lieut. Poe, chief engineer at General McClellan's 
headquarters, suggesting that search should be made for this 
young man and his information obtained. 



92 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 

On the 9th of July, Gen. McClellan, having completed his 
preparations, ordered a reconnaissance in force, which was 
made by McCook's brigade, supported by my own, and resulted 
in disclosing the great strength of the enemy's position with- 
out ascertaining his numbers. On returning from this re- 
connoissance, Gen. McClellan directed me to occupy the front 
with my brigade, which was to lead in the attack he intended 
to make the next morning. Having made the necessary dis- 
positions, on returning to my tent an officer of my command 
informed me that he had found young Hart. Being brought 
to my tent, the young man informed me that the enemy's 
camp was two and three-quarter miles west of his father's 
house at the top of the mountain, where they had their hospi- 
tal and commissary stores; that it was possible to reach the 
top of the mountain by a circuitous route through the forest 
around the enemy's left to a point within a mile and a half of 
the gap, whence there was a practicable sled and cart road 
to his father's house. He stated he had no doubt he could 
conduct a body of troops to this point, even in the night, 
but that they could not take with them any artillery. I 
immediately repaired to the tent of Gen. McClellan with 
this information, showed him a sketch, and explained it. I 
then asked him if he desired to see young Hart, and at his 
request brought the young man to his tent, where the gen- 
eral questioned him very carefully. I then sent Hart to 
my tent to await orders, and said to the general : "Now, general, 
if you will allow me to take my brigade I will take this 
guide and, by a night's march, surprise the enemy at the 
gap, get possession of it, and thus hold his only line of 
retreat. You can then take him on the front. If he gives 
way we shall have him; if he fights I will leave a portion of 
the force at the gap and with the remainder fall upon his 
rear." Col. Marcy, chief of staff, at once fell in with my 
suggestion, and the general, after an hour's deliberation, as- 
sented, stating that as one of my regiments (the 17th Ohio) 
was absent, he would give me the 13th Indiana, Col. Jeremiah 
Sullivan; and then inquired about what time I thought I 
could reach the point, which was a matter of importance to 
know, so as to time his attack. I said I supposed I might 



Gen. Rosecrans' Account of the Battle 93 

be able to reach it by 10 o'clock on the morning of the 11th, 
and that I thought he could safely begin his attack on that 
supposition. But it was finally decided that, as unforeseen 
obstacles might arise to retard the time of my reaching the 
gap, I should take Burdsall's cavalry and send a message 
back every ten minutes, reporting progress, while he was to 
hold his troops in readiness to commence the attack the mo- 
ment he heard the noise of my firing. I then gave him the fol- 
lowing as my proposed arrangement : "The troops to be formed 
in front of his quarters at 3 o'clock in the morning, and to 
enter the forest at the front line of our pickets at daylight 
with one day's rations." To this arrangement he assented, 
and an invitation to Col. Lander to accompany me completed 
the programme. 

The troops entered the forest in the morning in a terrible 
rain-storm. As it was now daylight, and the enemy might 
discover our movements, on consultation with the guide and 
Col. Lander, who accompanied him, it was deemed best to in- 
cline much further to the right than had been at first intended, 
which lengthened the route. At 11 a. m., weary and wet, the 
column halted on the brink of a deep valley, the opposite side 
of which was the last ascent, except a small one, before reach- 
ing the road that would bring us to an open wood with 
a gentle descent three-quarters of a mile to the object of our 
march. From this point I despatched to Gen. McClellan stat- 
ing this fact, and that, owing to the excessive roughness of 
the road, almost impassable for horses, and to the fatigue of 
the animals, I should not send another despatch until I had 
something of importance to communicate. Down through 
this gorge, and toiling slowly up the opposite ascent, the head 
of the column arrived at, within a short distance of the top 
of the mountain, a cleared field, after eleven hours' marching, 
at about 1 p. m., where, halting, the men were directed to rest 
and lunch, while, with the guide and Col. Lander, I recon- 
noitred our position. 

To the east, apparently near our feet, though seven miles 
distant, lay Beverly. Cavalry horses were hitched in the 
streets; the end of a tented encampment appeared on the 
right, partly hidden by the mountain; wagons were passing, 



94 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 

all indicating the presence of a considerable force in Beverly. 
Beyond the depression in the open ground in front of us was 
a low wooded crest which we had to ascend, and thence it was 
but a short mile to Hart's tavern. At two o'clock the 
column, closed in mass, was moved noiselessly and swiftly 
across the open ground into the edge of the forest, and 
thence, after some difficulty in finding the way, wound up 
the hill to the top of the crest, which it reached about half 
past two o'clock, in a terrific shower, and was fired upon by 
the enemy's advance guard. The 10th Indiana rapidly ad- 
vanced, inclining to the right, along the crest of a steep de- 
clivity overlooking the Beverly road, halted and formed in 
line of battle just out of range of the enemy's musketry. 
The 8th Indiana, under my orders, halted in column, while the 
13th Indiana, following the 10th, formed on its left and oc- 
cupied a spur of the mountain covered by a thicket over- 
looking the field in front of the enemy's position. The 19th 
Ohio halting faced towards the enemy's encampment in the 
direction of which lay a broad well-trodden way. 

The enemy, posted behind log breastworks nearly parallel 
to the road, opened upon us with artillery from a point on 
each of his flanks, while the sharpshooters occupied the line 
of fence in front of his position. Owing to a mistake in 
its movements the 13th Indiana took forty minutes to get into 
the proper position and to occupy the thicket in front of 
our left; so that it was forty minutes after three o'clock 
before our line of battle was ready to advance. All this time 
the enemy was firing on us with his artillery, which, however, 
did us but little damage, most of the shots going over the 
heads of the troops, while we could do nothing but annoy 
them by our skirmishers. When the line was ready to move, 
I brought down the 8th Indiana, and directed it, taking ad- 
vantage of the cover on the right of our line, to make its 
way to and capture the artillery on the enemy's left. By 
mistake Col. Benton took the direction of the centre. He 
was then directed to take advantage of a roll in the ground 
and charge another gun of the enemy's towards our left. Mis- 
understanding this, he passed through an interval between th£ 
wings of the 10th, and began deploying in front of his left. 



Gen. Rosecrans' Account of the Battle 95 

I directed him to remain in that position, and the colonel 
of the 10th to form his left wing in column on the left 
platoon, and be ready to charge the enemy's line in due time. 
The whole line advanced. Col. Sullivan had been ordered to 
take a portion of the 13th, which had remained in column 
for want of space, and moving around on the left of the field, 
to charge the enemy's battery on the right. Comprehending 
the rawness of our troops, and desirous of putting an end to 
the artillery fire as soon as possible, I placed myself at the 
head of this charging column of the 13th Indiana, and urged 
it forward at a double-quick. Col. Sam Beatty, of the 19th 
Ohio, conforming the movement of his command to that of 
our advancing line, took advantage of the first opening to form 
half of his regiment in line of battle, and delivered a terrific 
volley opportunely — just as the charging column of the 13th 
had got within about a hundred yards of the enemy's breast- 
works. At this the enemy began to waver. A second volley 
from the 19th threw him into confusion, whereon our whole 
line, charging with a terrific shout, leaped the enemy's breast- 
works and pursued his fugitive army into the woods. The 
battle was over. The enemy's dead and wounded covered the 
ground. Two pieces, the only artillery he had, fell into our 
hands. Flushed with success, our troops scattered very much 
through the woods, and it became a matter of critical im- 
portance to reassemble them without delay. This was substan- 
tially accomplished by a little after six o'clock. While the 
troops were reassembling, a quartermaster of the 44th Virginia 
was captured down the road towards Beverly, who reported 
that his regiment had reached a point within three-quarters 
of a mile of the battle, but did not dare to come up. This, 
and what had been seen from the top of the mountain, made 
it evident that our position was an isolated point between the 
rebel intrenched camp on the west and another force of un- 
known strength in the vicinity of Beverly. Xo firing was 
heard in the direction of the intrenched camp. No at- 
tack had therefore been made by Gen. McClellan. There was no 
assurance of succor from that quarter; nothing to prevent the 
enemy taking his measures to overwhelm us without the pos- 
sibility of prevention from our main body. What was to be 



96 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 

done ? We could not go to Beverly, for we were already sep- 
arated from our command by the enemy, whose strength had 

been stated to me by and McC. as probably from 5,000 

to 8,000 men. It was too late to undertake an advance on 
the enemy's camp, distant nearly three miles of a road skirted 
by almost impenetrable thickets of underbrush. In this 
emergency Capt. Conklin was detailed to take charge of the 
captured pieces of artillery, and the troops were placed in 
position to prevent a surprise and to defend themselves from 
attack coming either from the enemy's camp or from Beverly. 
By the time these dispositions were made it was dark. Mean- 
while a messenger had been sought among our cavalry, and 
none could be found who would undertake to carry word to 
Gen. McClellan. The night was dark, cold and rainy. The 
wounded of both sides filled all the outhouses, and were 
huddled together in a tavern; in fact, every building was used 
to keep them from the inclemency of the weather. The troops 
turned out six times during the night, on account of the 
picket firing on the front, expecting an attack of the enemy. 
At three o'clock in the morning a prisoner was brought in, 
from whose answers I inferred that the enemy were attempting 
to evacuate, and accordingly made disposition to move on them 
at daylight, which was done. On reaching the enemy's camp 
our advance discovered a white flag, and soon it was sur- 
rendered with all that remained of Pegram's force, about a 
hundred and seventy men, with all their artillery, transporta- 
tion, camp and garrison equipage and quartermaster's stores. 
Pegram, with the remainder of his force, had escaped during 
the night to the north of us with the intention of reaching 
Gen. Garnett; but the news of the capture of the gap, which 
had been carried to Beverly by the 44th Virginia, was de- 
spatched that night to Garnett, whose position, was, as I have 
before stated, seventeen miles north of Beverly. Gen. Morris 
was in his front to prevent his advance, and he could re- 
treat only by Beverly on the turnpike, or take an inferior 
road in a northeast direction through a rough country down 
Cheat River and strike the northwest Virginia turnpike, which 
leads from Clarksburg to Winchester, near the Maryland line. 
He chose the latter, apprehensive that he would be intercepted 



Gen. Rosecrans' Account of the Battle 97 

by our force coming over Rich Mountain. On the next morn- 
ing, at seven o'clock, Gen. Morris began to pursue him. This 
movement cut off the retreat of Pegram, who sent in a flag 
of truce and surrendered to Gen. McClellan, who, on the 
morning of the 12th, as soon as he had learned of the capture of 
the rebel camp, marched through it to Beverly, and thence fol- 
lowed the 44th Virginia, and whatever other rebels had re- 
treated by the turnpike, towards Staunton, continuing the pur- 
suit to the top of Cheat Mountain. 

The committee will remember that Gen. Morris overtook 
the rear guard at Carrick's ford, where, during a sharp 
skirmish, Garnett fell, and his troops, continuing their retreat, 
finally escaped to Winchester. Thus, by the capture of the 
gap at Rich Mountain, the keystone was knocked from the 
rebel arch of defence, and they were driven from Western 
Virginia. 

I forbear to take notice of the various reports and state- 
ments concerning this battle which have been privately and 
publicly circulated. The committee will find the facts here 
stated substantially in my official report, which is that of 
the four regimental commanders who accompanied me in that 
expedition — Col. Jerry Sullivan, 13th Indiana, now brigadier; 
Col. Samuel Beatty, 19th Ohio, now brigadier; Col. Benton, 8th 
Indiana, now brigadier; and Col. (afterwards brigadier gen- 
eral) Manson, and is hereby made a part of my testimony. 

As no explanation was ever, to my knowledge, given for 
the failure of our main force to attack the enemy on the 11th, 
it is proper to say that while we were seizing the gap, not 
only was the firing of the enemy's artillery heard, but the 
musketry and cheers of our own men in the final charge on 
the enemy's line were heard by the men in the camp, a mile 
and a half in rear of our main force. 

It should also be added, that so strong was the impression 
that our column had met with disaster in the conflict at the 
gap, that Gen. McClellan sent his chief of staff from the 
front back to the camp to arm all the teamsters, lest the 
enemy, after having destroyed my brigade, should fall upon 
and cut the main body to pieces. 

As it is probably known to some members of the commit- 



98 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 

tee that sundry reports of this battle, at variance in many 
material points with its true history as here given, were iu 
circulation in Washington during the latter end of 1861 and 
the early part of 1862, I have been careful to enter into de- 
tails, giving all the facts of importance in relation to the 
actions of the general commanding, his staff officers, and 
those who served with me in the affair. 

By Mr. Gooch: 

Question. Do you know any reason why Gen. McClel- 
lan did not make an attack, with the force immediately under 
him, in his front, as was contemplated when you left him? 

Answer. I know of no reason why he did not, and of no 
reason why he should not have done so. 

Question. If he had made that attack, as was contemplated 
between you and him, in your opinion what would have been 
the result? 

Answer. The enemy, having no attack made on his front, 
had despatched to the gap one half of his artillery and a 
considerable force in addition to that usually stationed there. 
The probabilities are that had the attack in front been 
made, we should have beaten the enemy and destroyed or cap- 
tured nearly his entire force that day, instead of allowing 
them to run away through the woods, individually or in 
squads, during the night subsequent to the capture of the 
gap, as they did. At all events Gen. McClellan was bound, as 
a military man, to have made the attack in his front, for 
the purpose of preventing the enemy from falling on me with 
too heavy a force. 

Question. Do you know whether Gen. McClellan has 
ever assigned any reason why he did not make the attack, as 
contemplated between you and him? 

Answer. The only reason I have ever seen assigned is 
contained in his official report, published as a campaign docu- 
ment, and prefaced by the remark that he had not, until re- 
cently, had in his possession the necessary papers to enable 
him to write a report of the campaign of Western Virginia 
In that report he says: 

"About half past two the firing which we had heard in the 
direction of the gap, and which apparently receded, ceased. 



Gen. Rosecrans' Account of the Battle 99 

Shortly afterwards an officer appeared in the rebel camp and 
made a speech. We could not hear the words, but from 
the cheers which followed many supposed it had fared badly 
with our detachment. Immediately ordered roads to be cut 
and guns got into position, intending to open the next morn- 
ing, in order to relieve Rosecrans." 

I am quoting from memory and may not give the words 
exactly, but I give the substance. Gen. McClellan adds that 
he was delayed by accidents the next morning in opening, un- 
til the arrival of a messenger announcing the capture of the 
rebel camp. This is all I have ever seen or heard from him 
in reference to the matter. 

Question. If he had supposed that the enemy was getting 
the better of you, why should he have delayed until the next 
morning before commencing the attack? 

Answer. Such a mode of relieving me was the surest way 
to enable the enemy to destroy me. The only sure relief he 
could have given would have been to attack the enemy the in- 
stant he heard the first firing. 

Question. I understand you to say you expected to reach 
the top of the mountain by 10 o'clock in the morning. In 
reality you did not arrive there until half past two o'clock. 
Why was that? 

Answer. In reply to Gen. McClellan's question about what 
time I thought I could reach the top of the mountain I stated 
that I thought 10 o'clock would be the latest. That was on 
the supposition that I should start as soon as possible after 
our conversation. But, as I have already stated, it was, on 
the suggestion of Gen. McClellan, determined that the head of 
the column should not quit the main road and enter the forest 
at our front picket line until daylight. A further cause of 
delay, which has been stated, was this: that, owing to the 
fact that we were undertaking this march mainly in the day- 
time, Gen. Lander thought, on consultation with the guide, 
and I decided, that it would be wiser to take a more circuitous 
route, passing farther from the enemy. This lengthened 
our march, making it over ten hours. 

Question. How far distant from you were Gen. McClellan 
and the main body of our army at the time you were en- 
gaged with the enemy? 



100 Lee's Invasion op Northwest Virginia 

Answer. In a straight line it was probably two miles; 
by road it was two and three-quarter miles to the rebel lines, 
and our troops were formed in line of battle in front of the 
rebel lines just out of range of their fire. 

Question. Then he must have known from the sound of 
your guns, if in no other way, when you commenced your at- 
tack upon the enemy and the continuance of the fight? 

Answer. Certainly. 

Question. How many men had Gen. McClellan under his 
command, including the force which accompanied you? 

Answer. I do not know exactly, but believe at least 
between 6,000 and 7,000 effective men. 

Question. How many men did you take with you when 
you made your movement to the top of the mountain? 

Answer. Either 1,743 or 1,843; I forget which. My offi- 
cial report shows the number, and is made a part of my testi- 
mony. 



THE RETREAT AND DEATH OF GEN. GAR- 
NETT. 

HIS WITHDRAWAL FROM LAUREL HILL. 

The Confederate position on top of Rich Mountain 
was not lost till late in the afternoon of the 11th. 
The entrenched camp at the west base of Rich Moun- 
tain was not abandoned by Pegram until after mid- 
night succeeding. But Gen. Garnett, more than a 
dozen miles distant as the crow flies, knew that a bat- 
tle had been fought; and anticipating, or learning, 
the result, left his position on the west side of Laurel 
Hill at dusk that evening and crossed to the east side 
of the mountain. 

Here he halted, waiting perhaps for definite news 
and in distressing uncertainty after he received it 
whether or not to attempt a retreat through Beverly. 
Col. Porterfield, in the appended correspondence, says 
he was with Garnett 's command at this time, and 
that Garnett could easily have removed all doubt 
about the line of retreat to the south if he had but 
used his cavalry scouts to ascertain. 

It is not to be assumed that Gen. Morris' videttes 
were not alert; but if they were, Garnett 's with- 
drawal across the mountain must have been managed 
very skillfully, for Morris did not know till next 
morning what had happened. Then Capt Benham, 
apparently one of the most intrepid of his subordi- 
nates, took the lead in the pursuit. But Garnett had 
the whole night's lead, and the weather conditions 

101 



102 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 

were such as made desperate work for both pursuers 
and pursued. A mountain storm set in, and roads 
and streams alike soon became almost impassable. 

At Carrick's Ford of Cheat River, the rear of the 
retreating army was overtaken; and in the sharp en- 
gagement which followed, Gen. Garnett, while per- 
sonally directing the placing of skirmishers, received 
a fatal bullet. 

Gen. Morris' troops, from excessive fatigue and 
lack of food were compelled to forego farther pursuit. 
The Confederates passed through to Winchester road ; 
and although Gen. Hill, commanding at Grafton, had 
imperative orders to intercept them, he was unable 
to organize a force with the celerity necessary to ef- 
fect this. Gen. Hill wrote a lengthy report explain- 
ing the difficulties and disabilities which the sudden 
order imposed on him. 

Following reports of Gen. Morris and Capt. Ben- 
ham, of the Union army, and of Col. Taliaferro and 
others of the Confederate, give the most interesting 
available facts. 

morris' pursuit of garnett. 

July 13th, 6:00 A. M., Gen. Morris wired Adjt. 
Gen. Williams that after resting two hours, his ad- 
vanced column — Steedman, Dumont and Milroy — 
moved at 3:00 in pursuit of Garnett. He had left 
Belington the day before with four wagons of hard 
bread and pork — all the wagons available, the rest 
having been sent to Philippi for supplies. As pre- 
viously reported, he had but seven wagons to the 
regiment. His men had necessarily to be restricted in 
rations, and must be so as they advanced. He en- 



The Retreat and Death of Gen. Garnett 103 

closed a telegram from Capt. Benham, one and a 
half miles east of New Interest at 6 :10 A. M. 

July 14th, Gen. Morris wrote Williams from Car- 
rick's Ford. Steedman's 14th Ohio, in advance, 
with two sections of Barnett's artillery, next Du- 
mont's Seventh and then Milroy's Ninth Indiana, 
started from Leadsville at 4:00 o'clock in the morn- 
ing under immediate command of Capt. Benham. 
About 6 :00 o 'clock a drizzling rain set in, which by 
9 :00 o 'clock had become quite heavy. 

The enemy left the main turnpike and turned 
towards Cheat River, crossing two branches of Laurel 
Mountain over a narrow and difficult road. Owing to 
the heavy rains, the roads were very difficult for both 
men and provision wagons. By 11:00 o'clock the 
rain had become a drenching storm and so continued 
for several hours, making the mountain roads nearly 
impassable. At 2:00 o'clock, the whole command was 
up to Carrick's Ford, after a march of 18 to 20 miles. 

MORRIS TO MCCLELLAN. 

July 16th, from Brigade headquarters, Elliott's 
Farm, near Belington, Gen. Morris reported again 
to Adjt. Gen. Williams: 

"On the morning of the 14th, I reported to you the opera- 
tions up to the routing of the Confederate forces at Carrick's 
ford, about 2:00 P. M. of the 13th. I have to add that while 
our troops were halting for rest, our scouts followed close 
upon the route of the enemy four to six miles farther, and 
on the morning of the 14th we learned they were fully fifteen 
miles in advance. About noon of the same day*, we started 
for Saint George, in pursuance of orders, which place we 
reached at night. Without provisions other than the beeves 
sent by Gen. McClellan, and in the exhausted state of our 
command, it was impossible to pursue farther. At Saint 



104 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 

George we heard that Gen. Hill had met the flying enemy and 
captured or dispersed the remnant. Our scouts discovered four 
miles west of our route 12 wagons mostly loaded with now 
clothing and had taken possession of them. On the morn- 
ing of the 15th, we left Saint George and after a march 
of 23 miles reached this place at 9:00 A. M. 

THE BATTLE AT CARRICK's FORD. 

In Capt. Benham's report of his pursuit of Gen. 
Garnett's army, dated "Camp 8 miles south of St. 
George, July 13, 1861." he says that as they ap- 
proached the Ford they came upon the rebels' train, 
the last half of which was just crossing the river. 
The enemy had taken a strong position with his in- 
fantry and artillery upon a precipitous bank, 50 to 
80 feet high, on the opposite side of the river, while 
the ground on the other side where the Union troops 
were was low land, nearly level with the river. He 
says: 

"Steedman's regiment, in the advance, opened fire most 
gallantly upon them; which was immediately returned by their 
strong force of infantry and by their cannon. Upon which 
Barnett's artillery was ordered up and opened on them with 
excellent effect. 

"As soon as I perceived a position by which their left could 
be turned, six companies of Col. Dumont's regiment were 
ordered to cross the river about 300 yards above them to pass 
up the hill obliquely from our right to their left and take 
them in the rear. 

"By some mistake — possibly in the transmission of the 
order — this command crossed at about double this distance 
and turned out, first, to their right; which delayed the effect 
of this movement. After some fifteen minutes, however, this 
error was rectified, and the hill being reported as impracticable, 
this command — now increased to the whole regiment — was or- 
dered down to the ford, under close cover of this hill on their 
side, and there to take them directly in front at the road. 



The Retreat and Death op Gen. Garnett 105 

"The firing of Steedman's regiment and of Milroy's now 
well ill action, with repeated and rapid discharges of the ar- 
tillery during this movement, decided the action at once. As 
Dumont reached the road, having passed along and under their 
whole front, the firing ceased and the enemy fled in great 
confusion, Dumont's regiment pursuing them about one mile 
farther and having a brisk skirmishing with their rear for the 
first half of that distance, during which Gen. Garnett was 
killed. 

"The enemy would still have been followed up more closely, 
and probably to the capture of a large portion of their scat- 
tered army, but that this was absolutely impossible with our 
fatigued and exhausted troops ; who had already marched some 
eighteen miles or more in an almost incessant violent rain, 
and the greater part of them without food since the evening 
— and a portion from noon of yesterday — so warm had been 
their pursuit on their hasty retreat from Laurel Mountain, 
twenty-six miles distant." 

SUMMARY OF RESULTS. 

Capt. Benham thus sums up the results of the pur- 
suit : 

"The capture of about forty loaded wagons and teams, 
being nearly all their baggage train and including a large 
portion of new clothing, camp equipage and other stores; 
their headquarters papers and military chest; two stand of 
colors and one piece of fine rifled artillery; while the com- 
manding general, Robert S. Garnett, is killed; 15 to 20 of the 
enemy killed and nearly 50 prisoners. Our own loss, 2 killed 
and 6 or 7 wounded." 



CONFEDERATE ACCOUNTS OF THE DEFEAT. 

THE KILLING OF GEN. GARNETT. 

Col. B. B. Taliaferro, 23rd Virginia Infantry, un- 
der date of Monterey, August 10th, reported to Gen. 
H. R. Jackson, commanding at that point : 

"On the evening of the 12th, Gen. Garnett bivouacked at 
Kaler's ford, on Cheat River, the rear of his command being 
about two miles back on Pleasant run. On the morning of the 
13th the command was put in motion. Before the wagon train 
had crossed the first ford, half a mile above Kaler's, the 
cavalry scouts reported the enemy close upon our rear with a 
very large force of infantry well supported by cavalry and 
artillery. First regiment ordered to take position across the 
meadow and hold the enemy in check until train had passed 
the river, and then retreat behind 23rd Virginia. 

"In a few minutes, the enemy's skirmishers were seen 
running along the opposite bank, which was low and skirted 
by a few trees. A hearty cheer having been given for Presi- 
dent Davis, we opened upon the enemy, who replied with heavy 
fire from their infantry and artillery. After continuing the 
fight until nearly every cartridge had been expended and 
until the artillery had been withdrawn by Gen. Garnett's or- 
ders, and as no part of the command was within sight of sup- 
porting distance, I ordered the regiment to retire. It would 
have been impossible to hold the position, and already nearly 
thirty of my men had been killed or wounded. 

"After marching half a mile, I was directed by Col. Starke 
to move on to the next ford, where I would overtake Gen. 
Garnett. On the farther side of this ford, I met Gen. Garnett, 
who directed me to halt my regiment 150 yards distant 
mound the turn of the road and to detail for him ten good 
riflemen, remarking that 'This is a good place, behind this 
driftwood, to post skirmishers.' A few minutes later Col. 
Starke rode by and said Gen. Garnett directed me to march 

106 



Confederate Accounts of the Defeat 107 

as rapidly as I could and overtake the main body. In a few 
minutes, Lieut. De Priest reported to me that Gen. Garnett 
had been killed. He fell just as he gave the order to the 
skirmishers to retire, and one of them was killed by his side.* 
"About daylight we reached Red House, in Maryland, on 
the Northwestern Turnpike, near West Union. At this last 
place a large force under Gen. Hill was concentrated; but it 
did not attack us, and we moved the same day as far as Green- 
land, in Hardy county, and after seven days arduous march, 
reached this place." 

REPORT OF COL. RAMSAY. 

Col. J. N. Ramsay, commanding at Petersburg, 
wrote Col. Jackson, July 16th, that his command was 
there, marching to Harrisonburg: "Not many killed, 
but hundreds missing. We have suffered awfully. 
We were near starvation. What is left of this army 
will not be fit for service in a month." 

UNION SENTIMENT IN THE VALLEY. 

In a despatch from Maj. M. G. Harman, command- 
ing at Staunton, dated July 15th, he says, speaking 
of the retreat of Garnett 's army to Monterey : 

"I would urge upon you the great importance of keeping 
the enemy from ever touching this country; for Union men in 
great numbers would be found here in this county and other 
counties in the Valley if the Federal troops were here to 
protect them. It is necessary, to keep our people loyal, to 
keep the enemy from having an opportunity to tamper with 
many of them." 

Harman wrote Gen. Lee, July 15th : 
mcclellan's flunk. 

"The enemy displayed no courage, after defeating us on 
top of Rich Mountain, or the forces at Camp Garnett would 
have been cut to pieces." 



*See letter of Col. Porterfield in appended correspondence. 



108 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 

This refers to the failure of McClellan to attack 
the entrenchments at the west base of Rich Mountain 
when he heard the guns of Rosecrans' attack on De 
Lagnel upon the top of the mountain. 

CONFEDERATE COMMENT. 

In a letter from Jefferson Davis to Gen. Johnson, at 
Harper's Ferry, July 10th, Mr. Davis said: "Gar- 
nett is lamentably weak, but reinforcements now on 
the way will, I hope, prevent a junction of McClellan 
and Patterson." 

A letter of Brig. H. R. Jackson, written from Mon- 
terey July 16th, regarding Garnett's retreat, said: 

"There can be no doubt that during the earlier days of 
last week the enemy engaged the attention of Gen. Garnett 
at Laurel Hill by repeated feints and skirmishes, and on 
the afternoon of the 11th turning the left flank of our posi- 
tion at Camp Garnett in large force. He succeeded, after 
a protracted (and on our side a desperate) struggle, in seiz- 
ing the summit of the mountain which had been held by a 
small body of our troops. Camp Garnett was thereupon 
abandoned." 

July 18th, Richmond received report of "the dis- 
astrous retreat of Garnett's command to Monterey." 

A letter from Richmond, July 20th, notified Brig. 
Gen. W. "W. Loring that he was assigned to the com- 
mand of the Northwestern army, and was ordered "to 
keep the enemy on the other side of the Allegheny 
ridge. ' ' 

Brig. Gen. H. R. Jackson, commanding the North- 
western army, ad interim, wrote the Adjutant Gen- 
eral's office, July 22nd: 



Confederate Accounts of the Defeat 109 

"From an intelligent officer — Capt. Hall — one of the re- 
cently released prisoners, I learn that while in the enemy's 
camp he had intimate intercourse with Gen. Rosecrans, who 
told him that by means of telegraphic railroad facilities 
Gen. McClellan could at any time concentrate troops even to 
the number of 50,000 in Northwestern Virginia. Rosecrans 
also said they were on the lookout for Wise." 



PEGRAM'S RETREAT AND SURRENDER. 

ABANDONMENT OF FORT GARNETT. 

That portion of Col. Pegram's command who were 
defeated by Rosecrans at Hart's, on top of Rich 
Mountain, retreated eastwardly and reached Beverly. 
The main body who, with Col. Pegram at their head, 
vacated Camp Garnett, at the west base of the moun- 
tain, in the night, proceeded northeastwardly through 
the mountains with the expectation of joining Gar- 
nett 's army. But Garnett had begun his retreat too 
soon for them to reach him; and Gen. Morris, pur- 
suing sharply, cut off the only road by which Pegram 
could have followed Garnett. Thus he found him- 
self, after McClellan 's arrival at Beverly, between 
two Federal armies, with no convenient way for es- 
cape. There was one trail across the Cheat range, 
known as ' ' The Old Seneca Path, ' ' by which he might 
have got out of reach if his men had been in condi- 
tion ; but they were so reduced by hunger and fatigue 
that the alternative of flight into a mountain region 
where it would have been impossible to subsist, drove 
Pegram to surrender to McClellan; and he accord- 
ingly, about midnight of the 12th, from "Mr. Kittle 's 
house, near Tygart's Valley river, six miles from 
Beverly," addressed a communication to "The Com- 
manding Officer of the Northern Forces, Beverly," 
offering, in view of the reduced and almost famishing 
condition of his force, to surrender. 

Gen. McClellan sent his reply by Adjt. Gen. Wil- 
liams, with escort, who arrived at Pegram's head- 

110 



Pegram 's Retreat and Surrender 111 

quarters a little after sun-up next morning, addressed 
to "John Pegram, Esq., styling himself Lieut. Col. 
P. A. C. S.," accepting the surrender. 

Col. Pegram asked only that they "receive at your 
hands such treatment as Northern prisoners have in- 
variably received from the South." Gen McClellan, 
in his acceptance of the surrender, said he would re- 
ceive the "officers and men" as "prisoners of war" 
and "treat them with the kindness due to prisoners 
of war. But, ' ' he said, "it is not in my power to re- 
lieve you or them from any disabilities incurred by 
taking arms against the United States." In a sub- 
sequent exchange of prisoners, Col. Pegram was re- 
fused parole, because he had been an officer in the 
United States army. 



Col. Pegram, at Beverly, July 14th, wrote a report 
to the Adjutant General at Richmond, touching the 
disaster which had overtaken his command, "not 
knowing," he remarks in the opening, "where a com- 
munication will find Gen. Garnett. " Col. Pegram 
describes the engagement on the top of Rich Moun- 
tain with some particularity: 

THE BATTLE AT HART 's. 

"The battlefield was immediately around the house of one 
Hart, situated at the highest point of the turnpike over the 
mountains and two miles in the rear of my main line of 
trenches at the foot of the western slope of the mountain. 
The intricacies of the surrounding country semed scarcely 
to demand the placing of any force at Hart's; yet I had that 
morning placed Capt. De Lagnel, of the Confederate artillery, 
with five companies of infantry, numbering in all about 



112 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 

310 men, with instructions to defend it to the last extremity 
against whatever force might be brought to the attack by the 
enemy, but also to give me timely notice of his need of re- 
inforcements. These orders had not been given two hours 
before Gen. Rosecrans, who had been conducted up a distant 
ridge on my left and then along the top of the mountain by 
a man, attacked the small handful of troops under Capt. De 
Lagnel with 3,000 men. 

"When from my camp I heard the firing becoming very 
rapid, without waiting to hear from Capt. De Lagnel, I or- 
dered up reinforcements and hurried on myself to the scene 
of action. When I arrived, the piece of artillery was entirely 
unmanned, Capt. De Lagnel having been severely wounded ; 
after which his men had left their piece. The limber and 
caisson were no longer visible, the horses having run away 
with them down the mountain; in doing which they met and 
upset the second piece of artillery which had been ordered 
up to their assistance. 

"Seeing the infantry desert the slight breastworks thrown 
up that morning by Capt. De Lagnel, I used all personal 
exertions to make them stand to their work, until even I saw 
that the place was hopelessly lost. 

"On my way back to camp, I found the reinforcing force 
under the command of Capt. Anderson of the artillery in the 
greatest confusion, they having fired upon their retreating 
comrades. I hurried on to camp and ordered the remaining 
companies of my own regiment in camp to join them. This 
left my right front and right flank entirely unmanned. 

"I then went back up the mountain where I found the 
whole force drawn up in line in ambuscade near the road under 
command of Maj. Nat Tyler, of the 20th.. I called their at- 
tention and said a few encouraging words to the men, ask- 
ing them if they would follow their officers to the attack; 
to which they responded by a cheer. I was here interrupted 
by Capt. Anderson, who said to me: 'Col. Pegram, these men 
are completely demoralized and will need you to lead them.' 
I took my place at the head of the column, which I marched 
in single file through the laurel thickets, and through almost 
impassable brushwood, up a ridge to the top of the moun- 



Pegram's Retreat and Surrender 113 

tain. This placed me about one-fourth of a mile on the right 
flank of the enemy; which was exactly the point I had been 
making for. 

"I had just gotten all the men up together and was about 
to make my dispositions for the attack when Maj. Tyler came 
up and reported that during the march up the ridge one of the 
men in his fright had turned around and shot the first sergeant 
of one of the rear companies, which had caused nearly the 
whole company to run to the rear. He then said that the 
men were so intensely demoralized that he considered it mad- 
ness to attempt to do anything with them by leading them on 
to the attack. A mere glance at the frightened countenances 
around me convinced me that this distressing news was but 
too true, and it was confirmed by the opinion of three or 
four of the company commanders around me. They all agreed 
with me that there was nothing left to do but to send the 
command under Maj. Tyler to effect a junction with either 
Gen. Garnett, at Laurel Hill, or Col. W. C. Scott, who was sup- 
posed to be with his regiment near Beverly. 

"It was now six and a half o'clock P. M., when I retraced 
my steps with much difficulty back to camp, losing myself fre- 
quently on the way and arriving there at eleven and a quarter 
o'clock. I immediately assembled a council of war of the 
field officers and company commanders remaining, when it was 
unanimously agreed that after spiking the two remaining 
pieces of artillery, we should attempt to join Gen. Garnett by 
marching through the mountains to our right. This act was 
imperative, not only from our reduced numbers, now being 
about 600, and our being placed between two large attacking 
armies, but also because at least three-fourths of my command 
had no rations left ; the other fourth not having flour enough 
left for one meal. 

"Having left directions for Sergt. Walke and given direc- 
tions to show a white flag at daylight, I then called companies 
G and H, of the 20th regiment, with which and seven com- 
panies of Col. Heck's regiment, I started at one o'clock A. M., 
and without a guide, to make our way if possible over the 
mountains where there was not the sign of a path, towards 
Gen. Garnett's camp." 



114 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 

They arrived at Tygart's Valley river at seven 
o'clock the next evening, having made twelve miles 
in eighteen hours. Here Col. Pegram was informed 
there was a small Confederate camp at Leadsville, 
three miles distant. He hired a horse and rode for- 
ward, but when in sight of Leadsville church he 
stopped at a farmhouse, where he was informed that 
Garnett's army had retreated eastward, pursued by 
3,000 of the enemy. Col. Pegram went back to his 
command, which he found in confusion. Another 
council of war was held later in the evening. It was 
found there was but one road over which escape was 
possible. This would lead them within three miles 
of Beverly (then occupied by the enemy), over Cheat 
Mountain and other mountain ranges, into Pendleton 
county; and it was known that along this road it 
would be found impossible to obtain subsistence. 

One of the captains had escaped by this route after 
the retreat from Philippi, and thought they could 
do it again; but as it was then 11:00 P. M., and if 
this road were to be taken it would have to be done 
at once without allowing the half-famished men to 
get anything to eat, all the officers except the captain 
referred to and one other, voted that it was impossi- 
ble to do anything but surrender; and these two 
agreed that the chances of escape if they took the 
road to Pendleton were "very slim." Accordingly, 
Col. Pegram wrote and despatched his note to Gen. 
McClellan, as previously set forth. 

REPORT OF COL. HECK. 

Col. Jonathan M. Heck, under whom before the 
breaking out of hostilities the militia at Morgantown 



Pegram 's Retreat and Surrender 115 

had refused to muster because he was a secessionist, 
who had entered the Confederate service under Por- 
terfield, had been sent by Garnett to take charge of 
Camp Garnett at the west base of Rich Mountain 
and was second in command at the time of the en- 
gagement, wrote a report to "Col. R. R. Howison," 
Richmond, some time after the surrender, but without 
date. 

In his account of preliminary operations at Rich 
Mountain, Col. Heck says Pegram very much under- 
rated the enemy's strength in front and wrote to 
Gen. Garnett for permission to surprise and attack 
him. He thinks this report of Pegram kept Garnett 
from ordering him to fall back, as he had no doubt 
Garnett would have done, at the same time falling 
back from his own position to Cheat Mountain, had 
he learned, or even supposed, the force in front of 
Pegram half as strong as it was. Heck makes this 
statement as "due to the memory of Gen. Garnett, 
who fell a victim to a combination of circumstances 
over which he had no control. ' ' The reader will note 
in Col. Porterfield's correspondence, appended to this, 
that he discredits Col. Heck's theory as to Garnett 's 
ignorance of the magnitude of Gen. McClellan's 
army.* 

Following statements are from Col. Heck's report: 

REPORT OF COL. HECK. 

"On the morning of the 11th a cavalry sergeant of the 
enemy who had been detailed to assist in keeping up com- 



♦Pegram says in his report: "If I had known the num- 
ber of the enemy and their means of getting to my rear — 
which all my so-called reliable woodsmen informed me was 
impossible — I would have retreated the night before, cutting 
down trees on both sides of the mountain, thus giving time 
to Gen. Garnett to retreat by way of Beverly to Huttons- 
ville." 



116 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 

munication between Rosecrans, who had started away early 
that morning with six regiments of infantry to turn our left 
flank, and Gen. McClellan, who with the main body of the 
enemy and eighteen pieces of artillery was to take us in 
front as soon as Rosecrans made the attack in the rear, 
missed his way, rode up to our line and was wounded and 
captured. Col. Pegram learned from him that the enemy had 
moved a force to our rear, but could not learn by which 
flank. Pegram had already, in anticipation of a rear attack, 
sent two or three companies to the top of the mountain. 
He now sent two more companies and a piece of artillery to 
reinforce the picket on the mountain, which made in all a 
force of about 300 men, under command of Capt. De Lagnel. 

"Col. Scott, who was marching with a regiment to rein- 
force Gen. Garnett, was requested by Pegram to hold a road 
one mile west of Beverly. This was done because Pegram 
thought Rosecrans would try to turn his right flank by a 
circuitous route coming in at that road. But the enemy made 
the attack about 11 o'clock on the mountain from the left 
flank. After Capt. De Lagnel was wounded, Capt. Curry, of 
the Rockbridge Guards, took command and conducted the 
retreat. The enemy having charged and taken the piece of 
artillery, were bayoneting our wounded soldiers, who had been 
shot down at their posts. Pegram at once determined to take 
half the command and charge and retake the position; and 
immediately organized and marched from our camp, leaving 
me in command with instructions to hold that position at all 
hazards. In the meantime the enemy was busy making 
preparations for an attack in front, cutting roads and placing 
a large number of pieces of artillery in position. 

"About 11 o'clock at night, having heard nothing further 
from Col. Pegram, his adjutant and other officers insisted on 
a council of war. I called a few officers together and repeated 
to them my orders from Col. Pegram instructing me to hold 
the position till I heard from him, which might not be before 
morning, as he had not then determined whether he would 
attack Gen. Rosecrans that night or in the morning. We 
were about returning to our several posts, as we were expect- 
ing an attack every moment, when Col. Pegram returned and 



Pegram 's Retreat and Surrender 117 

informed us that he had determined not to make the at- 
tack at Hart's house and had sent the men he had selected for 
that purpose away under command of Maj. Nat Tyler; and 
he ordered me to call in all the companies and pickets and 
retreat immediately in the direction of Gen. Garnett's camp 
at Laurel Hill. 

"Soon after sun-up on the 12th we were in sight of Beverly, 
and could see the river valley for many miles both right and 
left. Had we gone directly down this valley, we could have 
escaped, as the enemy did not enter Beverly until one P. M. 
of that day. I suppose we would have gone down into the 
valley at this point if Col. Pegram had not mistaken some of 
our (Lilley's) men for the enemy's advance. As it was, we 
were kept in the mountains, marching slowly in the direction 
of Garnett's camp at Laurel Hill." 

Col. Heck says the surrender of Pegram was op- 
posed by himself and Capt. J. B. Moorman, of the 
Franklin guards. They were in favor of crossing 
Cheat Mountain by the road near Beverly, which 
would have led into Pendleton county. "Capt. Moor- 
man," Heck says, "had marched his company by the 
same route after the defeat at Philippi and thought 
it could be done again." 

REPORT OF MAJ. NAT. TYLER. 

Maj. Nat. Tyler, in a report made by him, says that 
the fight began about 11 o'clock and lasted three 
hours, when the enemy succeeded in getting to the 
road between the rebel position and Beverly. He 
says Col. Pegram ordered him before the firing ceased 
to reinforce Capt. De Lagnel with the 20th regiment. 

"And as we were marching up the mountain, he determined 
to take command of a storming party and attempt the re- 
capture of Hart's house. Before arriving in position he ascer- 



118 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 

tained the impossibility of successfully storming the enemy's 
position, and ordered me to continue the retreat with the 
20th regiment while he returned and brought the remainder of 
the command. We reached Beverly at daybreak." 

REPORT OF ENGINEER JED HOTCHKISS. 

Engineer Jed Hotchkiss, who had assisted Col. 
Heck in laying out Camp Garnett, made a report to 
him some time after the battle. He mentions that 
about 50 men had reached Beverly at 11 o'clock A. M. 
of the 12th ' ' and found the people helping themselves 
to abandoned commissary stores, expecting the enemy 
every moment." At the conclusion of his report 
Hotchkiss refers to some friction which had occurred 
between Heck and Pegram as to the command at 
Camp Garnett: 

"Pegram being ordered by Gen. Garnett, as he himself said, 
to report himself and command to you, he arrogantly demanded 
the command of the post because of his superiority of rank, 
before asking you for it or you had refused to give it to him; 
that you expressed a willingness to give it up to him if you 
could be assured that such was the desire of Gen. Garnett ; and 
afterwards by his arbitrary and selfish direction of affairs, 
and in the opinion of many concerned and engaged, brought 
about the disasters that attended the battle of Rich Moun- 
tain. To my personal knowledge, you sent one that came to 
you with information in reference to the designs or operations 
of the enemy in turning our left flank to communicate the 
same to Lieut. Col. Pegram the day before the battle." 

Hotchkiss says the Confederate countersign the 
night following the battle was "Indian;'' that the 
Union countersign that night was the same, and that 
this enabled the escaping Confederates to pass the 
Union pickets at one point when challenged by them. 



Pegram 's Retreat and Surrender 119 

DEATH OF CONVENTIONIST HUGHES. 

John N. Hughes, a member of the Virginia Con- 
vention, was killed in mistake by Confederate troops 
while attempting to carry a despatch on horseback 
from Col. W. C. Scott, of the 44th Virginia to Col. 
Pegram. In a letter from Maj. Harman, at Staunton, 
to Gen. Lee, Harman says that Mr. Hughes "was 
sent by Col. Scott to Col. Pegram and was killed by 
our men." During the progress of the fight on top 
of Rich Mountain, Col. Scott's regiment was posted at 
a road junction one mile west of Beverly with in- 
structions to remain there in expectation that Pe- 
gram 's position was going to be flanked on his right 
and that the flanking force would approach Beverly 
by this road intersection. Col. Scott had a letter from 
Pegram requesting this, and had been instructed by 
Garnett to comply. In his report Col. Scott sa}'s: 

"The letter was read to most of my officers and to Mr. 
John N. Hughes, who resides in Beverly, with whom I had be- 
come acquainted in the late convention, and who had expressed 
a determination to join my regiment. He said he was perfectly 
acquainted with the road on which Col. Pegram desired me to 
take position." 

Col. Scott was in momentary expectation of some 
word from Pegram relieving him from this station 
and directing him to reinforce Pegram. 

"But getting no such message, or any information from 
the fight, and hecoming impatient, I determined to send a 
messenger myself. I therefore ordered Mr. J. N. Hughes, who 
volunteered for the purpose, to go to Col. Pegram and know 
from him whether or not he wished my services at any other 
point than the one I then occupied, and if so to send me a 



120 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 

guide. If not, 1 ordered Hughes to bring me information of 
whatever was going on. He dashed up the mountain at a 
rapid gallop." 

"After waiting a long while for return of Hughes," 
Col. Scott says Lieut. Cochrane, of the Churchville 
cavalry, came down the turnpike off the mountain, 
"with a few of his men," and addressing himself to 
the Colonel, explained the situation on the mountain 
and accompanied him, at the head of his regiment, 
back up the mountain. Lieut. Cochrane, March 6, 
1862, wrote a letter to Col. Scott, in response to re- 
quest to "state what occurred while 1 was with you 
on the 11 th day of July last in relation to the Rich 
Mountain fight. ' ' In this letter Lieut. Cochrane says : 

"On the way up the mountain, I informed you of the 
death of Hughes, and you requested me not to mention it to 
the men, as it might dampen their spirit." 

The report current afterwards was that Hughes on 
the mountain had met a Confederate force and sup- 
posing them to be Union troops had ridden forward 
and hurrahed "for Lincoln," and that they had im- 
mediately riddled him with bullets. Lieut. Coch- 
rane 's remark was suggestive of the idea that it was 
his detachment which Hughes had met with this un- 
fortunate result. In hope of clearing up a doubt as 
to the precise circumstances, the writer, Dec. 26, 
1903, addressed an inquiry to Col. Porterfield, resid- 
ing at Charlestown, Jefferson county, to ask for his 
recollection of the matter. His reply to the inquiry 
is contained in his letter of Jan. 4, 1904, appended. 
Later, through the courtesy of the postmaster at 
Beverly, the writer was enabled to obtain the follow- 



Pegram's Retreat and Si hrender 121 

ing statement from Col. S. N. Bosworth, 31st Vir- 
ginia Inf. C. S. A., who was present at the Rich 
Mountain fight and has always lived at Beverly: 

"Mr. John N. Hughes was killed on the top of Rich 
Mountain by the Confederate troops that fought there. He 
thought them to be the enemy and turned his horse to return 
to Scott's regiment, when they fired on him. He was buried 
in a trench with twenty-one other Confederate soldiers, and 
was after the war removed to Mount Iser, Beverly, and there 
reinterred. His body was known by his shawl, in which 
eighteen bullet-holes were found." 

A later note from Col. Bosworth said : 

"I think the statement that Mr. Hughes was killed by a 
small detachment of Confederate troops that was supporting 
Lieut. De Lagnel's piece of artillery is correct. I was near 
there but not on the ground at the time, and I have no doubt 
that is the true version of it. Mr. Hughes was somewhat in- 
toxicated at the time — at least it was so reported." 



RESUME. 

The reader who has followed this narration can 
hardly have failed to note two things regarding the 
Confederate invasion — one, the inadequacy of mili- 
tary plan ; the other, the imbecility of execntion. Gen. 
Lee begins the movement on Northwest Virginia in 
fashion more academic than military. He proceeds 
on the assumption that the people there will submit 
without a struggle, as they did in East Virginia, to 
the Confederate assumption of control by virtue of 
the secret league of usurpation and violence entered 
into by the Convention with the emissary of the 
Southern Confederacy. 

Officers to organize military forces and take pos- 
session of the country are appointed in districts where 
they dared not allow it known they held such com- 
missions. The designation of Alonzo Loring to take 
charge of the western terminus of the Baltimore & 
Ohio Railroad, to hold and control it for the Con- 
federacy, with authority to call out and organize 
volunteers in the Panhandle counties, to any one 
familiar with the circumstances and the state of local 
public opinion at that time, was a proceeding little 
less than fantastic. It was on a parity with Gov. 
Letcher's telegraph order to raise the Confederate 
flag on the Wheeling custom house. 

Maj. Boykin, who was first sent to Grafton to take 
charge there of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad and 
the interests of the Confederacy, in co-operation with 
Maj. Loring, was politely requested by a delegation 

122 



Resume 123 

of citizens to avail himself of the next train for his 
departure. When Col. Porterfield went to Grafton 
later, he found neither officers nor men to take his 
orders or support him. Both he and Boykin des- 
patched Gen. Lee that the whole region was cold and 
inhospitable to Confederate pretensions. 

It is apparent Gen. Lee was ill-informed as to the 
state of public sentiment in Northwest Virginia, — as 
ignorant, possibly, as Gen. McClellan was touching 
danger of negro insurrection. In consequence, valu- 
able time was lost in organizing Gen. Lee's army of 
occupation. He evidently supposed the Secession 
element in the Northwest was so preponderant it 
would rise, in response to his call, and take posses- 
sion of the country. This was a serious mistake. 

Further pursuing this erroneous lead, Gen. Lee 
planned to hold Grafton, the junction point of the 
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, with a few companies of 
raw volunteers. He expected these to be collected in 
the adjacent country, and this failing, arranged to 
have them gathered up along the route from Staun- 
ton to Tygart's Valley. The Federal authorities 
could not have permitted this possession of the rail- 
road junction if it had taken a hundred thousand men 
to prevent it. Col. Porterfield, with the raw recruits 
who had been sent him, was compelled to abandon 
the post precipitately on the first demonstration of 
the Federal advance. Following this, he is surprised 
and driven out of Philippi, as result of conditions 
for which he was little responsible. 

Next, Lee's Adjutant General, — protege of Jeffer- 
son Davis, with whom he had served in the Mexican 
war — is sent out with a force of several thousand 



124 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 

men, for a purpose nowhere well denned. There is no 
evidence of any purpose or expectation that Gen. 
Garnett would move north of the railroad line. His 
confidential despatches show no plan for any such ad- 
vance ; nor even a definite purpose to capture Grafton ; 
nor to do any other specific thing except to disable 
the railroad. He takes possession of the passes in 
the westerly mountain range, places a small force at 
the west base of Rich Mountain, and posts his main 
army at the Laurel Hill where the Tygart's Valley 
river cuts through it, a dozen miles or more north 
from Beverly. Then, a little later, he tells Gen. Lee 
he finds the place not defensible against good light 
infantry. 

Here he is confronted by Morris, with a force in- 
ferior in numbers to his own; and assumes more the 
attitude of an army of observation than one of ag- 
gression. After a little, Gen. Garnett seems to real- 
ize that he does not know just what he is there for. 
He discusses his situation in despatches to Gen. Lee 
and explains its disabilities. He finds the means of 
defense available to the Union commander so far ex- 
ceeds his own means of attack that an opportunity to 
assail Grafton, or the railroad at any other point, is 
too remote a contingency to be of value ; and he sug- 
gests whether the game of holding an army idle for 
the mere chance of such a contingency is worth the 
cost. 

McClellan's advance was not ill-planned or exe- 
cuted, though it might be thought the rout of Porter- 
field at Philippi should have been better followed 
up. There was no real obstacle to Morris going to 
the southern end of Tygart's valley and sealing up 



Resume 125 

the Cheat Mountain pass. Col. Kelley's instructions 
contemplated pursuit as far as Beverly, and he was 
to have command of the whole force after the junction 
at Philippi; but Kelley's wound — at the moment 
supposed to be mortal — interfered with this pro- 
gramme; and with the limited knowledge of the 
country or resources of the enemy coming forward, 
the commanders were but prudent in the halt at 
Philippi. That Porterfield's men expected McClel- 
lan to take the entire valley is apparent. Some of 
them went across the mountains from Beverly into 
Pendleton, in full persuasion the Federals would over- 
take them if they attempted to reach Cheat Mountain 
pass. They knew the valley was bare of Confederate 
troops, and none nearer than Staunton, but the Fed- 
eral officers did not know this. 

Regarding the decisive action at Rich Mountain, 
the credit for the Union victory there belongs to 
Rosecrans and the men who with him, through eleven 
hours of storm, climbed up the precipitous and thicket 
beset mountains to the rear of the rebel breastworks 
at Hart's. True, McClellan contemplated a flank 
movement before his arrival in front of Pegram's en- 
trenchments. Any commander with a map before 
him must have done that. But when confronted by 
Pegram's entrenchments at the foot of Rich Moun- 
tain, it appears he contemplated a direct attack in 
front. The real problem there was like the one con- 
fronted by Wolfe at Quebec: how to find the way 
around to the enemy's rear. 

Rosecrans, second in command, after viewing the 
formidable defenses of Pegram, was fortunate in find- 
ing a son of the man who kept the little tavern on 



126 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 

the mountain top, and in learning the young man was 
loyal to the Government. He took young Hart to 
McClellan's tent on the night of the 10th and ex- 
plained to the General his plan to head a force under 
Hart 's guidance for a flanking march around through 
the wooded mountains to the south, to come in on the 
mountain-top east of Hart's. McClellan, with the 
abundant caution of his nature, hesitated, though his 
chief of staff assented to the plan at once. With the 
indecision which characterized McClellan's future 
military career, he seemed to shrink from the ordeal 
of action. He took an hour to think it over; and, 
finally consenting, delayed the start next morning. 

Rosecrans told the joint committee of Congress it 
was agreed that night between McClellan and him- 
self that the moment McClellan heard the guns of 
Rosecrans' attack on top of the mountain, he was 
to open on Pegram 's entrenchments in his front at 
the foot of the mountain. Such an understanding 
was a matter of course; necessary to Rosecrans' se- 
curity and to the success of the whole movement. Pe- 
gram if left undisturbed, would send part of his force 
to help resist Rosecrans' attack at Hart's. In fact, 
— McClellan not attacking, — this is just what hap- 
pened. Pegram, finding he was not to be attacked, 
did send a detachment to the aid of De Lagnel. But 
it was too late, as the day was already lost. 

The firing at Hart 's was plainly heard in the camps 
of both McClellan and Pegram. McClellan not only 
failed to attack but actually withdrew to a safer dis- 
tance, leaving Rosecrans to his fate — so far as that 
depended on help from the main army and the com- 
manding General. Rosecrans did not need their help. 



Resume 127 

He not only routed the enemy on the mountain top, 
but, after a night of anxiety, marched down the 
mountain at daylight and took possession of Pegram's 
abandoned camp, in McClellan's front, and sent a 
messenger to acquaint his superior that the road to 
Beverly was now open. 

The fall of Rich Mountain brought Garnett quickly 
to face the crisis he must have looked forward to. 
Pegram's defenses were at least five miles nearer 
Beverly than Garnett 's main army. The danger of 
having his communications cut at Beverly must have 
been constantly before Garnett. Yet he was con- 
strained by the presence of Morris in his front to re- 
main at Laurel Hill and guard against attack. How 
to do this and still be prepared to get away via Bev- 
erly in the event of adversity at Rich Mountain, was 
the problem. No retreat east or north could be any- 
thing but disaster. East by the "Old Seneca Path" 
there were formidable mountain ranges practically 
uninhabited, where an army must perish from lack 
of food. To the Northeast were long stretches of 
mountain roads, of which he knew nothing, to be 
traversed in furious storms, and raging streams to 
cross, before he could reach the Winchester road, and 
probability of interception once that road was 
reached. 

Thus Garnett had lain, with a threatening foe in 
front, another on his flank, at the mercy of events he 
could not control nor foresee. When the moment for 
action came and Rosecrans knocked the peg from 
under the defenses at Rich Mountain, Garnett 's cam- 
paign — or Lee's, if it was his — went to pieces like a 
house of cards ! 



128 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 

Garnett might still have escaped by way of Beverly, 
if he had known, or dared. The news of the Rich 
Mountain disaster reached him promptly, and he 
started to move at dusk that night. He could have 
had till noon next day to cover twelve miles of good 
road between him and Beverly. But either he be- 
came panic-stricken or was not well-informed of the 
state of affairs at Beverly. His nerve seems to have 
failed him at the one supreme moment of his life 
when he needed it. 

After he got his army over to the east side of the 
mountain, he might have turned south to safety. He 
turned north, and was lost; he himself — it was whis- 
pered among the officers — courting death and putting 
himself in the way of it as the only escape from the 
overwhelming humiliation he had not the hardihood 
to face. 



LEE'S FINAL FAILURE TO GET THROUGH 
THE MOUNTAINS. 

THE STORY TOLD BY GEN. ROSECRANS. 

Twelve days after the engagement at Rich Moun- 
tain, Gen. McClellan was directed to turn over the 
command of the Department of the Ohio to Gen. Rose- 
crans and repair at once to Washington. Referring 
to this in his testimony before the Committee on the 
Conduct of the War, April 22, 1865, Rosecrans says 
McClellan left him a memorandum of what he had 
proposed to enable the troops, acting on the defens- 
ive, to hold Western Virginia against further attack. 
The main points of defense were, to fortify and hold 
Gauley Pass from the Kanawha valley towards Lew- 
isburg; Cheat Mountain pass, on the Beverly and 
Staunton road; and Red House pass, on the North- 
western Virginia turnpike, leading from Clarksburg 
to Winchester. 

Gen. Rosecrans' account of the remainder of the 
season's operations, subsequent to the departure of 
McClellan, is a terse and graphic statement; and the 
story of that part of the campaign cannot be better 
told than in the General's own words. 

There were then, he told the Committee, ten regi- 
ments of three-year troops in West Virginia east of 
the Kanawha valley. They were newly raised and 
without drill or experience. There was one battalion 
of cavalry and two batteries of artillery, one of them 
mountain howitzers, manned by regulars. The 

129 



130 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 

strength of these regiments would average about 
eight hundred men. In the Kanawha valley there 
were about 2,700 men under Gen. Cox. In all there 
were probably 11,000 men scattered all over West 
Virginia. 

Gen. Rosecrans says: 

"I immediately addressed myself to the task of meeting 
the anticipated coming invasion of the rebels. Gen. Cox 
was instructed to proceed to the north of Gauley and fortify 
that pass. To Brig. Gen. J. J. Reynolds was confided the 
defense of the Cheat Mountain pass, which included that of 
the road leading from Huttonsville to Lewisburg, which was 
closed by a line of field-works at a place called Elkwater, 
a few miles south of Huttonsville. Col. Lorin Andrews, with 
three and a half regiments, was posted on the Northwestern 
Virginia turnpike, near the point where it crossed the north 
branch of the Potomac, where, under the direction of Capt. 
Merrill, of the engineers, he threw up some field-work. 

"Soon the news oozed through every pore of society that, 
acting on the defensive in front of Washington, the rebels 
intended to make an offensive campaign to recover pos- 
session of Western Virginia; that to Gen. Lee was to be con- 
fided the accomplishment of this work. Dismay and alarm 
pervaded the State, even reached Washington, and came to 
me in friendly warning from more than one of the departments 
of the government. Nor was it long before these rumors re- 
ceived confirmation. Gen. Lee, appearing in Gen. Reynold's 
front with a flag of truce, proposed the exchange of some of 
our men captured at Bull Run for the prisoners of war cap- 
tured by us at Rich Mountain and Beverly and paroled by 
order of Gen. Scott.* 



♦Answering later a question asked by the Chairman, Gen. 
Rosecrans said he did not make the exchange of prisoners 
proposed by Gen. Lee. He declined because he saw Lee 
wanted to exchange prisoners captured at Bull Run for 
mountaineers captured at Rich Mountain and Beverly, who 
knew the country and would immediately add valuable men 
to his strength, while the Bull Run prisoners would add 
nothing to the strength of the Union forces, and, in fact, 
could not serve with Rosecrans' command. He told Lee 
unless he could remedy this inequality there could be no 
exchange; and there was none. 



Lee's Final Failure 131 

"A heavy force appeared menacing us in front at Cheat 
Mountain, while another column, coming from Warm Springs 
by way of Huntsville, appeared in front of Elkwater. 

"Meanwhile, Gen. Cox from Kanawha valley, informed 
me that while Gen. Wise was advancing on his position at the 
mouth of Gauley by the Lewisburg and Kanawha turnpike 
with a force variously estimated at from five to eight thousand 
men, he had information that Gen. Floyd with another column 
was advancing from Lewisburg with the intention of crossing 
Gauley above him, and attacking either our depots at Weston 
and Clarksburg or making his rear on the Kanawha river in 
the vicinity of Charleston. 

"I at once despatched Gen. Cox instructions to remove 
his sick and all public property not absolutely necessary 
from the valley, and if compelled to leave to retire fight- 
ing towards the Northwestern Virginia railroad with a view 
to concentration in case of necessity, with Gen. Reynolds 
and other troops farther east. The post at New Creek sta- 
tion was turned over to Col. Biddle, of Gen. Burk's command, 
and that on the northwest road stripped of all save a nominal 
force to reinforce Gen. Reynolds. 

"The governor of Ohio, at this time apprehending disaster 
to us, sent us the 28th, 47th and 30th, raw regiments of three- 
years troops. I also assembled all the troops that could be 
spared, seven regiments and a half, three of Avhich had just 
received their arms, and marched from Clarksburg, by way 
of Weston, Bulltown and Sutton, to meet Gen. Floyd, who, 
having crossed Gauley, had attacked and overwhelmed Col. 
Tyler, of the 7th Ohio, at Cross Lanes, a distance from Clarks- 
burg of 117 miles and about 20 miles above Gen. Cox's position 
at the mouth of the Gauley. 

"Our column crossing Big Birch mountain on the 10th 
September, 1861, encamped at its foot, ten miles above Somer- 
ville, on the ground from which we had driven Floyd's out- 
posts. Here the citizens reported that Floyd, with from 15,000 
to 20,000 men, was encamped below Somerville, near Cross 
Lanes, on the north side of the Gauley. We could not stop 
to count numbers. Our only alternatives were to fight and 
whip or pass him and unite with Gea. Cox. Accordingly at 



132 Lee's Invasion op Northwest Virginia 

3 o'clock the next morning our column began to move, and 
by 1 o'clock p. m., after a march of fifteen miles, halted two 
miles from the enemy's intrenched position, having thus far 
had only a little skirmishing. While resting cavalry, of which 
we had but two companies, our staff began to reconnoitre. Fir- 
ing between the enemy's advanced guard and the head 
of our column soon followed, and by half past two o'clock 
Col. Lytle was in the camp of the rebel Col. Reynolds, who 
had retreated into the thick forest, the entrance of which, 
marked with numerous paths leading to the rear, satisfied me 
that the citizens' reports of the enemy being intrenched were 
probably correct. I therefore directed the leading brigade 
(Benham's), consisting of three of my best regiments, to ad- 
vance cautiously, but firmly, and to feel the enemy's position. 
Unfortunately, its commander, excited and impressed with the 
idea that the enemy was retreating, though emphatically cau- 
tioned to beware of masked batteries, advanced through the 
forest without deploying skirmishers, until the head of the 
column emerged in front of an intrenched line, and a battery 
of seven or eight pieces behind a parapet, where it received a 
terrific artillery and musketry fire, which brought it to a 
stand. This sudden and fierce fire caused the commander to 
send for reinforcement and artillery. Despatching orders for 
the other four regiments to follow and halt at the edge of 
the woods, I proceeded to the front and reconnoitred the 
enemy's position. Meanwhile Col. Robert McCook, whose 
brigade followed next, sent a portion of the 9th Ohio to our 
right, where it also drew the enemy's artillery, accompanied 
by heavy volleys of musketry. His line was found to extend 
across a bend in the Gauley river, its flanks resting upon 
almost inaccessible precipices five or six hundred feet above the 
Gauley. I now prepared for the assault, and to that end 
sent Col. W. S. Smith, with the 13th Ohio, supported by the 
28th Ohio, under Col. Mohr, to our left, where he reported he 
could find cover from the enemy's musketry until within about 
fifty yards of his flank, whence he thought he could ascend 
to the height on which their breastworks were built, and, by 
a sudden rush, take them. It was sunset before the fierce fir- 
ing at that point indicated that Smith's column was at work. 



Lee's Final. Failure 133 

Meanwhile Col. McCook had formed the 9th and the 47th Ohio 
as a storming column, to be supported by the 10th Ohio, to 
attack the battery on the enemy's centre. The troops were 
much jaded, and to inspire them with spirit I told them I 
would lead them myself. At this time the firing on our left 
receded, showing our attack there had not succeeded. It was 
also dusk, and an officer brought the report that our column, 
under Col. Smith, had found it impracticable in the darkness 
and depth of the ravine to accomplish its work. It therefore 
became necessary to defer the attack until morning. Taking 
good care to leave the impression that we were immediately 
in their front, and ready for the attack, the troops were 
quietly and carefully withdrawn to a good position, just out 
of reach of the enemy's fire, where, exhausted with the march- 
ing and fighting of the day, they lay down on their arms. At 
five o'clock next morning Col. Ewing, from the advance, 
brought in a contraband, who stated that during the night the 
enemy had withdrawn across the Gauley, destroying the foot- 
bridge and sent the ferry-boats over the falls, leaving only a 
small portion of his troops on the north side. Orders were 
immediately given to advance, and Col. Ewing took possession 
of the camp and the few prisoners he could find skulking 
through the woods unable to make their escape. Orders 
were immediately given to drive the enemy from the opposite 
side of the river, and hold the ferry, which, under Gen. 
Benham, was to be put in condition for crossing our troops 
as rapidly as possible. The Gauley, for a distance of nearly 
twenty miles, rushes through a chasm cut in the rocks from 
five to eight hundred feet deep, with precipitous sides, the 
current, excepting at a very few places, being too swift to 
cross, even with a skiff. Carnifex ferry, at the mouth of 
Meadow river, a southern tributary of the Gauley, is a level 
reach about two hundred and fifty yards long and one hun- 
dred and twenty-five yards wide, above and below which the 
water dashes over the rocks white with foam. The descent 
from the north side is by a winding road about a mile and a 
half in length from the line of the enemy's intrenchment. 
It was extremely difficult to obtain materials, and it took 
twelve days to replace the ferry-boats the enemy had destroyed. 



134 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 

Meanwhile Gen. Cox, from the mouth of the Gauley, despatched 
that after Wise had skirmished heavily with his advanced 
guard, he retired towards Lewisburg, and that he, Gen. Cox, 
should cross the Gauley in pursuit. I replied that he should 
advance carefully, until we could get the means to cross 
and join him. He obeyed the instructions, and so soon as a 
single small ferry-boat was ready, Gen. McCook, with two and 
a half regiments, by working night and day for forty-eight 
hours, crossed and joined him at the head of the Sunday 
road. It was also our misfortune to have been compelled to 
move so light that our ammunition and provisions were both 
nearly exhausted, and the trains to replenish them, which 
had been directed to follow us, were so delayed by the ter- 
rible rains which set in the night after the battle that they did 
not reach us for nine days thereafter. And the country was 
unable to supply us, which would have so long delayed us, 
even had we not been hindered by want of means of crossing 
the Gauley. The enemy having retreated towards Lewis- 
burg, Gen. Cox followed him, taking possession of one or two 
lines of intrenchments on his way, and reaching the top of 
Mount Sewell, where I joined him on the 28th, leaving orders 
for the remainder of my troops to follow as rapidly as pos- 
sible. It was pending this movement, when Gen. Lee, learn- 
ing that I was marching to attack Floyd, attempted to force 
Reynolds from his position at Cheat Mountain, but was badly 
beaten. From that time he seemed to be in observation, await- 
ing the result of the operations under Floyd and Wise. Gen. 
Reynolds, with rare intelligence and sagacity, kept him per- 
petually harassed, until finally the battle of Carnifex ended 
the enemy's operations in the Kanawaha valley. 

"Gen. Lee next determined to concentrate all his force on 
the Lewisburg road to oppose the advance of our victorious 
troops. When, therefore, we reached the top of Mount Sewell, 
we found him strongly posted in front of us, intrenched with 
an army of about 14,000 men; we had in our advance on his 
front 5,300 men and four and a half regiments coming up 
from the rear. One of the most terrible storms ever known 
in Western Virginia set in. Eighteen horses perished in one 
night at headquarters. The Gauley rose fifty feet. Forage, 



Lee's Final Failure 135 

clothing and commissary stores at its mouth, down the 
Kanawha, in spite of our utmost exertions, were damaged or 
swept away by the flood. The roads became almost impas- 
sable. The country between the mouth of the Gauley and 
Mount Sewell, a distance of thirty-eight miles, never abund- 
antly supplied, was now almost destitute of forage. It was 
evident that as, all told, we could not number to exceed 8,500 
effectives, we had no reasonable chance of driving Lee, with 
near twice that number, from an intrenched position, nor 
could we have compelled Lee to retire. Would it have been 
advisable to advance any farther at that season of the year, 
when it was impossible to have subsisted either animals or 
men, and when, moreover, we had nothing to accomplish by 
an advance of a small column far into the interior, beyond 
support and in proximity to the enemy's great rail communica- 
tions? Having spent two or three days in examining the 
country with a view to future operations, the troops were 
withdrawn to the vicinity of the Gauley, where prompt meas- 
ures were taken to supply them with clothing, an imperative 
necessity, from the fact that the continual marching during 
the past four months, and their remoteness from depots of 
supplies had rendered it impracticable heretofore, and the 
troops were so naked that in one regiment I counted one 
hundred and thirty-five men without pantaloons on parade. 
This position was held because it covered all the country in 
its rear, and still threatened and compelled the enemy to 
watch us. While thus occupied I learned from various sources 
that Gen. Lee had determined to drive us from our position 
by sending a column through Raleigh Court House to strike 
the Kanawha below us, and cut off our supplies, while he 
should take advantage to attack us on our front, and des- 
perately damage us in the retreat to which he expected to 
force us. Knowing the country better than Gen. Lee, I felt 
certain his column west of the river would be obliged to 
take the route by Fayette Court House over Cotton mountain, 
and strike the river opposite the mouth of the Gauley, where 
our rear guard was posted, and took measures accordingly. 
Nor was I disappointed. On the 27th October the head of 
Floyd's column, passing through Fayetteville, seized the road 



136 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 

opposite Miller's Ferry, where lay McCook's brigade, and the 
next day opened with artillery from the top of Cotton moun- 
tain, a distant and comparatively harmless fire on our posi- 
tion and depots at the mouth of the Gauley. Between our 
forces and Floyd's ran New river, through a narrow chasm 
from seven hundred to a thousand feet deep, cut in the rocks. 
The water whirls and foams through this channel, with but 
two short level reaches in twenty- five miles. One of these, at 
Miller's ferry, the enemy watched. About four miles above 
was a small pool, known as Townsend's ferry, to which there 
was a descent by a foot-path and a small ascent leading from 
the opposite side to the plateau, southeast of Fayetteville. 
Having satisfied myself of the possibility of using this as a 
place of crossing by which to surprise the enemy, I ordered 
the means therefor to be prepared, which consisted in sawing 
down the trees to avoid noise, and lowering by ropes over the 
cliffs materials for two ferries, one formed of wagon boxes 
laid side by side across two parallel poles, to which they were 
bound by two others lying on the tops of the boxes and se- 
cured to the lower ones by rope lashings. Over this was 
stretched canvas paulin. The other was what is known in the 
west as a bull-boat, covered with paulin. These were to be 
passed to and fro by a rope stretched across the river, which 
here was not too wide to admit of it. The work was pushed 
with the utmost secrecy and despatch, under the direction of 
Maj. (now major general) Crawford, and during a continued 
rain of seventy hours. The plan of operations was as fol- 
lows: The bridge which lay next above Gen. Cox's, at the 
mouth of Gauley, passing down secretly to a point six miles 
below, being reinforced by troops brought up from Charles- 
ton and other points on the river below, was secretly to cross 
the Kanawha at the mouth of Loup creek, and lie concealed 
until our preparations as above described were made for the 
crossing. When that was done, Gen. Cox was to commence 
skirmishing with the enemy, whose artillery had been driven 
from the front of Cotton hill. 

The commander of the Loup creek force was to send a 
column of 1,000 men across the mountains to Cassidy's mill, 
four miles west of the enemy's position, and about the same dis- 



Lee's Final Failure 137 

tance from Fayetteville, which lay seven and a half miles 
in his rear, and while this detachment was on its way was 
to march with the remainder of his forces up the river, and, in 
conjunction with Gen. Cox's troops, drive the enemy from Cot- 
ton hill, and prepare to attack him in his encampment on 
Laurel creek at its southern base. As soon as his detach- 
ment should have reached the mill this attack was to begin. 
While thus drawing the enemy's attention, Gen. Schenck was 
to move simultaneously to cross New river with 2,700 men at 
Townsend's ferry and seize the enemy's line of retreat near 
Fayetteville, announcing the success of this operation to the 
command in the enemy's front. Thus Floyd's force would 
be hemmed in beyond the possibility of escape. To be in readi- 
ness for any movement of Gen. Lee co-operating with Floyd 
by attacking us on the Lewisburg road, thorough watch was 
to be kept on that road towards Mount Sewell, and McCook's 
brigade with our artillery was to hold it, or a point near 
Hawk's Nest, which offered such difficulties to the advance of 
an enemy as would have enabled him to hold Gen. Lee for at 
least twenty-four hours. Our troops on the west side, hav- 
ing taken Floyd, were, in that case, to march to Bowyer's 
ferry, cross New river seven miles south of Fayetteville, and 
place themselves, G,000 strong, on the Lewisburg road in the 
rear of Lee's position, which would have put him wholly in 
our power. The execution of this plan proceded until the 
ferry-boats were ready; but the exceedingly violent rains had 
raised New river so that the small level at Townsend's ferry 
disappeared, and the river there, as elsewhere, was but a tor- 
rent, over which it was impossible even to ferry a skiff. When 
this became certain Gen. Schenck's command was ordered to 
move with all possible despatch to the mouth of Gauley, and 
cross the Kanawha at the falls, where means were in readi- 
ness. 

On the morning of November 11, Gen. Cox's troops attacked 
and drove the enemy's advance guard from Cotton hill, where 
the head of the Loup creek column arrived before noon, and 
pushed on over the mountain, attacked the enemy's rear guard 
at Laurel creek, his main body having retired from his en- 
campment there to Dickinson's farm, three miles further south. 



138 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 

At 12 o'clock on the same day the detachment, 1,300 instead 
of 1,000 strong, arrived at Cassidy's mill, on the flank and 
rear of the enemy, and there waited for orders while watching 
for the advance of Lee on the east side of the mill, and the 
movement of our column over the river, as well as that of Gen. 
Schenck, who, by marching all night, reached the mouth of 
Gauley on the morning of the 12th, and began crossing. Our 
column on the enemy's front, on the side of the mountain, lay 
on their arms from four o'clock in the afternoon of the 11th 
until the next morning, though its commander had ample and 
explicit orders. Hearing nothing from that front until late 
in the morning of the 12th, at 10 o'clock I despatched Capt. 
W. F. Rainolds, topographical engineers, aide-de-camp, to as- 
certain what was the matter. At about 2 p. m. he found the 
command about half a mile south of the foot of the moun- 
tain, lying on their arms, and after inquiry as to what was the 
matter, rode to the front beyond our advanced skirmishers 
to some hastily-built breastworks, thrown up by the enemy at 
Dickinson's farm, opposite Miller's ferry, the day before, and 
found them deserted. Returning, he informed our commander, 
who expressed surprise, and immediately set about ordering 
a move. But the column only reached the enemy's deserted 
camp at about 11 o'clock that night, when it halted. Mean- 
while the detachment at Cassidy's mill, instead of moving 
across to Fayetteville, only three or four miles distant, was 
ordered to march four miles down the stream to join the rear 
of this column, seven miles and a half north of Fayetteville, 
which it did. The enemy had retreated about midnight of the 
11th, an advanced guard hearing the movement, which was not 
more than three miles from the main body, and reporting 
the same to the column headquarters as early as 2 a. m. of 
the 12th. This put Floyd about twenty-four hours ahead. Our 
troops halted here, and the commander, Gen. Benham, sent me 
the following despatch, viz. : 

"One mile from Dickinson's — 11% p. m. 
"Gen. Rosecrans: I push forward with the chance of catch- 
ing Floyd's train. Do not let me be interfered with, though 
he has a long start. Two great blunders, made by my two best 



Lee's Final Failure 139 

officers, have put me twenty-four hours behind Floyd. I should 
have been only twelve hours had it not been for this. I in- 
tend to take his train. It is safe for all to come on, as I am 
pushing to Raleigh. 

"Respectfully, etc." 

On the forenoon of the 14th our advance came up with 
the enemy's rear guard, with which it had a smart skirmish. 
Meanwhile, Gen. Schenck with, his command, had followed 
as rapidly as possible, and, being senior in rank, was ordered 
to assume the command until my arrival on that side of the 
river. Gen. Schenck sent his adjutant general, Maj. Piatt, 
to the front to ascertain the condition of affairs, and sent all 
the subsistence he could get forward on unharnessed train 
animals to supply our hungry men, who were out of rations, 
and to give such orders as might be deemed prudent in the 
premises. The major met a messenger from Gen. Benham with 
despatches to Gen. Schenck, informing him that he had In- 
formation which led him to believe Lee, with a considerable 
force, was at Bowyer's, urging Gen. Schenck to come and meet 
him, and proposing that their united forces should proceed 
at once in that direction. But, proceeding to the front, the 
major ascertained that our troops were exhausted, out of 
rations, and in the then condition of the roads could neither 
be supplied nor had they much prospect of catching the enemy 
or his trains, which, of course, were sent in advance of his re- 
treating forces. Moreover, a terrible snow and rain storm 
came on; the roads became desperate, and it was perfectly 
manifest that further pursuit would be much more likely 
to damage us than the enemy. Under these circumstances Gen. 
Schenck gave orders to discontinue pursuit and return to 
Fayetteville, where supplies could reach him, and whence, 
subsequently, I ordered all troops, except Gen. Schenck's, 
to return to their old positions. Thus Floyd escaped; but his 
column had retreated in a most demoralized condition, leaving 
some ammunition and camp equipage behind. 

Gen. Lee did not carry out the plan of attack he had origin- 
ally proposed on the Lewisburg road, the condition of the roads 
between us and Mount Sewell having interposed almost insup- 
erable obstacles; and, morever, Gen. Lee himself having been 



140 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 

called about that time east under orders for Charleston, 
most of Lee's troops retiring from the position in front of 
Mount Sewell to an intrenched camp at Meadow Bluff; while 
Floyd's troops went to Dublin Station, on the Southwest 
Virginia and Tennessee railroad. Thus ended the enemy's 
campaign against us in Western Virginia — in defeat and fail- 
ure — and the people, during the winter, established an ef- 
fective civil government, which has ever since continued. 

As the civil administration of a department commander 
is an important element of duty, in closing the statement of 
my campaign in Western Virginia it will be proper to say 
that the people of Western Virginia gave testimony to their 
satisfaction with my administration by a unanimous vote of 
thanks from both houses of the legislature, which was passed 
during the session of 1861-'62. 



McCLELLAN'S ABANDONMENT OF THE 
KANAWHA VALLEY. 

Is Easily Persuaded by a Kanawha Delegation. — Explana- 
tions by the General and by Judge Summers. 

MCCLELLAN EXPLAINS TO GEN. SCOTT. 

The following is Gen. MeClellan's explanation, 
written to Adjt. Gen. Townsend from Cincinnati, 
June 1, 1861 : 

"I had intimated in preceding despatches an intention of 
moving on the valley of the Great Kanawha, and in fact ma- 
tured my plans for carrying that intention into effect in 
such manner as to render all resistance hopeless, with the 
design of effecting the occupation, as I did that of the Graf- 
ton line, without firing a shot. 

"My view of our course is that we should not cross the 
frontier without being fully assured that our assistance is 
demanded b t y the Union men and that our movements should 
be in such force as to preclude the possibility of resistance. 

"I had a long interview this morning with Judge L. 
Ruffner and Col. B. F. Smith, both of Kanawha valley. * 
They came accredited by Hon. V. Horton, of Pomeroy, and 
other reliable men, and are represented as expressing the 
sentiment of the Union men of that region. 

"My conference with them was full and frank. I told 
them that I did not believe it to be the will of the general 
government to force assistance on the Union men where there 
was good ground to believe that they were able and willing 
to take care of themselves; that should I learn that any 
force from eastern Virginia had entered their valley, I could 



*CoL Benjamin H. Smith, U. S. District Attorney, and 
Lewis Ruffner, salt manufacturer, both resident at Charles- 
ton. 

141 



142 Lee's Invasion op Northwest Virginia 

promptly drive them out; that they might count upon our 
aid whenever demanded; that it is necessary for them to make 
up their minds to take a decided stand. 

"They stated that the Union feeling (shown to be decidedly 
preponderant by the late elections) is rapidly increasing; as- 
sert their ability to keep the secessionists under, say that they 
will not allow themselves to be forced into the Southern Con- 
federacy, and deprecate sending any troops there for the 
present. I have therefore thought it prudent to submit the 
matter to Gen. Scott, the more especially as I think no ill 
effects can follow from some delay; for I have information 
which satisfies me that there are no East Virginians nor Con- 
federate troops in that region, and that they cannot move 
them there at present. 

"These Kanawha gentleman approve of the Grafton move- 
ment; and I have determined, until I receive further in- 
structions from Gen. Scott, to modify my original plan so as 
to accomplish the same result in a manner that will not be 
obnoxious." 

It seems pertinent to remark that Gen. McClellan's 
"view" that the Union armies should not "cross the 
frontier" except on request of the Union men south 
of it, nor without an irresistible force at command, is 
rather startling from the military point of view. Un- 
der this rule of action, the United States armies could 
not have entered a single insurrectionary state. Gen. 
McClellan's proneness to mix his political views with 
his military duties, so fatal to his reputation as a 
commander and so injurious to the country, it thus 
appears, developed at a very early stage of his career. 

Hon. George W. Summers, Col. Benjamin H. Smith 
and Lewis Ruffner had gone to Gallipolis to persuade 
the Union commander there not to cross the river. 
He told them he had no orders to cross, but he was 
liable to have such orders; so Messrs. Smith and 
Ruffner went on to Cincinnati to urge Gen. McClellan 



McClellan's Abandonment of Kanawha 143 

to keep out of the Kanawha valley. Mr. Summers — 
the ablest, most important, most influential of the 
three — did not accompany them. 

Mr. Summers had been a member of the Virginia 
convention. His course at Richmond, and his printed 
declarations after his return home, indicated that he 
was in sympathy with (or under the influence of) the 
Confederate cabal. 

Col. Smith was U. S. District Attorney. He was 
regarded as loyal. So was Mr. Ruffner, who was an 
old man, of great ability; a salt manufacturer; a 
brother of Dr. Henry Ruffner, distinguished for his 
anti-slavery attitude, who died at Charleston before 
the year was out. Lewis Ruffner afterwards took 
part in the loyal reorganization at Wheeling. Mr. 
Summers did not. 

THE EARLY ATTITUDE OP KANAWHA. 

The Union men in Kanawha were not sufficiently 
pronounced in their loyalty to the United States to 
be represented in the convention which gathered at 
Wheeling, May 13th, 1861, to organize resistance to 
the transfer of Virginia to the Southern Confederacy. 
Mr. Summers had promised Union members of the 
convention at Richmond that he would co-operate in 
their movement to resist the Confederate usurpation; 
but the promise was not kept. Mr. Ruffner went to 
Wheeling as a member of the General Assembly, and 
became, ex-officio, a member of the June convention, 
which reorganized the government of Virginia. Mr. 
Smith late in the session of the convention which met 
at Wheeling in November, 1861, to frame a constitu- 
tion for the new State of West Virginia, obtained a 



144 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 

seat in that body as a delegate from Logan county, 
though a resident of Kanawha, upon petition of a 
few refugees who were under protection of an Ohio 
regiment. His subsequent part in the proceedings 
of that convention indicated that his object in getting 
into it was to promote certain special interests: one 
being protection of wild-land owners who had been 
delinquent in payment of taxes on their lands more 
than twenty years; another, to aid in engrafting on 
the West Virginia constitution the same old " internal 
improvement" policy which had proved the ruin of 
Virginia; third, to resist measures looking to the 
gradual or other removal of slavery in the new State. 
He and Brown of Kanawha were the champions of 
the slave interest in the recalled sitting of the con- 
vention in February, 1863. 

Assuming that these gentlemen were simply timid 
and were sincere in their later avowal of loyalty to 
the United States government, they made a mistake in 
persuading Gen. McClellan to withhold troops from 
the Kanawha valley; and he, it is apparent, needed 
very little persuasion. The reasons he gives Adjt. 
Gen. Townsend for abandoning the plan for occupa- 
tion are not convincing. He says he had satisfied 
himself there were no "East Virginia" troops in the 
Valley; and, again, that there were no "Confederate" 
troops. If Gen. McClellan was well informed, he 
knew there were several hundred Confederate troops 
there at the time he wrote his letter to Townsend. All 
the troops organized anywhere in Virginia under the 
proclamation of Letcher and the call of Gen. Lee 
were "Confederate." To justify driving them out 
or capturing them, it was not necessary that they 



McClellan's Abandonment of Kanawha 145 

should have come from Eastern Virginia. Gen. Mc- 
Clellan is little less than childish, also, in the remark 
that if he found the rebels had got into the Valley, 
he would promptly drive them out. This was a case 
where prevention was more economical than cure — 
as the event abundantly proved. 

JUDGE SUMMERS MAKES AN EXPLANATION. 

In a public address at Wheeling, in the old court- 
house, the evening of August 3, 1863, Mr. Summers 
undertook to defend this application to Gen. McClel- 
lan to keep troops out of the Kanawha valley. From 
the shorthand notes of that address, the following is 
now transcribed: 

"I was sent, with certain other gentlemen, who have been 
honored with the public confidence from that day to this — 
one of whom is now a delegate from the county of Kanawha, 
one of whom is U. S. Disrict Attorney of West Virginia — 
to Gallipolis, where we communed with as sound a man as 
the land produces — I mean the representative of the Pomeroy 
district in the Congress of the United States, Hon. V. B. 
Horton. There was then a regiment at Gallipolis, the colonel 
of which assured us he had no orders to cross the river. 

"The line of remark presented on that occasion was briefly 
this: The Kanawha country was not on any line of transit; 
troops sent to Eastern Virginia would pass by the railroads 
from Parkersburg and Wheeling. Through the Valley, you 
encounter a series of hills rendering the roads inadequate 
for the passage of troops or any large amount of supplies. 
That there was no necessity — as yet, at all events — for hostile 
demonstrations there ; that there were some two or three 
companies, at the outside, of State troops organized at the 
time of the John Brown raid; that the counties immediately 
on the river had no purpose whatever, so far as we could 
understand to attempt to annoy the towns on the Ohio, and — 
least of all — to cross the stream. 



146 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 

"That view was concurred in by the commandant of the 
regiment and by all our friends at Gallipolis at the time, 
so far as I know; and two gentlemen went on to Cincinnati 
and had a conference, as I was informed, with Gen. McClellan 
himself, who coincided in the view that no troops need be 
sent there unless troops from the Confederate states were 
sent out to the Kanawha country. That was all we desired. 
We had no expectation of troops from the east. We supposed 
they would have enough to do beyond the mountains. We 
had no conception at that time of Wise and his troops com- 
ing there. Indeed, he brought no troops. He brought a lot of 
officers — no privates, I believe; they were all officers. 

"After our return to Kanawha, to our chagrin and sur- 
prise, we understood messengers had been sent — alarmed as 
they were at the appearance of this regiment at Gallipolis — 
to the East for aid in the form of troops and munitions of 
war. 

"From that hour, I washed my hands of the whole matter. 
All I had done was upon the concession that both parties 
were to act on this line of policy, and if one acted other- 
wise, of course, it relieved the other. When these troops 
v/ere in possession of the valley, no opportunities occurred — 
at least on my part — of communicating with Ohio, with the 
commanding general, or anybody else, in relation to the change 
which had occurred." 



IMBECILITY OF MCCLELLAN. 

Gen. McClellan, in yielding to the persuasion of 
these gentlemen, seems conscious he had taken leave 
of his better (military) judgment. His weak com- 
plaisance in the matter resulted in the occupation and 
despoilment of the Valley by Wise and his lieutenants, 
and in costly military operations to recover the coun- 
try thus abandoned to the enemy. Judge Summers, 
a lawyer, might be excused for thinking the war then 
opening was to be just a bit of children's game; but 



McClellan 's Abandonment of Kanawha 147 

Gen. McClellan, an educated soldier, ought to have 
known better. 

Gen. Lee had prompt advice of Gen. McClellan 's 
agreement not to occupy the Kanawha valley, for it 
is a matter of official record that six days after Mc- 
Clellan had so informed Gen. Scott, Wise had orders 
to proceed thither at once. 



In connection with Judge Summers' explanation, it 
may be remarked that the official records afford some 
insight into the conditions existing in that region 
at that juncture. We note that, 

May 3rd, Col. Tompkins, Charleston, was ordered to 
take command of troops called out in the Kanawha 
valley under proclamation of Gov. Letcher. 

May 27th, Col. Tompkins, "commanding Virginia 
volunteers," despatches from Falls of Kanawha to 
Adjt. Gen. Garnett: 

"I have this moment express from Lieut. Col. McCausland, 
at Buffalo, dated yesterday, stating that the U. S. Govern- 
ment had sent two hundred troops to Gallipolis and will have 
six hundred more there today. Send down all the troops you 
have." 

Same date, Col. Tompkins wrote Adjt. Gen. Gar- 
nett explaining the situation: 

"Great excitement prevails in this region. The divided 
sentiment of the people adds to the confusion, and except 
the few loyal companies now mustered into the service of the 
State, there are few people who sympathize with the secession 
policy." 

May 29th. Col. Tompkins, " commanding Confed- 
erate forces in the Kanawha valley," — from which it 
would seem there really were some Confederate 



148 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 

troops there — wired Garnett at Staunton that troops 
were gathering along the Ohio border, "several hun- 
dred at Gallipolis." 

May 30th, Col. Tompkins wrote Gov. Letcher that 
he had then 340 men under his command, and when 
the companies then in process of formation in that 
valley should have been completed, he would have 
about a thousand. At this time, Col. Jenkins, ex-Con- 
gressman, was raising a regiment of cavalry; which 
evidently is not counted in Col. Tompkins' reckon- 
ing. 

Same date, Col. Tompkins issues an appeal : 

"Men of Kanawha! Men of Virginia! To arms! Repel 
the aggressors! Preserve your honor and your rights! Rally 
in every neighborhood, with or without arms; organize and 
unite and report to those nearest to you in military posi- 
tion." 

It was in this posture of affairs that Gen. McClel- 
lan, two days later, notified Gen. Scott he had aban- 
doned his purpose to occupy the Kanawha valley. 

If it be true, as Mr. Summers asserts, that Wise 
took none but officers with him into the Kanawha, it 
must also be true he found on his arrival in the val- 
ley a very energetic and efficient organization ready 
to his hand. For nowhere in the whole theater of the 
war do we find more drastic measures than those im- 
mediately put in operation there by Wise. From his 
letter to Gen. Lee, dated July 17th, it appears Wise 
had then three thousand men under his command, 
none of whom, so far as appears, had been sent from 
the East. The absence of Union troops in the valley 
left the Union people there helpless in the presence of 



McClellan 's Abandonment of Kanawha 149 

even a small force of organized Confederates and 
made Wise as completely master there as if he had 
taken a large army with him. 

Judge Summers did well to "wash" his hands of 
this calamitous business. But water will not always 
cleanse. Lady Macbeth declared the attempt to wash 
out the stain of Duncan's blood would "the whole 
multitudinous seas incarnadine." No more could 
Pilate free his hands from the innocent blood of Jesus, 
though he wash till Doomsday. In any case it avails 
no more to wash hands after the mischief is done 
than to lock the stable after the steed has been stolen. 

Gen. McClellan never took the trouble to "wash" 
his hands of this Kanawha blunder. He never tried 
to justify or explain what he had done beyond the 
(quoted) letter to Adjt. Gen. Townsend. If he felt 
any compunction for his abandonment of the South- 
west to the ravage of Wise, he never gave a sign. But 
after a time, he seems to have perceived something 
had gone wrong in that part of his military preserve. 
June 12th he wired Townsend : 

"I have started all the preparations for an expedition to 
gain possession of the Kanawha valley; which will probably 
be the end of the secession cause in that region." 

They were only "preparations" and he had only 
"started" them; so we need not be surprised to find 
it was not until July 2nd (when at Buckhannon) 
that McClellan issued an order to Gen. Cox to move 
an army into the Kanawha valley. Following are the 
details of the order : 

"Assume command of the First and Second Kentucky 
regiments; call on Gov. Dennison for a company of cavalry 



150 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 

and six guns; expedite the equipment of this force and move 
at once to Gallipolis; cross the river and occupy Point Pleas- 
ant; move two regiments to the mouth of Ten Mile creek, 
where the road from Letart Falls intersects the Kanawha 
river; place a regiment in reserve at Point Pleasant; en- 
trench two guns at Letart's and four at your advanced posi- 
tion on the Kanawha. Remain on the defensive, and endeavor 
to keep the rebels near Charleston until I can cut off their re- 
treat by movements from Beverly." 

This order illustrates the unreadiness of McClellan, 
so painfully characteristic of his conduct in his larger 
command; where it is asserted he took as his con- 
fidential adviser a General who by his open disobedi- 
ence of orders on the field more than once entitled 
himself to be shot by a drumhead court martial. Mc- 
Clellan had eminent talent for preparation. On the 
Potomac he developed an equally eminent talent for 
masterly inactivity. 

Gen. McClellan was called to the command of the 
army of the Potomac because the newspapers ac- 
claimed him as the "Young Napoleon of the West." 
This acclaim was based solely on his own grandilo- 
quent reports; and when, a fortnight after Rich 
Mountain, the National capital was in a panic over 
the rout of the Union army at Bull Run, the "Young 
Napoleon" was called thither to take charge of the 
army of defense and restore the confidence of the 
country. 

The facts narrated in the foregoing pages show 
that Rosecrans, not McClellan, was the hero of Rich 
Mountain, which battle was decisive of the campaign 
in West Virginia in 1861 : which defeated and dis- 
credited Lee, and cleared the field for the restoration 
of civil government in Virginia. 



CRISP COMMENT BY COLONEL PORTER- 
FIELD. 

Rosecrans the Hero of Rich Mountain — Garnett's Mistake. 

DEATH OF CONVENTIONIST HUGHES. 

Charles Town, W. Va., January 4, 1904. 
G. D. Hall, Esqr. 

My Dear Sir: Your letter of the 26th ult., inquiring the 
particulars of the killing of John N. Hughes, on the Rich 
Mountain, July 11th, 1861, has been received. I regret that I 
cannot give you as full and satisfactory a statement as to 
how that unfortunate affair occurred as I would wish. 

On the evening of July 11, 1861, when the battle of Rich 
Mountain was being fought, Col. W. C. Scott, with his regi- 
ment, was stationed on the road coming from a northerly 
direction into Buckhannon turnpike, a mile or so west of 
Beverly. Whilst there he sent Mr. Hughes as a messenger 
to Col. Pegram, whose camp was at the western base of the 
mountain. Col. Scott at that time heard the sound of the 
battle, but thought it came from Pegram's camp and not from 
the top of the mountain where there was a small force under 
Capt. De Lagnel. Whilst the battle was going on, some 
mounted men were seen in the road east of the Confeder- 
ate position, who were mistaken for the enemy and fired upon. 
From the best of my recollection, Hughes was killed by that 
fire; but I am not certain that he was. Later, Capt. De 
Lagnel sent a squad of cavalry down to Scott's position. Mr. 
Hughes may have met that cavalry and been killed by them, 
but I do not think it at all probable that he was. I will try 
to get positive information on this point, and if I succeed will 
send it to you. 

Gen. Rosecrans was undoubtedly entitled to the credit of 
the success at Rich Mountain. He planned and carried out the 
movements by which it was accomplished. Rich Mountain was 

151 



152 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 

the key to Garnett's position; and when Rich Mountain 
was taken, Laurel Hill fell with it, and Garnett's whole army 
was then defeated. 

McClellan should have made a feint of attack on Pegram's 
camp, to prevent Pegram from sending reinforcements to De 
Lagnel, on the top of the mountain — just as Gen. Morris 
feigned an attack on Garnett and held him at Laurel Hill. 

The whole campaign was admirably planned and executed 
by the Union side; but just the reverse by the Confederate. 
McClellan being in command, of course, got all the credit 
for it. How far he acted by the advice of Rosecrans, I do not 
know. 

As has been stated, Gen. Garnett was detained at Laurel 
Hill, all the time expecting an attack would be made on him 
there. The movements of Gen. Morris in his front were all a 
feint intended to hold him in his position until Rich Mountain 
was taken. When Garnett found that Rich Mountain was lost, 
and that he was defeated, he seemed to have lost his head. He 
then had ample time to retreat through Beverly, and save 
what was left of his army and his train. There was no 
excuse for his not knowing that the road was open to him. 
He had sufficient cavalry to have ascertained that fact to a 
certainty. The reports said to have been brought to him 
that trees had been felled across the road, and that McClel- 
lan's troops were in Beverly, were all false. The real state 
of affairs in his then front could have been ascertained by a 
reliable cavalry company in a single hour. But he did not 
use the means he had of getting the truth. He acted upon the 
belief that he could not retreat by the main road through 
Beverly, and turned off to the east upon a by-road of which he 
knew little or nothing, with the result that was to have been 
expected. 

A full and correct account of this campaign would be very 
interesting and instructive. Some years ago Gen. E. A. 
Carman, formerly of the U. S. A., then living in Washing- 
ton city, wrote what he entitled "The W'est Virginia Campaign 
of 1861," but I have not seen notice of its publication. He 
showed me his manuscript; but from my recollection I think 
it was rather defective. 



Comment by Colonel Porterfield 153 

It would require more time and labor than I could spare 
from my present duties to attempt to write a history of it. 
Yours very truly, 

GEORGE A. PORTERFIELD. 



Charles Town, W. Va., Feb. 5th, 1904. 

G. D. Hall, Esq., 

Dear Sir: Since the receipt of your letter of the 19th 
ult., I have gotten a copy of the second volume of the Records 
of the War, and I am now inclined to agree with you that 
John N. Hughes was killed by a party of cavalry under 
Lieut. James Cochrane. I wrote to his son, who is a druggist 
at Bristol, Tenn., to know if he had heard his father speak 
of this unfortunate occurrence, or if his father had left any 
papers in which it had been referred to. He replied in the 
negative. Perhaps some of the older residents of Beverly may 
remember how it occurred. 

The firing of some of Capt. Anderson's men upon some of 
their comrades was on the western side of the mountain. 

It was impossible for Hughes to have passed the top of the 
mountain after the battle commenced. It was near three 
o'clock before the battle was fully begun. I heard the fir- 
ing, and it lasted about three hours. Rosecrans reports that 
he reached the top of the mountain about a mile and a half 
south of the road, about one o'clock; and he was delayed by 
the pickets and other obstacles about two hours before he 
reached De Lagnel's position. 

There was constant communication between Garnett and 
Pegram's camps until the top of Rich Mountain was taken. 
After that it was impossible. 

The distance from Beverly to Laurel Hill does not exceed 
twelve miles. I passed over the road often, and did not 
think the distance so great as that. Almost all of Garnett's 
force was on the western slope of Laurel Hill. It was pro- 
tected by breastworks of logs and stone. 

Garnett began his retreat at dusk on the evening of the 
11th of July. He moved down the turnpike to where the road 
to St. George enters it. There he halted his command for 



154 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 

awhile — about half an hour — and then turned down the St. 
George road. He marched all that night. 

It was not known to Gen. Morris that Garnett had retreated 
until the morning of the 12th. 

I do not place much confidence in Heck's statement. That 
paper was written some time after he left the service, and was 
made up, no doubt, from memory and from what had been 
told him. On page 257 he states: "The enemy * * * 
were bayoneting our wounded soldiers who had been shot at 
their posts." This is not true. He says "the day after we 

left Buckhannon, June , the enemy under Rosecrans, five 

thousand strong, occupied the place and was largely rein- 
forced." This, of course, was reported to Pegram and Garnett. 
I therefore do not believe that Pegram asked Garnett for 
permission to go out and attack McClellan at Roaring creek. 

Garnett could have retreated to the top of Cheat Moun- 
tain any night, but he would never have consented to doing so 
without a contest. He had just come from Richmond, where 
he had heard such a howl of abuse of me, for the accident to 
my small and destitute command, that he could not have 
faced his eastern friends if he had done so. I understood that 
he had joined in this himself. If he did, his "Arab chickens 
came home to roost." It was said by Capt. (afterwards Gen- 
eral) Benham, U. S. A., who had served with Garnett on 
Gen. Taylor's staff in the battle of Buena Vista and was with 
the pursuing column and the first to recognize Garnett's body 
after he was killed, that he believed Garnett had wilfully 
placed himself where he would be shot, to avoid the mortifica- 
tion of his disastrous defeat. 

Gen. Garnett was no doubt a brave man, and a good officer 
in a subordinate position; but his campaign in Western Vir- 
ginia shows that he was deficient as a general in the field with 
a separate command. He was undoubtedly stunned by his de- 
feat, and did not know which way to move. He should often 
whilst at Laurel Hill have asked himself the question: "What 
shall I do if Pegram should be defeated?" and have been 
prepared to act accordingly. He failed in this respect. He 
was unfortunate in having had to divide his command. It 
should have been united ; but I know of no place west of 
Cheat Mountain where this could have been safely done. 



Comment by Colonel Porterfield 155 

Garnett was a great favorite of Jefferson Davis ; had served 
with him in the Mexican war. In his "Rise and Fall of the 
Confederate Government," Mr. Davis compares him to Ney, 
the last of the rear-guard in Napoleon's retreat from Moscow. 

I observe by reference to McClellan's report (page 205) 
that he does not give Rosecrans the credit, to which he is 
justly entitled, of first proposing to turn Pegram's left flank — 
which resulted in the defeat of Garnett's army — but intimates 
that it was his own original proposition ; and there appears a 
disposition to slur Rosecrans throughout this report. There 
was a lack of magnanimity in this, to say the least of it. 

Rosecrans found a man named Hart, of whom he inquired 
if it was possible to take a force to the top of the moun- 
tain south of the road. When informed that it was, he took 
the man to McClellan, and the result of the interview was that 
McClellan ordered Rosecrans on that expedition. Before that, 
it was said, McClellan intended to attack Pegram's front — 
which would have been attended with great loss of life. 

I also notice that (on page 213) Rosecrans complains of an 
offensive letter which McClellan had written him. Gen. Rose- 
crans was an upright man, and proved himself to be one of the 
ablest generals of the war. Every word of his reports can be 
relied upon as true. 

The Richmond authorities made a great mistake when they 
sent troops into Northwestern Virginia. The Hon. George W. 
Summers advised Gov. Letcher not to do so, and he was right. 
That part of the state was separated from the rest by the great 
Allegheny and Cheat ranges of mountains. The people gen- 
erally were for the Union. Any required number of troops 
could be (and were) sent to their aid from Ohio, Indiana and 
Pennsylvania. The authorities appear not to have taken all 
this into consideration. The first aim of Garnett was to reach 
and destroy the B. and 0. railroad. The destruction of that 
road west of the mountain would have amounted to nothing. 
It was torn up in the valley, during the war, from Harper's 
Ferry to the North mountain, the ties piled up and burned, 
the rails heated and bent; and yet the road was fully repaired 
in as little time as it took to tear it up. 

It is now near forty years since the war ended; the harsh 
feeling engendered by it is passing away ; and all right-thinking 



156 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 

persons must acknowledge that it is better to have a united 
than a divided country. 

I am always ready to give you any information that I can. 
Yours truly, 

GEORGE A. PORTERFIELD. 

P. S. — I was with Garnett's command when he began his 
retreat, at dusk on the evening of July 11th, also when he 
turned down the St. George road, about two hours later. 

McClellan is in error when he states that "Our rapid march 
turned Garnett back and cut off his retreat." (See pages 203 
and 204.) At the date of his report, 9 a. m., July 12th, when 
he says: "I am now pushing on to Beverly," Garnett could 
have been on the Cheat Mountain, if he had followed the turn- 
pike through Beverly. Garnett no doubt thought McClellan 
would move towards Beverly at once — which was improbable; 
but even could he have done so, Garnett had the means of 
holding him in check until his train passed through. 

McClellan needed no messenger from Rosecrans when he 
heard the sound of his guns on the top of the mountain. 

If they were "in sight of Beverly," they saw it from the 
top of the mountain. McClellan does not say when they en- 
tered that town. It was not before noon, 12th. 



THE STORY OF A SCOUT.* 

Who Tried to Do a Little Business on His Own Account. 

Who Spent Near Two Years in Rebel Prisons, and 

Who Gave His Life for the Union Cause. 

A few miles east of Clarksburg, in staid old Har- 
rison county, named for one of the early governors 
of Virginia who was one of the signers of the Decla- 
ration of Independence, lived and died Leonard 
Kreitzer. He had been a soldier of the Revolutionary 
war, in a New Jersey regiment, an alien by birth, but 
an American patriot by choice. After the Revolution, 
he settled near where the hamlet of Bridgeport after- 
wards grew, on the borders of Simpson's creek. He 
was a model farmer, a good citizen, of strong indi- 
viduality and high moral attributes which he im- 
parted to a grandson, adopted by him, who bore his 
Christian name and whom he reared to the simple 
and healthful life of his farm. 

Leonard Clark, who had come of this lineage on 
his mother's side and Huguenot blood on his father's, 
was at the beginning of the Rebellion a young man of 
family in his early prime; of medium stature, pow- 
erfully built, close-knit and muscular; face dark, 
handsome, leonine and resolute. He was not obtru- 
sive in manner, nor given to needless speech. He had 
the instincts and breeding of a gentleman. His in- 
telligence was of a high order ; his courage undoubted. 

A few years before the period with which we deal, 
he had a frightful and desperate encounter with a 
maniac. It was "in the haying." He had crossed 
into the meadow for a chat with a neighbor, Elder. 

•This story, save slight correction and some omissions and addi- 
tions, was contributed to the Pittsburgh Dispatch a dozen years ago. 

157 



158 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 

They were sitting in the shade when the neighborhood 
school teacher, Rodney Atchison, who had dismissed 
for the day, came across the meadow on his way home. 
He approached and picked up Elder's scythe, lying 
near, and turning away cut a few strokes and then 
came back as if to lay it down. Instead of this, he 
sprang at Elder and with a stroke of the keen blade 
severed his head from the body. Turning instantly, 
he aimed a blow at Clark with the same deadly intent. 
Clark was quick and "ducked." The blade flashed 
over his head and only clipped a lock of hair. Clark 
seized the madman, and after a desperate struggle 
broke away from him, snatched a stake from a near- 
by fence and knocked the scythe from Atchison's 
hands, and with another blow felled him and held him 
till help arrived. 

This was the man who in the early spring of 1861, 
then domiciled at Claysville, Taylor county, found 
himself too indignant over the presence of rebel troops 
at Grafton, and later at Philippi, to wait for the 
arrival of the United States volunteers expected from 
beyond the Ohio. As the only thing he could do, 
after Porterfield's withdrawal to Philippi, he deter- 
mined to get some information as to the number and 
position of the Secession forces at that place. He 
was familiar with the mountain region south of the 
Baltimore & Ohio railroad; had driven cattle and in 
other ways traversed the roads and by-ways in Bar- 
bour and the counties south of it; and in the crisis 
now impending, strongly felt not only the call of his 
country, but the ' ' call of the wild ' ' itself inviting him 
to adventure as a scout. He accordingly, close on the 
heels of the retreating Confederates, set out on the 



The Story op a Scout 159 

dangerous service he proposed to himself, afoot and 
alone, without confiding his purpose even to his fam- 
ily. 

The story of this adventure of Clark's was told 
the writer at Grafton by a brother-in-law of his not 
long after it occurred. 

In the neighborhood of Porterfield's camp, Clark 
was discovered by the rebel pickets, who were mounted 
and gave chase. The hue and cry brought others, 
who joined in the pursuit. He took to the woods, and 
thus for a time baffled his pursuers. But they were 
persistent; and whenever he would emerge into open 
ground, he would find himself headed off by horse- 
men, while dismounted men chased him through the 
brush. 

Thus the chase went on hour after hour through 
the day, Clark by desperate exertions keeping out of 
the clutches of his pursuers, who might have shot 
him, but seemed intent on taking him alive. The 
country was rugged, and the toil of climbing the steep 
hillsides was but partly compensated by the run down 
the other side. Faint with hunger, worn down with 
running, climbing, dodging, hiding, hat lost and cloth- 
ing torn, a man of ordinary physique and courage 
must have given up; but Clark kept up the flight, 
steadily heading north and drawing his enemies far- 
ther from their camp. At times he would be appar- 
ently cut off in all directions. Finally, he was so ex- 
hausted, he could go no farther, and crawled into a 
hollow log in a brush-heap which offered its friendly 
shelter. He lay there a long time listening to the 
shouts of his disconcerted pursuers. They could not 
believe he had escaped ; for they had a cordon drawn 



160 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 

all round the piece of woods in which he had been 
last seen. And so they lingered in the vicinity and 
beat the covers in all directions. At times some came 
very near and Clark listened to their conversation. 
One man actually came and stood on the log which 
concealed him. At this moment he gave himself up 
for lost. But the man went away without making 
any discovery, and the friendly darkness coming on, 
they withdrew. Clark lay still far into the night, 
and hearing his persecutors no more, at last ventured 
to crawl out, and once more set out in the direction of 
the north star, which had guided many a fugitive 
before in that region towards havens of freedom, 
desperately tired, sore, cramped and hungry, but res- 
olute and refreshed by his few hours' respite. He 
had not gone far before a sharp "Halt!" was fol- 
lowed by the whistle of a bullet. Clark did not waste 
a moment "on the order of his going." He plunged 
into the obscurity of the woods and was followed; 
but his incentive to escape was greater than the incen- 
tive to pursue, and his pursuers dropped off one by 
one till he heard them no more. He kept straight on 
through the night as well as his condition allowed, 
and when daylight smiled on him, he was in a friendly 
country. 

Next day he reached his home and appeared among 
his astonished family more dead than alive. What 
clothes remained were in tatters; hat and shoes gone, 
feet bare and bleeding : the physical man in a pitiable 
state, but the ardor of the patriot in no wise dimin- 
ished. 

When Gen. Morris, at the head of Union soldiers 
from Indiana, arrived at Grafton, Leonard Clark 



The Story of a Scout 161 

was the first to offer himself for the hazardous serv- 
ice of a scout. From that time on until captured, 
he never rested nor shrank from his dangerous duty. 
His services, by reason not only of his personal su- 
periority of mind and body, but of his familiarity 
with the whole mountain region which became the 
theater of war, were invaluable to the Union com- 
manders. His career as a scout was abruptly ended 
by his capture. In company with Dr. William B. 
Fletcher, of Gen. Morris' staff, he had penetrated 
some distance within the Rebel lines in Pocahontas 
county. Suddenly, they were confronted by the 
enemy's pickets, who with loaded guns demanded 
their surrender. Clark, by a quick dash, got under 
cover and could have escaped. Fletcher was caught 
and his captors, recognizing Clark and eager to get 
him, called to him that unless he came back they 
would shoot Fletcher. Clark realized what sur- 
render meant for him, but satisfied they would exe- 
cute their threat if he refused, he went back and 
gave himself up. 

Clark was lodged in the jail at Fincastle, Virginia. 
He lay there for weary weeks, uncertain what fate 
awaited him, but had good reason to apprehend the 
worst, as it had been freely given out that he would be 
hanged as a spy. Weeks lengthened into months, 
and still the threat was not made good. Some 
friendly influence had interposed and saved his life. 
It was said William P. Cooper, who had been editor 
of the Clarksburg Register, and some other influential 
Secessionists from Clarksburg, who had been the 
prisoner's friends at home, had managed to placate 
the bloody purpose first entertained. 



162 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 

After nearly nine terrible months in the Fineas- 
tle jail, Clark was removed to Richmond and lodged 
in the Belle Isle prison, where for a year he endured 
the privations and hardships of Confederate prison 
life. Here he was freed from the shadow of the gal- 
lows; and whereas solitude had been added to the 
other horrors of his situation at Fincastle, here he 
had at least the comfort afforded by company in his 
misery. 

He was exchanged in the latter part of March, 
1863, and at once returned to Western Virginia, ar- 
riving home a few days after the Jones raid had 
made the circuit of the upper Monongahela valley. 
It was the fortune of the writer to accompany him 
from Wheeling to Clarksburg. He had been in pris- 
ons nearly two years and for many months had liter- 
ally sat under the shadow of death. He looked like 
a man who had come out of the grave — his long 
black hair and beard contrasting with the pallor of 
a face bleached by protracted seclusion from the 
sunlight. He would not talk of what he had gone 
through, and one could not but respect his silence. 
But his spirit was unbroken, and he looked forward 
bravely and hopefully to the work before him. He 
was eager to get back into the service. Gen. Palm- 
er, of Tennessee, who had been a prison mate and 
released by the same exchange, offered him a regi- 
ment if he would go to Tennessee and join his com- 
mand. It was a tempting offer, but Clark's heart was 
set on service in West Virginia. Some friends pressed 
Gov. Peirpoint to give him a colonel's commission. 
The application failed. Many such commissions went 
to less capable and less deserving men. 



The Story of a Scout 163 

Another hardship was added to Clark's overflowing 
cup. In his eagerness to get into the Union service 
when he went on Gen. Morris's staff as a scout, he 
had taken no thought as to pay. The military au- 
thorities were likewise remiss in not having him prop- 
erly enlisted. So that when exchanged, he could get 
no pay for his lost two years, pressing as were the 
needs of his family. 

A statement of the case was furnished by the writ- 
er, after Clark's death — as he now recalls the time 
— to Hon. Chester D. Hubbard at Washington, then 
Congressman from the Wheeling district, and by him 
placed in the hands of a committee to bring in a bill 
for the relief of those entitled to it. Whether any- 
thing was ever done, the writer is now unable to say. 

But nothing could keep Leonard Clark from serv- 
ing the Union cause. His brother-in-law, Capt. Tim. 
Roane, commanded a company in a regiment of 
mounted infantry. Clark attached himself to the 
company and set to work drilling the men. He was 
a magnificent horseman. The cavalry arm was his 
natural place. He had the intrepid qualities, if op- 
portunity had offered, to make a great cavalry leader. 
Thus passed the time in which he shared the for- 
tunes of Capt. Roane's company, holding commission 
as a lieutenant. 

Leonard Clark was killed at Moorefield, Virginia 
(now West Virginia), in August, 1864, in a charge 
against the enemy. Though the writer saw him 
buried, it was more than twenty years later before he 
knew the precise circumstances attending his death. 
These were received from an officer of the regiment 
who was in the field at the time. 



164 Lee's Invasion op Northwest Virginia 

After his exchange, Dr. Fletcher, who was in Belle 
Isle prison when Clark was sent there, visited Clark's 
family and showed them the greatest consideration 
and kindness. The writer of this had long desired to 
get into communication with Dr. Fletcher, who was 
in charge of the Indiana Hospital for the Insane, to 
learn some particulars of his association with Clark 
as a scout on Gen. Morris's staff. Some six years 
ago, a letter of Dr. Fletcher's, with a portrait of 
him, was printed in the Chicago Tribune, relating to 
the effects of cigarette smoking. The writer of this 
immediately wrote the Doctor to ask if he was the 
Dr. Fletcher who had scouted with "Len" Clark 
in the "West Virginia campaign in 1861, and been cap- 
tured with him. A prompt answer came back that 
he was that identical person and had a good picture 
of Clark. It was the intention to write him very 
soon to ask all the particulars it was possible to ob- 
tain in regard to his service with Clark and the cir- 
cumstances of their capture; but before the letter 
could be written, a report came from Indianapolis 
announcing Dr. Fletcher's sudden death. This closed 
the last avenue through which it had been hoped in- 
teresting details of the invaluable services rendered 
the Union cause by Leonard Clark as a scout in the 
campaign of 1861, might be obtained. West Virginia 
sent many brave men to the defense of the Union. 
Perhaps no one of them dared more, toiled more dis- 
interestedly, suffered more, deserved more, and re- 
ceived less reward or recognition, than the subject of 
this sketch. 

Glencoe, Illinois, March, 1911. 



Lee's Invasion of 
Northwest Virginia 

in 1861 

By the author of 

"The Rending of Virginia" 

"Daughter of the Elm" 

"Old Gold" 

etc. 



Printed by a Chicago House 
Published at Glencoe, Illinois 



By mail or express, carriage paid, $ 1 .25 

Send orders to 
A. C. HALL, GLENCOE. ILLINOIS 



The Rending 

Of Virginia A History 

By 
Granville Davisson Hall 



THIS IS A WORK OF ABIDING VALUE. It 
records a chapter of American history from original 
sources. The author, as reporter in the Conventions 
which, at Wheeling, restored and reorganized the Virginia 
government in 1861, preserved the sole record of the 
debates which explain this remarkable proceeding. The 
work embodies a complete history of the Convention at 
Richmond which passed an ordinance of secession, and by 
coup d'etat, not equalled in violence or infamy since 
Louis Napoleon overthrew the French Republic, delivered 
the Old Dominion in chains to the Southern Confederacy. 
It embraces also a chronicle of that Convention written 
especially for its pages, at the age of 87, by one of the ablest 
members of the body, who died recently at the age of 97. 
C. The restoration and rehabilitation of Virginia as a State 
in the Union, and the subsequent creation of an indepen- 
dent State west of the Mountains, are events of the highest 
historical importance. They involve some of the most 
interesting questions that have arisen in American annals. 
These were ably discussed in the recent suit in the U. S. 
Supreme Court for adjustment of the ante-war debt of 
Virginia. In that suit the "Rending" was consulted as an 
authority and privately commended by counsel on both 
sides as "accurate and valuable." 

C This Virginia episode will in time be regarded as, next 
to Emancipation, the most compensatory fruit of the 
Rebellion. No student is well equipped who has not 
given it attention. 



Send orders to 

Price of the book, $2.00. A. C. HALL 

Glencoe, Illinois. 



' 



*B 



239. 




X 















^ °.v 












-A? 





^S V 



^ 



^ 
^ 












oK 






^J> 






***** 




^« 






'^5^K* 



